THE NATIONAL INTEREST

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Janine Wedel

James Billington on the Pope

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Essays & Comments

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Junior Faculty Research Grant Program

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The Smith Richardson Foundation's International Security and Foreign Policy Program is pleased to announce its annual grant competition to support junior faculty research on American foreign policy, international relations, international security, military policy, and diplomatic and military history. The Foundation will award at least three research grants of $60,000 each to support tenure-track junior faculty engaged in the research and writing of a scholarly book on an issue or topic of interest to the policy community. These grants are intended to buy-out up to one year of teaching time and to underwrite research costs (including research assistance and travel). Each grant will be paid directly to, and should be administered by, the academic institution at which the junior faculty member works.

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Living With China

Zbigniew Brzezinski

EURASIAN POLITICS have replaced European politics as the central arena of world affairs. Once European wars became evidently threatening to America, there was no choice for America but to inject itself into European politics in order to prevent new conflicts from erupting or a hostile European hegemony from emerging. Thus America's engagement in world affairs was precipitated during the twentieth century by European politics. Today, it is the interplay of several Eurasian powers that is critical to global stability. Accordingly, America's policy must be transcontinental in its design, with specific bilateral Eurasian relationships woven together into a strategically coherent whole.

It is in this larger Eurasian context that U.S.-China relations must be managed and their importance correctly assessed. Dealing with China should rank as one of Washington's four most important international relationships, alongside Europe, Japan and Russia. The U.S.-China relationship is both consequential and catalytic, beyond its intrinsic bilateral importance. Unlike some other major bilateral relationships that are either particularly beneficial or threatening only to the parties directly involved (America and Mexico, for example), the U.S.-China relationship impacts significantly on the security and policies of other states, and it can affect the overall balance of power in Eurasia.

More specifically, peace in Northeast and Southeast Asia remains dependent to a significant degree on the state of the U.S.-China relationship. That relationship also has enormous implications for U.S.-Japan relations and Japan's definition—for better or worse—of its political and military role in Asia. Last but not least, China's orientation is likely to influence the extent to which Russia eventually concludes that its national interests would best be served by a closer connection with an Atlanticist Europe; or whether it is tempted instead by some sort of an alliance with an anti-American China.

For China, it should be hastily added, the U.S.-China relationship is also of top-rank importance, alongside its relations with Japan, with Russia and with India. In fact, for China the Beijing-Washington interaction is indisputably the most important of the four. It is central to China's future development and well-being. A breakdown in the relationship would prompt a dramatic decline in China's access to foreign capital and technology. Chinese leaders

Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security adviser to the president, is author of *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives* (Basic Books, 1997).

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must carefully take into account that centrally decisive reality whenever they are tempted to pursue a more assertive policy on behalf of their national grievances (such as Taiwan) or more ambitious global aspirations (such as seeking to replace American "hegemony" with "multipolarity").

In essence, then, in the complex American-Chinese equation, Beijing should be prudent lest its larger ambitions collide with its more immediate interests, while Washington must be careful lest its strategic Eurasian interests are jeopardized by tactical missteps in its handling of China.

I. For Historical Clarity

IT FOLLOWS that the United States, in defining its longer term China policy and in responding to the more immediate policy dilemmas, must have a clearly formulated view of what China is, and is not. There is, unfortunately, enormous confusion in America on that very subject. Allegedly informed writings regarding China often tend to be quite muddled, occasionally even verging toward the hysterical extremes. As a result, the image of a malignant China as the inevitably anti-American great power of the 2020s competes in the American public discourse with glimpses of a benign China gently transformed by U.S. investors into an immense Hong Kong. Currently, there is no realistic consensus either among the public or in the Congress regarding China.

In recent years, inconsistency has also characterized the attitude of the U.S. government. It is unfortunately the case that the Clinton administration has been guilty of "vacillation and about-faces on China, often in response to popular and congressional pressure", that the President himself was "not willing to protect U.S.-China relations from tampering by Congress", and that "some in Congress would destroy the relationship if given the opportunity to do so."[1] The presidential mishandling in late spring 1999 of the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations with the Chinese and the persisting inclination of Congress to grandstand on the China issue validate that indictment.

In addition, public perception of China tends to be defined by spectacular symbols that allegedly encapsulate the essence of today's and tomorrow's China. Thus, for many Americans Tiananmen Square and Tibet have come to reflect the central reality of enduring communist oppression and of intensifying national chauvinism. For others, the Chinese economic "miracle", dramatized by the skyscrapers of Shanghai, and by China's growing free-market openness to the world through the Internet, travel, and foreign investment, symbolizes a transforming nation that is progressively shedding its communist veneer. Which China, then, is the real China, and with which China will America clash or cohabit in the years to come?

Having digested much of the available literature on Chinese political, economic and military prospects, and having dealt with the Chinese for almost a quarter of a century, I believe that the point of departure toward an answer has to be the recognition of an obvious but fundamen-

[1]Kenneth Lieberthal, "A New China Strategy", *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 1995). Lieberthal has been a member of the Clinton NSC staff.

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tal reality: China is too big to be ignored, too old to be slighted, too weak to be appeased, and too ambitious to be taken for granted. A major and ancient civilization—encompassing 20 percent of the world's population organized in a historically unique continuity as a single nation-state, and driven simultaneously by a sense of national grievance over perceived (and, in many cases, real) humiliations over the last two centuries, but also by growing and even arrogant self-confidence—China is already a major regional player, though not strong enough to contest at this time either America's global primacy or even its preponderance in the Far Eastern region.

China's military strength, both current and likely over the next decade or so, will not be capable of posing a serious threat to the United States itself, unless China's leaders were to opt for national suicide.[2] The Chinese nuclear force has primarily a deterrent capability. The Chinese military build-up has been steady but neither massive nor rapid, nor technologically very impressive. It is also true, however, that China is capable of imposing on America unacceptable costs in the event that a local conflict in the Far East engages vital Chinese interests but only peripheral American ones. In this sense, China's military power is already regionally significant, and it is growing.

Nonetheless, unlike the former Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China (PRC) is not capable of posing a universal ideological challenge to the United States, especially as its communist system is increasingly evolving into oligarchical nationalist statism with inherently more limited international appeal. It is noteworthy that China is not involved in any significant international revolutionary activities, while its controversial arms exports are driven either by commercial or bilateral state interests. (As such, they are not very different from those of France or Israel, with the latter actually exporting weapons technology to China.)

Moreover, in recent years China's international conduct has been relatively restrained. China did not exercise its veto to halt UN-sanctioned military actions against Iraq over Kuwait. Nor did it block the Security Council's approval of the international protectorate in Kosovo. It approved the deployment of UN peacekeepers in East Timor, and—unlike India in the case of Goa, or Indonesia when it seized East Timor—it peacefully reacquired Hong Kong and more recently Macau. China also acted responsibly during the Asian financial crisis of 1998, for which it was internationally applauded. Last but not least, its current efforts to gain membership of the WTO, whatever the merits or demerits of China's negotiating stance, signal the PRC's growing interest in global multilateral cooperation.

Internal Contradictions

THE PICTURE becomes more mixed when the domestic scene in China is scrutinized and when current Chinese views of the United States are taken into account. China is basically unfinished business. Its communist revolution has run out of steam. Its post-communist reformation has been partially successful, particularly at the urban-industrial-commercial levels, but this has required major doctrinal concessions and compromises. The result is that the Chinese system is a hybrid, with strong residues of communist dogmatism in the industrial sectors and in the state bureaucracy coexisting uneasily with dynamic, capitalist entrepreneurship driven by foreign investment. China's future sys-

[2]See the conclusion drawn by Z.M. Khalilzad et al., "The United States and China: Strategic and Military Implications" (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), p. 59.

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temic orientation is thus yet to be fully defined, but it is already evident that the cohabitation within it of communism and commercialism is inherently contradictory.

The trajectories of China's economic change and of its political evolution are thus parting. At some point, the distance between them will become too wide to sustain. Something, then, will have to give. Moreover, the existing political elite—itself not so young—will soon be replaced by a generation that came to political maturity neither during the Great Leap Forward nor during the Cultural Revolution, both epiphenomena of communist doctrinal exuberance. The emerging political elite matured during Deng Xiaoping's pragmatic upheaval in the Chinese economy, and hence may be more inclined to correct the political trajectory of China's evolution, bringing it closer to the economic trajectory.

The issue of human rights is thus likely to become more acute as the political regime seeks one way or another to close the gap between itself and its evolving socioeconomic context. The constraints on personal political liberty, the denial of religious freedom, and the suppression of minorities—most notably in Tibet—cannot be sustained in a setting of growing social and economic pluralism. The recent efforts to suppress the Falun Gong movement testify to the regime's sense of ideological and political vulnerability. Accordingly, the issue of freedom is bound to become both more critical and more difficult for the existing regime to manage. Indeed, it is almost safe to predict that in the near future—probably within the coming decade—China will experience a serious political crisis.

In any case, whatever its political prospects, China will not be emerging as a global power in the foreseeable future. If that term is to have any real meaning, it must imply cutting-edge superiority of a truly global military capability, significant international financial and economic influence, a clear-cut technological lead, and an appealing social lifestyle—all of which must combine to create worldwide political clout. Even in the most unlikely circumstance of continued rapid economic growth, China will not be top-ranked in any of these domains for many decades to come. What is more, its backward and debilitated social infrastructure, combined with the per capita poverty of its enormous population, represents a staggering liability.

One should note here that some of the current scare-mongering regarding the alleged inevitability of China's emergence as a dominant world power is reminiscent of earlier hysteria regarding Japan's supposedly predestined ascendancy to superpower status. That hysteria was similarly driven by mechanical projections of economic growth rates, without taking into account other complex considerations or unexpected contingencies. The Japanese purchase of Rockefeller Plaza became at one point the symbol of the paranoiac, one-dimensional glimpse into Japan's future.

Be that as it may, China's unsettled domestic scene is likely to reinforce an inherently ambivalent and occasionally antagonistic attitude toward the United States. Though Chinese leaders recognize that they need a stable and even cooperative relationship with the United States if their country is to continue developing, China is no longer America's strategic partner against a threatening Soviet Union. It became so after the Shanghai breakthrough of 1972 and, even more so, after the normalization of relations in 1980, which dramatically transformed a three decade-long adversarial relationship into a decade of strategic cooperation.[3]

[3]The full story of the productive U.S.-China cooperation directed against the Soviet Union (especially in regard to Afghanistan), initiated by the Carter administration and continued under Reagan, still remains to be told.

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Today, with the Soviet Union gone, China is neither America's adversary nor its strategic partner.[4] It could become an antagonist, however, if either China so chooses or America so prompts.

Accentuating the Negative

CURRENTLY, Chinese policy toward the United States is a combination of functional cooperation in areas of specific interest and of a generally adverse definition of America's world role.[5] The latter has prompted Chinese diplomatic initiatives designed to undercut U.S. global leadership. Chinese policy toward Russia is ostentatiously friendly on the rhetorical level, with frequent references to "a strategic partnership." Such is also the case (perhaps not surprisingly) with Sino-French relations, with both sides proclaiming (as, for example, during the October 1999 Paris summit between Presidents Chirac and Jiang) their passionate fidelity to the concept of global "multipolarity"—not a very subtle slam at the disliked American "hegemony."

Indeed, the word "hegemony" has become the favorite Chinese term for defining America's current world role. Chinese public pronouncements and professional journals that deal with international affairs regularly denounce the United States as an overreaching, dominant, arrogant and interventionist power, increasingly reliant on the use of force, and potentially tempted to intervene even in China's internal affairs.

The NATO action in Kosovo precipitated especially a massive outpouring of Chinese allegations that America has embraced the concept of interventionism at the expense of respect for traditional national sovereignty, with dire implications for China. As one alarmed Chinese expert put it:

> Suppose serious anti-Communist Party or anti-government domestic turbulence erupts in China which cannot be quickly brought under control, and, at the same time, the international community commonly joins the anti-China stream. In this case, the hegemonists (perhaps jointly with their allied nations) could launch a military invasion of China.[6]

The above was neither an extreme nor an isolated assertion. Such charges have been accompanied by growing concern that the United States is accelerating and intensifying its efforts to construct an anti-Chinese coalition in the Far East, embracing what is represented as a dangerously rearming Japan, South Korea and also Taiwan, a coalition "that

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[4]It has, of course, become a significant economic partner—the United States' fourth-largest trading partner, in fact. China's bilateral trade with the United States amounted to exports of $62.6 billion and imports of $12.9 billion in 1997. That same year, U.S. foreign direct investment in China was just over $5 billion.

[5]Some top Chinese leaders have even speculated about the possibility of a U.S.-China military collision. In an address to senior PLA cadres, Zhang Wannian, the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, bluntly stated in early 1999 that, "The possibility that a limited war may break out between China and the United States does exist." *Cheng Ming* (Hong Kong monthly), April 1, 1999.

[6]Shi Yinhong, "Scholar on Hegemonistic Interference", *Ta Kung Pao*, July 2, 1999, trans. by Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). More specifically, he warned that "the hegemonists could possibly intervene in China's affairs on the following issues: the Taiwan issue, the Tibet and Xinjiang issue, the South China Sea islands issue, China's internal political system or China's strategic weapons."

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resembles a small NATO of East Asia."[7] American, Japanese and South Korean discussions of possible collaboration against theater missile attacks have intensified these Chinese suspicions. Occasional American and Taiwanese press speculation that Taiwan might be included in such a collective effort has also further aggravated the Chinese, who see it as additional evidence that the United States is increasingly inclined to make permanent the current separation of Taiwan from China.

Perhaps the most striking example of the current Chinese inclination to stress the negative dimensions of the U.S.-China relationship is the attempt to provide a deeper intellectual or cultural rationalization for the seemingly intensifying antagonism. The Chinese-owned Hong Kong daily, *Ta Kung Pao*, published a major editorial entitled "On the Cultural Roots of Sino-U.S. Conflict" in September 1999, advancing the thesis that "the conflict between Chinese and American civilizations is at a deeper level one between sacred and secular lifestyles." Amazingly for a nominally communist regime, it is China that is said to represent the former: "Chinese civilization has always stressed an integration of heaven with man." This identity is said to contrast sharply with "the consumerist and hedonist mode of behavior that grew out of American Civilization", making Americans "look down on Oriental Civilization, holding that it is backward and ignorant." The policy inference that was drawn from the foregoing was stark: "in China-U.S. relations, it will be absolutely impossible to permanently resolve conflicts of political views in areas such as human rights, democracy, and freedom."[8]

To be sure, the foregoing views are in part instrumental, for they are also meant to serve the current Chinese efforts to put America on the ideological defensive. They do not define for Beijing the overall character of the U.S.-China relationship. Since China seeks to reduce the scope of America's global preponderance (and its resulting leverage on China), it needs some sort of a doctrinal legitimation for controlled antagonism; yet China also wants to retain for itself, for obvious reasons of domestic self-interest, the vital benefits of collaboration with America. Striking a balance between the two is not easy, especially given the fact that China's communist leaders have not found an effective substitute for their previous Marxist world-view. That central reality imposes a severe restraint on Chinese anti-American proclivities.

Hence, U.S.-China military links are being preserved, economic ties enhanced and political relations kept relatively congenial—even while "multipolarity" is hailed and "hegemony" condemned in joint declarations with Moscow, Paris and whoever else cares to join. The result is a confused amalgam, involving communist terminology and Chinese nationalist sentiments. That mishmash reflects the ambivalent position in which the Chinese leadership finds itself both at home and at large, given the unresolved ambiguities of Chinese domestic and foreign policy.

Doubtless, China's leaders, generally intelligent and hardheaded, sense that inherent ambiguity. They must realize that Paris, rhetoric aside, will not join in

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[7]Ding Sheng, "The New Clinton Doctrine", *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi*, August 20, 1999, trans. by FBIS. An authoritative discussion of the alleged American plans to dominate Eurasia strategically, and to exploit to that end its various ethnic problems, is contained in an analysis of U.S.-Russia relations by Lu Zhongwei, "International Security Environment Goes Through Changes", *Beijing Review*, August 23, 1999.

[8]"On Cultural Roots of the Sino-U.S. Conflict", *Ta Kung Pao*, September 21, 1999, trans. by FBIS.

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some fanciful Beijing-Moscow-Paris anti-American coalition. They have to know that Russia does not have much to offer to China, except perhaps some technologically not very advanced military equipment. Ultimately, they have to understand—and their conduct reflects that they do—that at this historical juncture the relationship with the United States is central to China's future. Outright hostility is simply not in China's interest.

The foregoing points toward a further observation. China today, in relationship to the wider international system, is neither the militarist Japan of the 1930s nor the ideologically and strategically threatening Soviet Union of the 1950s–70s. Though all analogies, by definition, are partially misleading, there are some important parallels between China's current situation and imperial Germany's circa 1890. At that time, German policy was in flux, while Germany itself was a rising power. Like today's China, Germany's ambitions were driven by a resentment of a perceived lack of recognition and respect (in the case of Germany, especially on the part of a haughty British Empire, and in the case of today's China, on the part of an arrogant America), by fears of encirclement by a confining and increasingly antagonistic coalition, by rising nationalistic ambitions on the part of its predominantly young population, and by the resulting desire to precipitate a significant rearrangement in the global pecking order.

One will never know with any certainty whether the European war of 1914, a quarter of a century later, could have been avoided by wiser policy in the 1890s. Similarly, one cannot be certain about which direction China will head over the next quarter of a century. However, already at this stage it should be self-evident which prospect is to be avoided. For America, that requires a strategically clear-headed management of the sensitive issue of Taiwan and, even more so, of the longer range task of fitting China into a wider and more stable Eurasian equilibrium.

What China Is and Is Not: A Decalogue

1. China is neither an international adversary nor a strategic partner of the United States, though it is hostile to perceived U.S. "hegemony."
2. China is not going to become a global power, though it is a regional power capable of asserting its national interests.
3. China is not a direct security threat to the United States.
4. China does not pose a global ideological challenge to the United States.
5. China is not regionally destabilizing and is in fact behaving internationally in a relatively responsible fashion.
6. China is neither totalitarian nor democratic politically but an oligarchic-bureaucratic dictatorship.
7. China is not in compliance with universal standards of human rights and of tolerance for minorities in places such as Tibet or Xinjiang.
8. China is evolving economically in a desirable direction.
9. China is not likely to avoid serious domestic political strains because commercial communism is an oxymoron.
10. China does not have a clear vision of its political evolution or of its international role.

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II. For Strategic Proportionality

The Taiwan Question

FOR AMERICA, Taiwan is a problem; China is the challenge. Taiwan complicates U.S.-China relations, but it is U.S.-China relations that will determine in large measure the degree of stability or instability in the Far East and, more generally, in Eurasia. Admittedly, how the Taiwan issue is handled will influence—and in some circumstances could even determine—the evolution of U.S.-China relations. But, except for its impact on those relations, the status of Taiwan itself is not a central international concern.

Still, it is important to take both history and strategy into account when addressing the sensitive and volatile issue of Taiwan's relationship with the mainland. That issue is a direct legacy of China's civil war. It is also an unresolved legacy, for Taiwan's separate existence reminds that neither side involved in the civil war succeeded in totally eliminating the other. Though one side won by gaining control over the mainland, and thus over the vast majority of the Chinese population, the losing side still preserved itself not only as a political entity but also as a potential political alternative, even though entrenched on a relatively small island inhabited by only 2 percent of China's people.

That Taiwan succeeded in preserving its independence from the side that emerged victorious in the Chinese civil war has been due mainly to the United States. America, though indirectly, continued to be involved in that war even after its termination on the mainland in 1949. It both protected and bolstered Taiwan. Episodic military clashes in the Taiwan Strait occurred until the *de facto* suspension of the civil war in the 1970s—a suspension attained by direct U.S.-China talks initiated under President Nixon and later formalized through the normalization of U.S.-China relations under President Carter.[9] The resulting arrangement was genuinely creative, for it enabled the winning side to acquiesce to the *de facto* partition of China as the transitional outcome of the civil war without accepting it as a permanent *de jure* reality.

That sensible accommodation was made possible by the acceptance on both sides of the intricate formula whereby (1) the United States acknowledged that in the view both of the mainland and of Taiwan there is only one China; and (2) the United States affirmed that it expects the issue of reunification to be resolved peacefully (and that U.S. national interest would be engaged if it should be otherwise); whereas (3) the Chinese reiterated that reunification is an internal Chinese matter, to be attained by whatever means China deems appropriate, though their preference is also for a peaceful resolution.

Once that hurdle had been traversed it followed that the officially recognized government of China had to be the one that governs 98 percent of the Chinese people. And it also followed that Taiwan could not be recognized as a separate "sovereign" state, though the United States could maintain practical and functional ties with it. Such ties were then for-

[9] An unusually candid presidential account of how normalization was effected is provided in Jimmy Carter, "The Real China Story", *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 1999).

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mally legislated by the U.S. Congress in the "Taiwan Relations Act" of 1980, which regularized U.S. relations with Taiwan without defining it as a sovereign state. In effect, the outcome of the great bargain preserved the formal unity of China while practically respecting the current reality of a separate status for Taiwan.

That arrangement has proven to be a blessing for Taiwan, while simultaneously permitting the development of extensive U.S.-China ties. Taiwan's resulting prosperity hardly needs documenting. It has blossomed both as an economic miracle and as a democracy in the more secure setting of abated Sino-American tensions, of continued U.S. arms sales, and of the openly proclaimed U.S. stake in a peaceful Taiwan Strait. Taiwan's success has also provided stunning and encouraging evidence for the proposition that democracy and Chinese culture are compatible, an example that has significant long-term implications for the future evolution of mainland China.

Taiwan has not only prospered economically and flowered politically but has become a respected and active participant in various international organizations. For example, it is a full member of the Asian Development Bank, APEC and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, and is currently seeking access to the WTO. It maintains regular economic, technological and cultural ties with more than 140 states with which it does not have formal diplomatic relations.

An even more impressive testimonial to the benefits accruing from the U.S.-China normalization of relations has been the actual pacification of the Taiwan Strait. In contrast to the sporadic clashes that used to occur prior to normalization, there has been a massive flow of capital and people across the hitherto separating water.[10] These socioeconomic ties, in turn, have permitted the emergence of an informal but serious dialogue between representatives of the respective authorities.

Lee's Unilateralism

THAT informal accommodation was jeopardized in the second half of 1999 by the unilateral redefinition of Taiwan's relationship to the mainland, abruptly launched by the Taiwanese authorities. In a highly publicized interview, President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan suddenly abandoned the "One China" formula, redefining the Taiwan-mainland relationship as involving "state-to-state relations." The import of the new formulation was self-evident: one China was brusquely redefined as two separate states. Moreover, Lee in a subsequent statement insisted that the inhabitants of Taiwan have acquired a "fresh national identity based on the New Taiwanese consciousness."[11]

Lee's initiative was launched without any prior consultations with the United States. It was immediately followed, however, by stepped-up efforts by Taiwanese supporters in the United States, encouraged by a well-financed Taiwan lobby, to induce the U.S. government, through congressional pressure, to take a stand in support of Taiwanese "sovereignty."[12]

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[10]It is estimated that up to 200,000 Taiwanese businessmen now work in the PRC, with Taiwanese investments in mainland China now well in excess of $20 billion, and another $25 billion planned. The PRC is now Taiwan's third-largest trade partner, following the United States and Japan.

[11]Lee Teng-hui, "Understanding Taiwan", *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 1999).

[12]The notion of a "sovereign" Taiwan was explicitly postulated in a public statement issued by a group of conservative foreign policy experts, some of whom play an active role in the ongoing presidential campaign. (Heritage Foundation press release, August 24, 1999.)

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Various supporters of Taiwan also launched a public campaign alleging a growing Chinese military threat to Taiwan, urging particularly the Republican presidential candidates to support the so-called "Taiwan Security Enhancement Act", introduced earlier in the year in the U.S. Congress. That proposed act aimed at nothing less than the *de facto* revival of the 1955 Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China (terminated following the U.S. recognition of the People's Republic of China), with its specific and non-discretionary provisions designed to restore Taiwan as a U.S. military ally against China.

It should be noted that these alarmist pressure tactics disregarded the fact that the PRC currently lacks, and in the foreseeable future will not have, the airlift and sealift capability to effect a successful 120-mile, cross-strait amphibious invasion. One need only recall the enormous difficulty of the Normandy landings in 1944 across the narrower English channel, in spite of overwhelming allied air and naval supremacy as well as the relative weakness of the German forces. In contrast, the Taiwanese ground forces that would be resisting any landing communist forces are relatively better armed and more mobile. Taiwan also has the means to contest PRC efforts to assert air and naval superiority in the Taiwan Strait.

It is also noteworthy that the U.S. secretary of defense, in an assessment issued in February 1999, concluded that only "by 2005, the PLA [People's Liberation Army] will possess the capability to attack Taiwan with air and missile strikes which would degrade key military facilities and damage the island's economic infrastructure."[13] Even then, the acquisition of such a capability would not mean that the PRC could execute an effective invasion. One must also take into account Taiwan's capacity to retaliate effectively by striking or mining China's major ports, thereby cutting China's trade links with the entire world.

In any case, whatever may have been Mr. Lee's motives in publicly venting the formula of "state-to-state relations", there was no pressing security need for his unilateral initiative. Hence the question: *cui bono?* Since the Taiwanese leadership had to know that it would complicate U.S.-China relations and generate new tensions in the Taiwan Strait, one has to assume that the initiative was taken (at least in part) on the calculation that any U.S.-China military confrontation, even if provoked by Taiwan, would work to Taiwan's political advantage.

For the United States, acquiescence to the new formulation and passage of the proposed "Taiwan Security Enhancement Act"[14] would mean that Taiwan has been granted nothing short of a *carte blanche* to redefine its status as it wishes, with the United States obligated to defend the island, come what may. It would amount to a *de facto* unconditional guarantee of U.S. protection for whatever provocative step Taiwan might take, including even a formal secession from China, and thus it would be a repudiation of prior U.S.-China undertakings. It is also important to note that in any ensuing hostilities in the Taiwan Strait, the United States would find itself altogether isolated internationally.

For China, the proposed U.S. legislation would signal America's re-engagement in the Chinese civil war, while Beijing's acquiescence to the new "state-to-state" formulation would mean the formal acceptance of the permanent partition of China. Neither is a palatable choice for Beijing. It would also mean that, in the eyes of the Chinese, the

[13]William S. Cohen, "The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait", Report to the Congress pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1999).

[14]The House passed a modified version of the act in February.

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grand bargain with the United States had been exploited by Washington, first to consolidate Taiwan, and then to transform a separatist Taiwan into a permanent U.S. protectorate. No current Chinese leader could accept such an outcome and normal relations between the United States and the PRC would thereby be jeopardized.

The Clinton administration was, therefore, fully justified in repudiating the new Taiwanese formula and in reassuring Beijing that previous U.S.-China understandings remained in force. For some time to come, Washington will have no choice but to navigate carefully between the risk inherent in any unconditional assurances to Taiwan's security and the obligation to discourage any Chinese attempt at coercive unification. Perhaps an additional bilateral Washington-Beijing clarification regarding Taiwan might be helpful if it were to involve a clear-cut Chinese commitment (expressed, naturally, as a unilateral Chinese decision) never to use force in order to achieve national unity, matched by a simultaneous—and similarly "independent"—U.S. commitment to terminate all arms sales to Taiwan if it should formally declare itself to have seceded from China. However, even then, the U.S.-China relationship would still remain vulnerable to disruption because of the unresolved and always sensitive issue of Taiwan's future. That is why it is unlikely that either side would be willing to exchange such mutual assurances.

Democracy: The Essential Condition

ULTIMATELY, the issue of Taiwan will be determined primarily by what happens in China itself. A China that fails to evolve politically, or that flounders socially—not to speak of a China that regresses ideologically—will not attract Taiwan. Nor will it intimidate Taiwan, for the United States will continue to have a tangible national interest in the prevention of warfare in the Taiwan Strait. It follows that Taiwan will, and should, continue to have prudently measured access to the necessary U.S. military wherewithal for self-defense.

In contrast, a successfully developing and progressively democratizing China may eventually be able to reach some practical arrangement with Taiwan. It might do so by enlarging the "one country, two systems" formula (currently applied to Hong Kong) to "one country, several systems."

The "one country, two systems" formula was unveiled, with considerable publicity, by Deng Xiaoping during my meeting with him in Beijing in 1984. It was explicitly designed to accommodate Taiwan. In 1997, during a visit to Taiwan, I used the phrase "one country, several systems", having in mind—in addition to China—Hong Kong, Macau and perhaps eventually Taiwan. In an interview with the London *Times* (October 18, 1999), President Jiang tantalizingly observed, in speaking of "the main objectives for China *by the middle of the next century*", that, "We will ultimately resolve the question of Taiwan and accomplish the great cause of national reunification by adhering to the policy of '*peaceful reunification* and one country, two systems' after the successful return of Hong Kong and Macao." (The italicized passages [my emphasis] clearly hint at historical patience.)

At this stage, it is not possible to be more precise, but Taiwanese spokesmen are generally correct in postulating that China's democratization is the practical precondition for any arrangement that may approximate (and eventually become) reunification. It thus follows that the real strategic challenge for the United States—more important than the issue of Taiwan—pertains to China's evolution,

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both in its domestic politics and especially with regard to the global mindset of its ruling elite.

That evolution can be subtly influenced from the outside, even if a democratic transformation of China cannot be so imposed. Positive change in China will come, in the main, from socioeconomic pressures, unleashed (in part, unintentionally) by the ruling elite's otherwise rational economic reforms. Their cumulative effect, especially because of modern mass communications, is inherently incompatible with enduring political repression. In that context, the cause of human rights can be, and should be, deliberately supported from the outside, even at the cost of some friction with China's rulers.

China, however, is not America's client state. Nor does it pose a global ideological challenge like the former Soviet Union, in which case it was useful to put that country on the defensive by making human rights into a major issue. Indeed, a policy of sustained ideological confrontation with China is more likely to delay desired changes by stimulating more overt regressive reactions from an increasingly insecure political elite. Given the ongoing changes within China, including its evident trend toward more openness to the world, the promotion of human rights in the country is likely to be more effective if pursued with deliberate indirection.

For example, extensive programs to assist the Chinese in embracing the rule of law are bound to have a significant democratizing impact. Indeed, as the negative experience of post-Soviet Russia shows, loud emphasis on electoral democracy can prove to be self-deceptive. In contrast, the institutionalized spread of the rule of law can create enduring foundations for genuine democratization while enhancing the prospects for a functioning market economy. Since the ruling elite finds the latter to be in its interest, the propagation of the rule of law is both politically easier and in the long run more effective.

Similarly, the development of functional assistance to local officials, who in increasing numbers are subject to election, should be a major focus of an enlightened but not strident program on behalf of human rights. The stronger and more democratic the local government, the weaker the central controls. Yet here, too, the top political elite is susceptible to seductive co-optation since it realizes that an effective local government is necessary for successful modernization. Human rights can thus be piggy-backed onto China's own domestic ambitions. The U.S. Congress would be well-advised to bear the above strictures in mind, while providing more support for various nongovernmental organizations engaged in helping the Chinese to develop a genuine civil society.

The matter of Tibet is more intractable, especially since a strategy of indirection is not responsive to the more immediate grievances of the Tibetan people. Hence, on this issue a public stance of disapproval is unavoidable. At some point, the Chinese government may conclude that the costs to China's reputation are too high, and that some creative application of the "one country, several systems" formula would provide a more constructive solution to what is clearly a major violation of established international norms for the treatment of ethnic minorities. Direct talks with the Dalai Lama would represent a significant step in the right direction, and continued U.S. support for the Tibetan people is thus in order.

The Japan Factor

EFFECTIVE management of these delicate issues is more likely if the United States sustains a policy that progressively enhances the Chinese stake in a peaceful

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Northeast Asia and in a constructive Chinese role in a stable Eurasian power equilibrium. Only in that larger context can the salience of the Taiwan issue eventually be subsumed and the formula of a democratic and prosperous China as "one country with several systems" become reality. Moreover, just as the United States could not have conducted a successful policy toward the Soviet Union without simultaneously calibrating most carefully its relations with Europe, so American policy toward China must also be, almost by definition, a triangular policy, shaped with Japan very much in mind.

China is especially sensitive to anything pertaining to Japan and its changing international role. China views Japan both as a historic rival and as an extension of U.S. power. The character and scope of the U.S.-Japan alliance is hence a matter of the utmost importance to Beijing. And, not surprisingly, the Japanese are similarly preoccupied with China and its relationship with the United States. Particularly striking was the observation by Democratic Party of Japan President Yukio Hatoyama that, "We should make more efforts to reinforce China's confidence in Japan because we are not certain what the future holds for U.S.-China relations." Hatoyama added: "It cannot completely be ruled out that Washington and Beijing will not compete with each other over hegemony. Thus, it is potentially somewhat dangerous to consider it safe to always side with the United States." It is no exaggeration to say that whether Japan remains primarily allied with America, or instead arms itself and acts largely on its own in Asia, will be predominantly determined by how well or badly the United States handles its relations with China.[15]

The consequences of this triangular reality cut two ways. For China, the key implication is that Beijing would be wise to exercise self-restraint in its anti-American "hegemony" campaign. It could backfire badly for China. Overheated Chinese rhetoric about an anti-American coalition with Russia (and perhaps also with India) might prompt even stronger pressures in America on behalf of an anti-Chinese, U.S.-led alliance embracing not only Japan and South Korea but even Taiwan. Some in America might also advocate a strategic counter toward India, on the grounds that India is wary of China and that it shares America's democratic credentials. The Chinese should also be aware that latent but ingrown anti-Chinese sentiments, once given the opportunity, could quickly come to dominate Japanese politics.

In fact, anti-Chinese sentiments in Japan, especially in its foreign policy establishment, are visibly on the rise. In the words of Nobuo Miyamato, the Director of the Nomura Research Council,

> even though a joint declaration by Japan and China talks about a 'friendly and cooperative partnership', Japan and China will not be able to extricate themselves from a relationship of political and strategic competition for the next 50-100 years.[16]

Open Sino-American hostility would most likely spur an intense arms race between Japan and China, to the detriment of both the stability of, and the American position in, the Far East. Though neither America nor Japan can exclude the possibility that China may, indeed, become a threat—and hence their alliance is also a form of insurance—it is

[15]For a revealing discussion of Japan's relationship with China and the United States conducted by leading Japanese officials, see "Seeking True Independence, et al." (in Japanese), *Yomiuri Shimbun*, January 11, 2000.

[16]*Chuo Koron* (February 1999), p. 247, trans. by FBIS.

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neither in America's nor in Japan's interest to precipitate that threat. Hence an anti-Chinese alliance with a rearmed Japan should be America's last, and not first, strategic option.

Accordingly, for America the key implication is that the United States has to be very deliberate in balancing the inevitable readjustment in U.S.-Japan defense cooperation, pointing toward an enhanced international security role for Japan, with the imperative of sensitivity for Chinese concerns. The Chinese are convinced that Japan is irrevocably committed to significant remilitarization and that its sharp edge is pointed at China. The Chinese press very deliberately plays up any Japanese statements that can be construed as anti-Chinese. Thus even the most authoritative Chinese newspaper went into paroxysms of anger when the newly elected governor of Tokyo, Ishihara Shintaro—known also for his attacks on the United States—referred to Taiwan as Japan's "peripheral state."[17] The United States, therefore, must be especially careful to make certain that a more militarily powerful Japan is fully integrated into a larger cooperative security system in Northeast Asia and is not poised primarily as America's anti-Chinese ally.

It follows also that increasing U.S.-Japan security cooperation in the Far East should be designed in a manner that does not mimic NATO's originally overt focus on the Soviet Union's aggressive intentions. For the present, China does not have the capacity for genuinely serious regional aggression. Accordingly, ongoing U.S.-Japan-South Korea defense planning as well as joint exercises should avoid an overtly anti-Chinese cast. In addition, China should be included, as much as possible, in the emerging multilateral dialogue regarding regional security. It has taken years, and much American effort, to precipitate serious three-way U.S.-Japan-South Korea military discussions. Some four-way U.S.-Japan-China-South Korea defense consultations have also been initiated, and these may become gradually more formal. The key point to bear in mind here is that regional security in Northeast Asia is not a zero-sum game; how China is treated might well become a self-fulfilling prophesy.

The politically sensitive issue of Theater Missile Defense (TMD) is very germane to the above comments. Handled well, a TMD system could be regionally stabilizing; handled badly, it could spark intense U.S.-China hostility while setting off in Japan a polarizing and destabilizing debate over Japan's relations with the United States and with China. Accordingly, two important precautions are in order. The first is that no regional U.S.-Japan-South Korea TMD should include Taiwan either formally or through direct deployment. Taiwan can be *de facto* covered by a TMD located on U.S. naval platforms, thereby avoiding the Chinese charge that the United States is reverting by the back door to a formal defense arrangement with Taiwan. Secondly, consultations with the Chinese regarding any eventual missile system should be held on the same basis as proposed to Russia. There is no compelling reason to treat China differently.

More generally, it is also important to make the utmost effort to stimulate a comprehensive strategic dialogue with China regarding not only the security of Northeast Asia but of Eurasia more generally. Whenever possible, it should be a triangular dialogue, involving also the Japanese. Appropriate subjects should include the future of Russia (a topic rarely discussed in depth with the Chinese—yet of vital importance to China, given its far larger population, rapidly growing economy, and the

[17] See "Ishihara's Antics Worth High Vigilance", *Renmin Ribao*, November 17, 1999, trans. by FBIS.

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emptiness of the neighboring Russian Far East[18]), the status of the Central Asian states (with their energy resources being of great interest to both China and Japan), stability in Southeast Asia, and the unstable relationship between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. Developing and institutionalizing such a dialogue, and especially making it truly trilateral, will require a major effort and much time, but promoting it should be viewed as a high U.S. strategic priority.

Over time, a successful three-way dialogue, as well as a cooperative (and not unilateral) approach to the TMD issue, may foster a greater Chinese inclination to resolve peacefully the division of Korea. That division, the last major unresolved territorial-political legacy of the Cold War, is increasingly anomalous. However, its constructive resolution requires not only China's assent but its actual participation. That participation will become more likely when China begins to view itself as part of a larger security scheme in the Far East in which America and Japan are not perceived as its potential adversaries.

A three-way strategic dialogue could in turn pave the way for a broader Eurasian security forum, spanning America, Europe, Russia, China and Japan. The west of the Eurasian continent is already highly organized through NATO and the EU, and these integrated structures overlap with Eurasia's volatile "middle zone" through the fifty-four member Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which includes Russia and the Central Asian states. In the east, institutionalized security cooperation involves only the formal U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korea treaties as well as the informal Japan-South Korea consultations. China is not formally engaged, and there is no equivalent to the loosely cooperative OSCE. At the very least, a serious five-way strategic dialogue might prompt the redefinition of the letter E in OSCE from "European" to "Eurasian" through the inclusion in an expanded and redefined OSCE of a dozen or so Asian states.

Dealing China In

THE TASK OF assimilating China into a wider Eurasian equilibrium has to be pursued on other fronts as well. In addition to shaping a more sustained triangular relationship with China and Japan, China's accession to the WTO and the regularization of normal trade relations between the United States and China would be significant steps in the gradual integration of China into the world economy. Much the same applies to the question of China's inclusion in the G-8 (which I have been advocating for more than three years). The G-8 summit has become a hybrid, neither a forum for the democracies nor a conclave of the most advanced economies. That dual formula was compromised by the politically expedient decision to include Russia, hardly an advanced economy and questionably a democracy. Similar political expediency, therefore, should dictate the inclusion of the economically much more dynamic China, with the G-9 thereby becoming a more genuine global power forum. That would propitiate China's quest for status while also enhancing its stake in the emerging global system.

In some respects, China's international behavior is already no worse, and may

[18]Both the Russians and the Chinese are very sensitive to the demographic realities prevailing in Eurasia's eastern extremities. The population of Manchuria alone is 102.3 million and the density per square kilometer is 168. The total population of the four adjacent Russian regions is 6.1 million, with a population density of only 5.3 per square kilometer.

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be even better, than India's. New Delhi over the years backed various forms of Soviet aggression, went to war with its neighbors more often than China, flaunted its disregard for nuclear non-proliferation, used force to resolve some colonial legacies such as Goa, has been careless of human rights in Kashmir, and has proved no less obstreperous than China in the WTO negotiations. Yet no leading presidential candidate in America has labeled India as America's major "competitor", as was the case with China in late 1999. Obviously, India's democratic credentials give its external ambitions a more benign cast, but the comparison with India—like China a very poor, developing, but also politically aspiring power—should help to place in perspective the somewhat overheated fears of China.

Still, it is important to reiterate that China is unlikely to become America's strategic partner again in the manner that it was during the decade starting with the late 1970s. The most that can reasonably be expected, barring a serious domestic or international crisis, is that China will gradually become an increasingly cooperative player in the international "game", in which the major participants play according to shared rules even while each keeps his own score. As a major regional player, China will occasionally collide with the United States, but it is also likely to find that its long-run interests are better served by observing common standards. China may thus become neither a formal ally nor a declared enemy of America but an important participant in the evolving international system, increasingly meeting

Ten Basic Principles and Premises for U.S.-China Relations

1. The future orientation of China, and not the future of Taiwan, should be America's central strategic concern.
2. An anti-Chinese defense arrangement with Taiwan should not be indirectly revived, and U.S. arms sales should be carefully calibrated in relation to the state of U.S.-China relations and PRC capabilities.
3. Peaceful reunification can be promoted only by a democratizing and increasingly prosperous PRC on the basis of a "one country, several systems" formula.
4. Respect for human rights in China should be fostered by a policy of indirection focused on the benefits of the rule of law.
5. The U.S.-China-Japan relationship is highly interactive, in a manner reminiscent of the U.S.-European-Soviet relationship.
6. The United States should promote a trilateral strategic dialogue with China and Japan regarding the security of Eurasia.
7. A pre-emptive anti-Chinese defense coalition, based on TMD, could become a self-fulfilling prophecy of a hostile China.
8. The OSCE should be expanded to include Asia, following five-way security talks involving the United States, Europe, Russia, China and Japan.
9. The G-8 should be enlarged to G-9 by the inclusion of the PRC.
10. The ultimate U.S. goal should be a China that evolves into a genuinely vested partner in an increasingly cooperative Eurasian system.

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and grudgingly accepting more and more of that system's conventions.

Such an internationally more cooperative China will have an important geostrategic effect on Eurasia. Given Russia's evident fears of China's larger economy and population, such a China will be much more likely to push Moscow toward the Atlanticist Europe than a China that is antagonistic toward the United States. At the same time, such a China will reinforce Japan's stake in a stable alliance with America without frightening Tokyo either into rapid rearmament or into divisive tensions with the United States.

It follows that the central strategic task of U.S. policy toward China should be nothing less than the attainment of a fundamental, truly historic shift in the mindset of the Chinese elite: to view China no longer as the self-isolated Middle Kingdom, or as the Celestial Empire, or as the aggrieved victim, or as the world's revolutionary center—but, more prosaically, as a vested partner in Eurasian stability and as a key player in the global system. □

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

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Tainted Transactions

Harvard, the Chubais Clan and Russia's Ruin

Janine R. Wedel

ONLY A FEW years ago, American policymakers were confidently predicting that a regimen of privatization and market reform would in due course transform Russia into a stable and prosperous democracy. America would smooth this transition and U.S. aid—unselfish and urgent—would serve as a "bridge", enabling representatives from both sides to implement their respective agendas. Pictures of "Bill" and "Boris" embracing and beaming at the camera symbolized the promise of a new era in U.S.-Russia relations, one that bore little resemblance to the preceding decades of Cold War acrimony.

Today all that has passed away. Far from fulfilling their promise of a better life, the U.S.-sponsored "reforms" of the 1990s have left many, if not most, Russians worse off.[1] For this state of affairs many Russians today blame precisely the Western aid and advice they have received.[2] Some, indeed, believe that the United States set out *deliberately* to destroy their economy.

How did the United States, by far the dominant partner in the relationship, allow one of the most promising rapprochements of the last century to founder? Rather than proceeding on the basis of common sense and well-established modes of representation between states, it acted upon an ideology implemented through a most dubious mode of conducting relations between nations. The ideology—that of radical privatization and marketization, applied in this instance in a cold-turkey manner to a society with no recent experience of either—is well known. The way in which advice and aid were given is much less familiar, but it is a vital part of the story.

It is necessary to give this distinctive way of conducting business a name, and, drawing on my experience as an anthropologist, I shall call it "transactorship."[3] By "transactors", then, I shall mean players in a small, informal group who work together for mutual gain, while formally representing different parties. Even though transactors may genuinely share the stated goals of the parties they represent, they have additional goals and ways of operating of their own. These may, advertently or inadvertently, subvert or subordinate the aims of those for whom they ostensibly act. The behavior of members of such groups is marked by extreme flexibility and a readiness to exchange roles, even to the extent

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of representing parties other than the ones to which they are formally attached.

In what follows, I shall show that during the 1990s the cozy manner in which American advisers and Russian representatives—that is, the transactors—interacted and the outcomes of their activities ran directly counter to the stated aims of the U.S. aid program in Russia. Specifically, those goals were to foster economic development and democratization and to nurture friendly bilateral relations. As a new decade begins, key transactors in this program are under investigation for money laundering, corruption and other criminal activities—the consequences of their undeclared goals.

Transactorship, as it applies in the U.S.-Russia relationship over the last decade, involves individuals, institutions and groups whose official status is difficult to establish. Indeed, nearly everything about transactors is ambiguous. Their sphere of activity is neither fixedly public nor private, neither firmly political nor economic; their activities are neither fully open nor completely hidden and conspiratorial; and the transactors are not exclusively committed to one side or the other. This malleability affords them enormous flexibility, which in turn enhances their influence on all sides. Alas, it is also what has sabotaged the once high hopes for a new era in U.S.-Russia relations.

The Emergence of Transactorship

HOW IN the case of Russia and the United States did the transactors come together to be designated as the bridge builders from their respective sides? As the vast Soviet state was collapsing in late 1991, Harvard professors Jeffrey Sachs, Andrei Shleifer and others participated in meetings at a *dacha* outside Moscow. There, young would-be Russian "reformers" were in the process of devising a blueprint for economic and political change. The key Russians present at the *dacha* were the economists Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais. These meetings occurred at the time when Boris Yeltsin, then president of what was still Soviet Russia, was putting together his team of economic advisers. Gaidar would become the first "architect" of economic "reform" in post-communist Russia. A long-standing group of associates from St. Petersburg, centered around Chubais, was to figure prominently in Yeltsin's team. Indeed, Chubais would go on to replace Gaidar, and to become an indispensable aide to Yeltsin.

While at the *dacha*, Sachs, his associate Anders Åslund and several other Westerners offered their services to the Russians, including that of facilitating access to Western money—an offer the Russians accepted. In the ensuing months and years the members of the Harvard and Chubais teams saw to it that *they* became the designated representatives for their respective sides—and transactors in the sense I have described. On the American side, representatives from the Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID) would provide the theory and advice to reinvent the Russian economy.

Maintaining that Russian economic reform was so important, and the "window of opportunity" to effect change so narrow, U.S. policymakers granted the Harvard Institute special treatment. Between 1992 and 1997, the Institute received $40.4 million from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in non-competitive grants, and—until USAID suspended its funding in May 1997—had been slated to receive another $17.4 million. Harvard-connected officials in the Clinton administration, citing "foreign policy" considerations, largely bypassed the normal public bidding process required for foreign aid contracts. The waivers to competition were backed by friends of the Harvard Institute group, especially in the

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U.S. Treasury.[4] Approving such a large sum of money mostly as non-competitive amendments to a much smaller award (the Harvard Institute's original award was $2.1 million) was highly unusual, according to U.S. government procurement officers and U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) officials, including Louis H. Zanardi, who later spearheaded GAO's investigation of HIID activities in Russia and Ukraine. Indeed, the U.S. government delegated virtually its entire Russian economic aid portfolio—more than $350 million—for management by the Harvard Institute. The Institute was also provided the legal authority to manage other contractors (some of whom were its competitors), leaving it in the unique position of recommending U.S. aid policies while being itself a chief recipient of that aid. In 1996 the GAO found that the Harvard Institute had "substantial control of the U.S. assistance program."[5] According to U.S. government procurement officers and GAO officials, delegating so much aid to a private entity was unprecedented.

In Russia, the Harvard representatives worked exclusively with Anatoly Chubais and the circle around him, which came to be known as the Chubais Clan.[6] The interests of the Harvard Institute group and those of the Chubais Clan soon became one and the same. Their members became known for their loyalty to each other and for the unified front they projected to the outside world.[7] By mid-1993, the Harvard-Chubais players had formed an informal and extremely influential transactor group that was shaping the direction and consequences of U.S. economic aid and much Western economic policy toward Russia.

Providing pivotal support to the Harvard-Chubais transactors was Lawrence Summers, earlier a member of the Harvard faculty and at this time chief economist at the World Bank. Summers had strong ties to the Harvard team, including Shleifer, the economist who served as project director of the Harvard Institute's program in Russia.[8] Soon, Summers would play a principal role in designing U.S. and international economic policies at the U.S. Treasury, where he would occupy the posts of undersecretary, then deputy secretary and, finally, secretary.

The Chubais transactors advertised themselves, and were advertised by their promoters, as the "Young Reformers." The Western media promoted their mystique and overlooked other reform-minded groups in Russia.[9] Western donors tended to identify Russians as reformers not on the basis of their commitment to the free market but because they possessed personal attributes to which the Westerners responded favorably: proficiency in the English language; a Western look; an ability to parrot the slogans of "markets", "reform" and "democracy"; and name recognition by well-credentialed fellow Westerners. Members of the Chubais team possessed all of these qualities. By their sponsors in the West, they were depicted as enlightened and uniquely qualified to represent Russia and usher it down the road to capitalism and prosperity. Summers dubbed them a "dream team",[10] which, given his position and status, was a particularly valuable endorsement.

In Russia, however, the Chubais transactors' primary source of clout was neither ideology nor even reform strategy, but precisely their standing with and their ability to get resources from the West. As the Russian sociologist Olga Kryshtanovskaya explained it,

> Chubais has what no other elite group has, which is the support of the top political quarters in the West, above all the USA, the World Bank and the IMF, and consequently, control over the money flow from the West to Russia. In this way, a small group of young educated reformers led by Anatoly Chubais transformed itself into the most powerful elite clan of Russia in the past five years.[11]

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U.S. support proved decisive in this transformation. The administration's "dream team" seal of approval bolstered the Clan's standing as Russia's chief brokers with the West and the international financial institutions, and as *the* legitimate representative of Russia. It also enabled the Harvard-Chubais transactors to exact hundreds of millions of dollars in Western loans and American aid.

The Modus Operandi

IT IS TIME now to look in greater detail at the way in which this extraordinarily effective operation worked—effective, that is, in acquiring standing and funds. There were five basic operating principles.

• *Democracy by Decree*

The transactors' preferred way of proceeding in the Russian context was by means of top-down presidential decree. U.S. officials explicitly encouraged this practice as an efficient means of achieving market reform. As USAID's Walter Coles, a key American official in the privatization aid program, put it, "If we needed a decree, Chubais didn't have to go through the bureaucracy."[12] Rule by decree also allowed the transactors to bypass the democratically elected Supreme Soviet and the Duma. The Harvard Institute's Russia director, Jonathan Hay, and his associates went so far as to draft some of the Kremlin decrees themselves. Needless to say, this did nothing to advance Russia's evolution toward a democratic system, nor was it consistent with the declared American aim of encouraging that evolution.

• *Flex Organizations*

A similar anti-democratic ethos pervaded the network of Harvard-Chubais transactor-run organizations. The transactors established and oversaw a network of aid-funded, aid-created "private" organizations whose ostensible purpose was to conduct economic reform, but which were often used to promote the transactors' parochial agendas. These organizations supplanted or circumvented state institutions. They routinely performed functions that, in modern states, are typically the province of governmental bureaucracies. They served to allow the bypassing of the Duma and other relevant actors, whose input was in the long term crucial to the successful implementation of economic reforms in Russia. Further, the aid-created organizations served as a critical resource for the transactors, a vehicle by which to exploit financial and political opportunities for their own ends. I call these bodies "flex organizations" in recognition of their impressively adaptable, chameleon-like, multipurpose character.

The donors' flagship organization was the Russian Privatization Center, which had close ties to Harvard University. Its founding documents state that Harvard University is both a "founder" and "Full Member of the [Russian Privatization] Center."[13] The center received funds from all major and some minor Western donors and lenders: the United States, the IMF, the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Union, Germany and Japan.[14] The center's chief executive officer, a Russian from the Chubais Clan, has written that while head of the center he managed some $4 *billion* in Western funds.[15] The Chamber of Accounts, Russia's rough equivalent of the U.S. General Accounting Office, investigated how that money was spent. An auditor from the Chamber concluded that the "money was not spent as designated. Donors paid . . . for something you can't determine."[16] When I interviewed aid-paid consultants working at the center, I was told that the funds were routinely used for political purposes.

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The center was an archetypal flex organization, one that switched its identity and status situationally. Formally and legally, it was nonprofit and non-governmental. But it was established by Russian presidential decree and received aid because it was run by the Chubais transactors, who also played key roles in the Russian government. In practice, the center played the role of government agency. It negotiated with and received loans from international financial institutions—which typically lend to governments, not private entities—and did so on behalf of the Russian state.

According to documents from Russia's Chamber of Accounts, the center wielded more control over certain privatization documents and directives than did the Russian government agency formally responsible for privatization.[17] Two center officials, its CEO from the Chubais Clan and Harvard's Moscow representative, Hay, were in fact authorized to sign privatization decisions on Russia's behalf. Thus did a Russian and an *American*, both of them affiliated with a *private* entity, end up acting as representatives of the Russian Federation.

• *"Transidentity"*

It was not only organizations that could change guises. The flex organization had its individual equivalent in the phenomenon of "transidentity", which refers to the ability of a transactor to change his identity at will, regardless of which side originally designated him as its representative.[18] Key Harvard-Chubais transactors were quintessential chameleons. To suit the transactors' purposes, the same individual could represent the United States in one meeting and Russia in the next—and perhaps himself at a third—regardless of national origin.

Jonathan Hay, who alternatively acted as an American and a Russian, provides a telling example of this phenomenon. In addition to being Harvard's chief representative in Russia, with formal management authority over many other U.S. contractors, Hay was appointed by members of the Chubais Clan to be a Russian. As such, he was empowered to approve or veto high-level privatization decisions of the Russian government. According to a U.S. official investigating Harvard's activities, Hay "played more Russian than American." The financial arena yields many such examples of transidentity, in which Chubais transactors appointed Americans to act as Russians.[19]

It was (and is) difficult to glean exactly who prominent consultants on the international circuit represented, for whom they actually worked, who paid them, and where their loyalties and ambitions lay at any given time. Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs, who served as director of the Harvard Institute from 1995 to 1999, provides a case in point.[20] According to journalist John Helmer, Sachs and his associates (including David Lipton, vice president of Sachs' consulting firm who later went to Treasury to work for Summers[21]) played both the Russian and the IMF sides of the street. During negotiations in 1992 between the IMF and the Russian government, for example, Sachs and his associates appeared as advisers to the Russian side. But they were at the same time "writing secret memoranda advising the IMF negotiators as well."[22]

Compounding this ambiguity is the question of whether Sachs was an official adviser to the Russian government. Although he maintains that he was,[23] key Russian economists as well as international officials cast doubts on his claim.[24] Jean Foglizzio, the IMF's first Moscow resident representative, was also taken aback by Sachs' practice of introducing himself as an adviser to the Russian government. As Foglizzio put it, "[When] the prime minister [Viktor Chernomyrdin], who is the head of government, says 'I never

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requested Mr. Sachs to advise me'—it triggers an unpleasant feeling, meaning, who is he?"[25]

Sachs also offered his services as an intermediary. According to Andrei Vernikov, a Russian representative to the IMF, and other sources, Sachs presented himself to leading Russians as a power-broker who could deliver Western aid. In 1992, when Yegor Gaidar (with whom Sachs had been working) was under attack and his future looked precarious, Sachs offered his services to Gaidar's parliamentary opposition. In November 1992 Sachs wrote a memorandum to the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Ruslan Khasbulatov (whose reputation in the West was that of a retrograde communist), offering advice, Western aid and contacts with the U.S. Congress. Khasbulatov declined Sachs' help after circulating the memo.[26] Sachs also proved adept at lobbying American policymakers.[27]

The most effective and influential transactors are extremely adept at working their multiple roles and identities. One such ubiquitous transactor was Anders Åslund, a former Swedish envoy to Russia who worked with Sachs and Gaidar. Åslund seemed at once to represent and speak on behalf of American, Russian and Swedish governments and authorities. Accordingly, he was understood by some Russian officials in Washington to be Chubais' personal envoy. Though a "private" citizen of Sweden who played a leading role in Swedish policy and aid toward Russia,[28] he nonetheless participated in high-level meetings at the U.S. Treasury and State Departments about U.S. and IMF policies.[29] Åslund was also involved in business activities in Russia[30] and Ukraine.[31] According to the Russian Interior Ministry's Department of Organized Crime, he had "significant" investments in the Russian Federation.[32] In addition to his work for governments, the Harvard-Chubais transactors and the private sector, Åslund was engaged in public relations activities. His assignment in Ukraine, where he was funded by George Soros, explicitly included public relations on behalf of that country, according to other Soros-funded consultants who worked with Åslund there.[33] His effectiveness in this role was no doubt enhanced by his affiliation with Washington think tanks, his frequent contributions to publications such as the *Washington Post* and the London *Financial Times*, and the fact that he always presented himself on these occasions as an objective analyst, despite his many promotional roles.

• *Interchangeability*

The maneuverability for individuals afforded by transidentity was also present at the group level. The Harvard Institute group, though formally representing the United States, also represented the Chubais group.[34] Thus, some U.S. officials and investigators requesting meetings with Russians were instead directed to Americans. In lobbying for aid contracts, the Harvard Institute group continually cited its access to Russian "reformers" as its primary advantage; this was in fact a key component of its public relations effort. In turn, Harvard acted as the Chubais Clan's entrée to the eyes and ears of U.S. policymakers and to American funds. In the United States, the Harvard transactors touted Chubais as the voice of Russia, and he became the quintessential enlightened Russian in the eyes of many U.S. officials and commentators.

Not surprisingly, then, in times of crisis for the Harvard-Chubais nexus—such as the ruble crisis of August 1998 and the Bank of New York money laundering scandals—the transactors and their associates have sought to bolster their colleagues' continued clout and standing in both Russia and the United States. Thus, Summers has frequently rushed to the defense of Chubais and other key transac-

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tors. In testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives' Committee on International Relations, for example, Summers stoutly defended Chubais and asked that Chubais' prepared statement ("I Didn't Lie") be placed in the congressional record.[35] Similarly, Åslund serves as a staunch defender of and advocate for Chubais. Of late, he also has been arguing Vladimir Putin's cause.[36]

• *Unaccountability and Self-perpetuation*

Transactors are largely above formal accountability. The group places its members in various positions to serve its agendas, which may or may not conflict with those of the government or public interest they supposedly serve. The result is a game of musical chairs. For example, a key agency in Russian "reform", the State Property Committee, was headed by a succession of Chubais transactors, among them Chubais himself, Maxim Boycko and Alfred Kokh. Kokh was named chairman of the Committee after Boycko was fired by Yeltsin for accepting a thinly veiled $90,000 bribe from a company that had received preferential treatment in the privatization process. Kokh himself was later removed for accepting a $100,000 payment from the same company. Chubais, Boycko and Kokh also held a variety of key positions in the Harvard-Chubais transactor-run, aid-funded Russian Privatization Center.

The Chubais transactors are unlikely to disappear in Vladimir Putin's Russia. In fact, Putin has long been intertwined with them. An operative in the KGB and briefly head of its successor agency, Putin, like most members of the Chubais Clan, hails from St. Petersburg and was intimately involved in the "reforms" there. After moving to Moscow to work with Chubais, Putin helped to suppress criminal investigations that implicated Yeltsin and members of his family—as well as Chubais himself.[37] Chubais, in addition to running the country's electricity conglomerate, is helping to run Putin's presidential campaign.[38]

Consequences of Transactorship

WHAT, it might be asked, is wrong with the transactorship mode of organizing relations between the United States and Russia in such circumstances? Many U.S. officials have argued that it is the most effective method by which to implement market reform—through a committed group with intimate access to both sides (and to many activities in both countries). In fact, there are several things that are seriously wrong with this argument.

Transactorship has served to undermine democratic processes and the development of transparent, accountable institutions.

Operating by decree is clearly antidemocratic and contrary to the aid community's stated goal of building democracy in Russia. It has weakened the message to the Russians that the United States stands for democracy. Further, the aid-created flex organizations have supplanted the state and often carried out functions that ought to have been the province of governmental bureaucracies.

As well, the flex organizations have likely facilitated the development of what I have called elsewhere the "clan-state", a state captured by unauthorized groups and characterized by pervasive corruption.[39] In such a state, individual clans, each of which controls property and resources, are so closely identified with particular ministries or institutional segments of government that the respective agendas of the state and the clan become indistinguishable. Thus, while the Chubais transactors were closely identified with segments of government concerned with privatization and the economy, competing clans had equivalent ties with other government

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organizations, such as the ministries of defense and internal affairs and the security services. Generally, where judicial processes are politically motivated, a clan's influence can be checked or constrained only by a rival clan. By systematically bypassing the democratically elected parliament, U.S. aid flouted a crucial feature of democratic governance: namely, parliamentarianism.

Transactorship has frustrated true market reform.

Without public support or understanding, decrees constitute a weak foundation on which to build a market economy. Some reforms, such as lifting price controls, may be achieved by decree. But many others depend on changes in law, public administration or mindsets, and require cooperation among a full spectrum of legislative and market participants, not just a clan.[40]

A case in point was USAID's efforts to reform Russia's tax system, and to establish clearing and settlement organizations (CSOs)—an essential ingredient in a sophisticated financial system. The efforts failed largely because they were placed solely in the hands of one group, which then declined to work with other market participants. In Moscow, for example, despite millions of USAID dollars, many Russian brokers were excluded from the process and consequently declined to use the CSO. Since 1994, when consultants working under USAID contracts totaling $13.9 million set out to design and implement CSOs in five Russian cities, very little evidence of progress has emerged. After an investigation into the Harvard Institute's activities in Russia, the U.S. General Accounting Office issued a report calling the CSO effort "disappointing."[41] Yet, absent support from parties to the reform process, reforms were almost certain to be ignored or even subverted during implementation.

To repeat, transactors, although they may share the overall goals of the sides they represent, may advertently or inadvertently subvert those goals in pursuit of their own private agendas. The Chubais-Harvard transactors were known to block reform efforts on occasion. In particular, they were inclined to obstruct reform initiatives when they originated outside their own group or were perceived to conflict with their own agendas.[42] When a USAID-funded organization run by the Chubais-Harvard transactors failed to receive the additional USAID funds it had expected, its leaders promptly obstructed legal reform activities in the areas of title registration and mortgages—programs that were launched by agencies of the Russian government.[43] In such instances, the transactors' interference put them at cross purposes with their own purported aim of fostering markets.

Lack of transparency, too, became apparent in the manner in which the transactors implemented economic reforms. Secrecy shrouded the privatization process, with numerous, unfortunate consequences for the Russian people. Privatization, which was largely shaped by the Harvard-Chubais transactors and significant parts of which were funded by USAID, was intended to spread the fruits of the free market. Instead, it helped to create a system of "tycoon capitalism" acting in the service of a half dozen corrupt oligarchs. The "reforms" were more about wealth confiscation than wealth creation; and the incentive system encouraged looting, asset stripping and capital flight.[44]

Transactorship has encouraged the maximization of opportunities for personal gain.

The prestige and access of the Harvard-Chubais transactors facilitated their involvement in other areas, including allegedly the Russian securities market, both in Russia and internationally, and may have helped them enrich them-

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selves. In such ways, the private agendas of the Harvard-Chubais transactors helped to subvert the goals of the sides they were supposed to be serving.

Providing a small group of powerbrokers with a blank check inevitably encouraged corruption, precisely at a time when the international community should have been demanding safeguards in Russia such as the development of a legal and regulatory framework, property rights and the sanctity of contracts. Over the years many substantiated reports of the Chubais transactors using public monies for personal enrichment have been published.[45] Today these same persons are among those under investigation for alleged involvement in laundering billions of dollars through the Bank of New York and other banks.[46]

The Harvard Institute has also had its difficulties. In 1996 the GAO found that USAID's management over Harvard was "lax."[47] In 1997 the government cancelled most of the last $14 million earmarked for the Institute, citing evidence that the project's two managers—Hay and Shleifer—had used their positions and inside knowledge to profit from investments in the Russian securities markets and other private enterprises.[48] The two remain under criminal and/or civil investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice.[49] In January 2000 a Harvard task force issued a report alluding to that financial scandal. It recommended that the Harvard Institute for International Development be closed and that selected programs be integrated into other university programs. The Institute was closed shortly thereafter. An inspired Harvard University spokesperson, Joe Wrinn, spun the story thus: "It's a vote of confidence for the study of international development and its permanent integration into Harvard University."[50]

Because the transactors' success is grounded in mutual loyalty and trust, and because of their shared record of activities, some of which have left them vulnerable to allegations of corruption, the transactors have ample incentive to stick together. Any desertions must be well considered, as they could have serious consequences for all involved.

Transactorship has encouraged not only corruption but also the ability to deny it.

Transactorship affords maximum flexibility and influence to the transactors, and minimal accountability to the sides the transactors presumably represent. If the Harvard Institute's manager in Russia were asked by U.S. authorities to account for privatization decisions and monies, he could respond by claiming that he made those decisions as a Russian, not as an American. If USAID came under fire for funding the Russian state, it could claim that it was funding private organizations.

Now that the issue of "Russian" corruption has captured headlines, Treasury Secretary Summers has lately been insisting that the Russian government make amends. "This has been a U.S. demand for years", he claims, as if he had not himself addressed letters to "Dear Anatoly"[51] and met with Chubais as recently as the summer of 1999. This only months after Chubais admitted that he had "conned" from the IMF a $4.8 billion installment in July 1998,[52] the details of that deal having been worked out in Summers' home over brunch—at a meeting that the *New York Times* deemed crucial to obtaining release of the funds.[53]

Transactorship has proved particularly harmful in a setting in which communism until recently prevailed.

The transactorship mode of organizing relations is reminiscent of precisely those features of communism that the international community should be concerned *not* to reinforce. The informal, but influential, parallel executive established by the Harvard-Chubais transactors

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recalls the powerful patronage networks that virtually ran the Soviet Union. Political aid disguised as economic aid is only too familiar to Russians raised under a system of political control over economic decisions. As Shleifer acknowledged in a 1995 book funded by Harvard, "Aid helps reform not because it directly helps the economy—it is simply too small for that—but because it helps the reformers in their political battles."[54]

And yet U.S. officials have defended this approach. In a 1997 interview, Ambassador Richard L. Morningstar, U.S. aid coordinator to the former Soviet Union, said, "When you're talking about a few hundred million dollars, you're not going to change the country, but you can provide targeted assistance to help Chubais"[55]—an admission of direct interference in Russia's political life. U.S. assistance to Chubais continued even after he was dismissed by Yeltsin as first deputy prime minister in January 1996: he was placed on the Harvard payroll, a demonstration of solidarity for which senior U.S. officials openly declared their support.

* * *

THE U.S.-RUSSIAN experience of transactorship is interesting and disturbing not only in its own right, but because this mode of operating may well become more frequent as a way of conducting transnational affairs in the twenty-first century. With the ongoing process of globalization, the nationality of actors is becoming increasingly irrelevant. Already global elites, with ever closer connections to one another and fewer to the nation-state, see themselves not so much as American, Brazilian or Italian, but as members of an exclusive and highly mobile multinational club, whose rules and regulations have yet to be written. In many respects, members of what Peter Berger has identified as the overlapping "Davos" and "Faculty Club" cultures have much more in common in terms of lifestyle and taste with each other than they have with their fellow nationals. And as Berger observes, "it may be that commonalties in taste make it easier to find common ground politically"—and, of course, economically.[56]

While all this is true, global elites will continue to operate in a world organized into nation-states. In such a world, assumptions about representation, grounded in national and international law, are based on the idea that an individual can formally represent either one state or another, but not both. The transactor mode of behavior may seem to offer a means of having it both ways, of squaring the circle. But it also raises crucial public policy questions. What are the implications of a state of affairs in which the "choice" of who represents one side is shaped to a significant degree by self-selected representatives of the other? What are the consequences when the same player represents multiple sides? Wherein lies the accountability to electorates and parliaments in a world of growing coziness and joint decision-making among governing elites? Where, if at all, do representation and democracy enter the picture? The U.S.-Russian case in the last decade provides a cautionary lesson in all these respects. But it has been a very expensive lesson. □

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[1]The Russian "population has suffered increasing hardship" since the ruble devaluation of August 1998. An estimated 38 percent was living in poverty at the close of the first quarter of 1999, as compared with 28 percent one year earlier. Real incomes in June 1999 were 77 percent of their June 1998 level. (*OECD Economic Outlook*, December 1999, p. 132.) Further, Russian citizens became poorer in 1999, even though wage arrears and absolute numbers below the poverty line trended down. "The average level of Russians' real cash income—incomes adjusted to account for inflation—decreased 15 percent", according to the Russian Statistics Agency. (Yevgenia Borisova, "Poverty Still Widespread Despite Modest Growth", *Moscow Times*, January 13, 2000, also in *Johnson's Russia List*, January 13, 2000.) An estimated 70 percent of Russians now live below or just above the poverty line.

[2]See United States Information Agency, "Is Economic Reform in Russia Dead?", *Opinion Analysis* (USIA: Office of Research and Media Reaction, March 15, 1999), pp. 3-4. The ratio of Russians who had favorable attitudes toward U.S.-Russia rapprochement versus those who did not declined steeply from 1994 to 1999. In 1994 the ratio was 2.47, as compared with 1.67 in 1999. See Boris Dubin, "Vremia i Lyudi: O Massovom Vospriiatii Social'nykh Peremen", *Russian Public Opinion Monitor* (May-June 1999), pp. 22-3.

[3]In coining this usage of "transactor", I purposefully draw on the original meaning of the term: someone who carries through or does business.

[4]For further detail, see my "Rigging the U.S.-Russian Relationship: Harvard, Chubais, and the Transidentity Game", *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* (Fall 1999), pp. 478-9.

[5]U.S. GAO, *Foreign Assistance: Harvard Institute for International Development's Work in Russia and Ukraine* (Washington, DC: GAO, November 1996), p. 3.

[6]A "clan", as Russians use the term, is an informal group whose members promote their mutual political, financial and strategic interests. See Olga Kryshtanovskaya, "The Real Masters of Russia", *Argumenty i Fakty* (May 1997), also in *Johnson's Russia List*.

[7]Although *individuals* are often thought of as the primary unit to take advantage of economic opportunities, this unit with respect to transactors is often the transactor *group*. Individual transactors must take the interests of their fellow transactors into account when making choices.

[8]The two received at least one foundation grant together (vita of Andrei Shleifer supplied by HIID).

[9]For the definitive history of Russian reform efforts, see Lynn D. Nelson and Irina Y. Kuzes, *Property to the People: The Struggle for Radical Economic Reform in Russia* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994); and Nelson and Kuzes, *Radical Reform in Yeltsin's Russia: Political, Economic and Social Dimensions* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995).

[10]*Russia Business Watch* (Spring 1997), p. 19.

[11]Kryshtanovskaya, "The Real Masters of Russia."

[12]Author's interview with Coles, June 6, 1996.

[13]U.S. GAO, *Foreign Assistance*, p. 60.

[14]*Russian Privatization Center 1994 Annual Report*, pp. 5, 24.

[15]Author's interview with and documents provided by Veniamin Sokolov (auditor at the Chamber of Accounts of the Russian Federation), May 31, 1998.

[16]Ibid; Sokolov, talk at American University, June 2, 1998. In 1994 both the Duma and the head of the Russian State Property Committee requested a detailed accounting from the Russian Privatization Center. They got nothing. (Sergei Zavorotnyi, "The Traces of 'Privatization' Go Overseas", *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, April 8, 1997.)

[17]Author's interview with and documents provided by Sokolov, May 31, 1998. See State Property Committee order no. 188 (which gave Jonathan Hay veto power over the Committee's projects), October 5, 1992.

[18]The concept of "transidentities" draws on Fredrik Barth's work. See his *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Co., 1969).

[19]See my "Rigging the U.S.-Russian Relationship", p. 485; and Anne Williamson, *Contagion. The Betrayal of Liberty: Russia and the United States in the 1990s* (forthcoming), chap. 15.

[20]In time, Sachs and Shleifer emerged as rivals and ran largely separate operations in Moscow. Still, they shared the transactorship mode of operating and many contacts in the Chubais Clan.

[21]Lipton and Sachs served together on consulting missions in Poland and Russia. "Jeff and David . . . were like an inseparable couple", remarked Andrei Vernikov, a Russian representative at the IMF. (Author's interview with Vernikov, November 22, 1997.) Lipton was named deputy assistant secretary of the treasury for Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. After Summers was promoted to deputy treasury secretary in 1995, Lipton moved into Summers' old job and assumed "broad responsibility" for international economic policy development.

[22]It was unclear who paid for Sachs and his team. (Helmer, "Russia and the IMF: Who Pays the Piper Calls the Tune", *Johnson's Russia List*, February 17, 1999.)

[23]While providing no documentation for his role, Sachs writes, "I was an official advisor of the Russian Government from December 1991 to January 1994. Together with Anders Åslund I directed the Macroeconomics and Finance Unit (MFU) of the Russian Ministry of Finance, housed within Government offices." Sachs further writes that his work in Russia with Åslund "was supported mainly by the Ford Foundation and the Swedish Government. I was not paid by the Russian Government." (Letter to author, March 12, 1998.)

[24]Gaidar Institute head Aleksander Bevz told journalist Anne Williamson that, "Sachs was never an official adviser to the government, that's his own illusion." Gaidar, too, described Sachs and Åslund as "insignificant figures." Williamson reports that, "Even Gaidar's archrival, [Grigory] Yavlinsky, insisted, 'What we did was not based on even 10 percent of their [Sachs' and Åslund's] advice. Gaidar was using those people as loudspeakers for the West, but, in fact, Gaidar did as he wished.'" (Williamson, *Contagion*, chap. 7.)

[25]Williamson's interview with Foglizzio, February 1, 1994.

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[26]Memorandum from Sachs to Khasbulatov of November 19, 1992; author's interviews with Stanford University economist Michael Bernstam, August 21, 1997 and October 17, 1997.

[27]See, for example, an Action Memorandum of February 4, 1993 from a State Department official to the secretary of state, in which Sachs requests an appointment with the secretary. The memorandum notes that Sachs also had sought appointments with National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, Treasury undersecretary-designate Larry Summers, and ambassador-designate Strobe Talbott.

[28]Sources include Dan Josefsson, "The Art of Ruining a Country With Some Professional Help from Sweden", *ETC* English Edition 1 (1999).

[29]Author's interviews with U.S. officials in the Departments of Treasury and State.

[30]For example, Åslund has long been linked to Brunswick, which began as a Moscow-based brokerage firm and evolved into an investment bank, the Brunswick Group. (See Williamson, *Contagion*, chap. 13.) Two of Åslund's Swedish associates worked for Chubais at the State Property Committee, where they helped to design and implement voucher privatization. (Williamson's interview with Martin Andersson, February 1995.) Later, "with still good relations to Chubais", they started Brunswick Brokerage to participate in voucher privatization and to help sell these and other assets to Western investors. (Sven-Ivan Sundqvist, "Svenska Rad Biter Pa Ryssen: Svenska Finansman i Ledningen for Brunswick Group, Foretaget Som Ska Hjalpa Ryska Staten Att Privatisera Industrin", *Dagens Nyheter*, June 15, 1997.)

[31]Sources for Åslund's business activities in Russia and Ukraine include those specified in the previous endnotes, as well as a number of additional reports and sources in Russia, Ukraine, Sweden and Washington.

[32]See Williamson, *Contagion*, chap. 13.

[33]Sources include author's conversations with Marek Dabrowski, May 9, 1995 and November 27, 1997. For details of Åslund's Ukraine activities, see my *Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe 1989-1998* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), pp. 158-61.

[34]Harvard transactors Hay and Shleifer often spoke for key Chubais transactors, notably Maxim Boycko, CEO of the Russian Privatization Center, and Dmitry Vasiliev, head of the Federal Commission, the Russian version of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

[35]"The United States and Russia, Part II: Russia in Crisis", September 17, 1998, Hearing transcript, pp. 29-30.

[36]See, for example, Barry Wood, "Russia's Economy", Voice of America, January 3, 2000; also in *Johnson's Russia List*, January 4, 2000; and "The State of the (Former Soviet) Union" (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 6, 2000), also in *Johnson's Russia List*, January 12, 2000.

[37]Putin worked under Pavel Borodin, the Kremlin's property manager, who has been linked to the Mabetex scandal. Swiss prosecutors have alleged that Mabetex Project Engineering, a Kremlin contractor, paid tens of thousands of dollars in credit card bills for members of the Yeltsin family. In one of his first acts, Putin signed a decree protecting Yeltsin from future prosecution and providing him with amenities such as a residence and a pension. See Sharon LaFraniere, *Washington Post*, January 7, 2000; and Paul J. Saunders, *Washington Times*, January 6, 2000.

[38]See, for example, Paul Starobin, "The Brain Trust Polishing Putin's Image", *Business Week*, January 31, 2000.

[39]See my "Informal Relations and Institutional Change: How Eastern European Cliques and States Mutually Respond", presented at the World Bank, Social Development Group (Washington, DC, April 20, 1998).

[40]See my *Collision and Collusion*, pp. 134-7, 145.

[41]U.S. GAO, *Foreign Assistance*, p. 8.

[42]U.S. GAO sources confirm this observation. (Author's conversations with Zanardi, October 28, 1997 and April 23, 1998.)

[43]Author's interviews with USAID-paid contractors and U.S. government sources. A member of the GAO audit team confirms this observation. (Author's conversations with Zanardi, October 28, 1997 and April 23, 1998.)

[44]For details, see "Whither Reform" speech by World Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz (worldbank.org/knowledge/chiefecon/); Jonas Bernstein, "Loans for the Sharks", *Moscow Times*, December 19, 1995; and Fritz W. Ermarth, "Seeing Russia Plain: The Russian Crisis and American Intelligence", *The National Interest* (Spring 1999).

[45]See accounts in *Johnson's Russia List*; my *Collision and Collusion*, pp. 151-5; and Williamson, *Contagion*, especially chaps. 13, 15.

[46]In August and September 1999, newspapers reported that billions of dollars had been laundered through the Bank of New York. (See Raymond Bonner with Timothy L. O'Brien, *New York Times*, August 19, 1999.) Anatoly Chubais and other members of Yeltsin's government are alleged to have been involved in money laundering. (See Jack Kelly, *USA Today*, August 26, 1999.)

[47]U.S. GAO, *Foreign Assistance*, p. 43.

[48]Letter from USAID to HIID director Jeffrey Sachs, May 20, 1997. See also "USAID Suspends Two Harvard Agreements in Russia" (Washington, DC: USAID Press Office, May 20, 1997).

[49]Hay has been named in other investigations as well. He, together with Dart Management, Inc., is the subject of a civil action in the U.S. District Court of New Jersey brought by Avisma Titano-Magnesium Kombinat over an alleged fraud and money laundering scheme.

[50]Beth McMurtrie, "Report Advises Harvard to Dismantle its Institute for International Development", *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, January 12, 2000.

[51]In a letter of April 1997 (obtained and published by *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*), Summers instructed Chubais on the conduct of Russian foreign and domestic economic policy.

[52]*Kommersant Daily*, September 8, 1998; *Los Angeles Times*, September 9, 1998.

[53]Michael R. Gordon and David E. Sanger, *New York Times*, July 17, 1998.

[54]Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, *Privatizing Russia* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), p. 142.

[55]Author's interview with Morningstar, February 11, 1997.

[56]Peter L. Berger, "Four Faces of Global Culture", *The National Interest* (Fall 1997), pp. 24-5.

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Remembering the Future

Paul Wolfowitz

EVEN THOUGH it has been ten years since the Berlin Wall came down, we still have no better name for the period in which we live than "the post-Cold War era." True, many have aspired to play the role of the next George Kennan—defining American strategy for this new era that does not yet have a name—but so far none has succeeded. Moreover, given the rate at which many politicians and commentators have been revising their recollections of their own stances during the period 1946–91, it may not be too long before someone disputes Kennan's authorship of the original containment strategy. For it seems that now, safely after the event, we have all become cold warriors.

In his maiden speech on foreign policy, presidential candidate Bill Bradley declared that, "For 50 years after the end of World War II and until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, we were sure about one thing: We knew where we stood on foreign policy." The former senator from New Jersey went on to rue the fact that today we face a more difficult challenge:

> when it comes to foreign affairs, things are not so clear. The world's a more complicated place and it's no longer divided like it once was into good and evil, clear enemies, obvious friends. The choices are no longer so stark, and stark choices are always the easy ones.

This nostalgia for the supposedly easier choices of the Cold War is not confined to Bradley. President Clinton, too, routinely echoes the lament about the lost clarity and clear choices of the recent past.

It is astonishing to hear the Cold War era so described. For in reality it was a time when the country was deeply divided over issues of foreign policy—most bitterly over the war in Vietnam, but also over the commitment of U.S. troops to Europe and Korea, the Strategic Defense Initiative and arms control, Central America and nuclear weapons, and over almost every year's budget request from the Defense Department.

Descriptions of the long conflict as being clear-cut and simple are particularly astounding coming from leaders of the party of George McGovern. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Democratic Party ceased to be the party of Harry Truman or "Scoop" Jackson and became instead the party that supported the Mansfield Amendment to remove U.S. troops from Europe; that reflexively opposed many of the weapons systems that were critical in the American competition with the Soviet Union; and that advocated a "nuclear freeze" at a time when the Reagan admin-

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istration was trying to convince NATO to proceed with the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces. Far from believing that the Cold War was a clear struggle between good and evil, the leaders of the Democratic Party attacked President Reagan as a war-mongering ideologue when he declared that the Soviet Union was an "evil empire."

Then, too, rarely were the country's leaders so sharply divided as they were in 1991 over the decision to evict Saddam Hussein's forces from Kuwait. Voting on largely partisan lines, it was only by slender majorities that both houses of Congress granted President Bush the authority to use force. Although Senator Bradley has lately discovered that "Iraq, 1991" exemplifies one of those times and places when "the national interest is clear", at the time he joined the majority of congressional Democrats in voting against the President. And for Governor Clinton the issue was not so clear either. In a characteristically hedged statement he said: "I guess I would have voted for the majority if it was a close vote. But I agree with the arguments the minority made."

All of this forgetfulness might merely be a matter for amusement were it not for the fact that much of what is being forgotten is crucially relevant to our immediate future.

Reflections on Consensus

IN 1992 a draft memo prepared by my office at the Pentagon, which proposed a post-Cold War defense strategy, leaked to the press and sparked a major controversy. The draft suggested that a "dominant consideration" in U.S. defense strategy should be "to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power." Those regions were specified as Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union and Southwest Asia.

The *New York Times*, having published the leak, editorialized violently against the document, as did some prominent members of Congress. Senator Edward Kennedy said that the Pentagon plans "appear to be aimed primarily at finding new ways to justify Cold War levels of military spending." Senator Robert Byrd commented that, "We love being the sole remaining superpower in the world and we want so much to remain that way that we are willing to put at risk the basic health of our economy and well-being of our people to do so." Senator Joseph Biden ridiculed the proposed strategy as "literally a Pax Americana. . . . It won't work."

Just seven years later, many of these same critics seem quite comfortable with the idea of a Pax Americana. They have supported or urged American military intervention in places like Haiti and Rwanda and East Timor, places never envisaged in my 1992 memorandum. Moreover, they seem very comfortable that all of this can be accomplished, and our commitments to our European and Asian allies maintained, with a greatly reduced defense burden and without risking the "basic health of our economy." Today the criticism of Pax Americana comes mainly from the isolationist right, from Patrick Buchanan, who complains that "containment, a defensive strategy, had given way to a breathtakingly ambitious offensive strategy—to 'establish and protect a new order.'"

One would like to think that this new consensus—Buchanan apart—reflects a recognition that the United States cannot afford to allow a hostile power to dominate Europe or Asia or the Persian Gulf; that the safest, and in the long run the cheapest, way to prevent this is to preserve the U.S.-led alliances that have been so successful—to paraphrase Lord Ismay in more diplomatic language—at keeping

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Americans engaged, allies reassured, and aggressors deterred. But in reality today's consensus is facile and complacent, reflecting a lack of concern about the possibility of another major war, let alone agreement about how to prevent one.

Still, one should not look a gift horse in the mouth. There *is* today a remarkable degree of agreement on a number of central points of foreign policy. No one is lobbying to withdraw troops from Korea, as was the case as recently as the late 1980s. No one is arguing that we should withdraw from Europe. American forces under President Clinton's command have been bombing Iraq with some regularity for months now, without a whimper of opposition in the Congress and barely a mention in the press. Even on ballistic missile defense there is today an emerging consensus that something needs to be done—although no agreement on precisely what.

Partly, this consensus is the result of a seemingly benign international environment. Thus, we have been told that the really important problem is "the economy, stupid", or the environment, or, as the vice president most recently announced, AIDS in Africa. What is wrong with these claims is not that AIDS in Africa and the environment are not serious problems; rather, it is the implication that conventional security is no longer something we need to worry much about.

Perhaps, indeed, we have seen the last of the Napoleons and the Kaisers and Hitlers and Stalins and Tojos. In a world where American primacy seems so overwhelming, it is hard to imagine how threats of that magnitude could come about. But if we contemplate the last century we find abundant evidence that even a decade can bring about enormous transformations in world affairs. (Consider the changes from 1905 to 1915, or from 1929 to 1939, or from 1981 to 1991.) And if that was true in earlier decades, how much truer is it today when the tempo of change has increased so dramatically? Further, even if the chances of another assault on world peace are remote, what is at stake is too great to permit complacency or neglect of America's responsibility as the world's dominant power.

Wars in Faraway Places

ULTIMATELY, we are placing bets on the shape of an uncertain future—a task which will prove that much more difficult if we cannot get the past right. The experience of Munich has provided a cautionary lesson for the second half of the last century—even if a somewhat overused one—and it should not be forgotten in this one. Addressing the British people by radio two days before his departure for Munich in 1938, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain made the case for appeasement in stark terms:

> How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas masks here because of a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing. . . . I am myself a man of peace to the very depths of my soul. . . . But if I were convinced that any nation had made up its mind to dominate the world by fear of its force, I should feel that it must be resisted; . . . but war is a fearful thing, and we must be very clear, before we embark on it, that it is really the great issues that are at stake, and that the call to risk everything in their defense, when all the consequences are weighed, is irresistible.

As it turned out, it was precisely "the great issues" that were at stake. Chamberlain's failure to come to the aid of those faraway Czechs meant that Britain would shortly face a much more terrible war and on much more disadvantageous terms.

As a result, this "lesson" was seared into the consciousness of the Western democracies and their leaders. It con-

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tributed to the resolve of President Truman to resist communist aggression in such "faraway" places as Korea, Iran, Turkey, Greece and Berlin, and of President Kennedy to resist Soviet pressure in Berlin and Cuba. But let us remember that it was also with Munich in mind that British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and French Prime Minister Guy Mollet took the unfortunate decision to oppose with force Nasser's takeover of the Suez Canal in 1956, and that a few years later, with even worse consequences, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson decided that Vietnam was a similar case of aggression that had to be opposed.

With the end of the Cold War, the United States and its allies and partners are again confronted with a series of wars in faraway places, and many repeat Chamberlain's counsel that we have no business intervening in conflicts among people we do not understand, where, in the current idiom, "we have no dog in the fight." Of course, the fact that the arguments have a similar ring to them does not mean that those who echo Chamberlain today are necessarily wrong, any more than those who argue for intervening in messy civil wars or ethnic conflicts for moral purposes are necessarily repeating the mistakes of Vietnam. History does not tell us what to do, but it does offer us some options to ponder.

Imagine, counterfactually, that England and its allies had successfully resisted Hitler in the Rhineland in 1936 or at Munich in 1938. Germany would then have been "contained." In that case we would certainly have been treated—would we not?—to learned discourses about how the resulting "cold war" with Germany was the unnecessary product of unwarranted Western suspicion and hostility toward a country that—chafing under unjustified Western impositions—had only been seeking its rightful "place in the sun." Or, to take a more recent example, we will never know what might have happened if Saddam Hussein's occupation of Kuwait had not been reversed: would he have, as seems entirely probable, brought the governments of the Arabian Peninsula under his control and, with the wealth that provided, built up his arsenal of conventional and nuclear weapons in preparation for a much bigger war with Iran or with Israel? If so, then what President Bush achieved was much more than just the liberation of Kuwait; but that achievement will never be as clear as Chamberlain's failure.

Even actions that seem like mistakes at the time may be rescued by the twists and turns of history. The failure to do more to deter Saddam Hussein from attacking Kuwait in 1990 seemed like a mistake at the time and is still treated as such in most discussions of that crisis. But consider: we shall never know what might have happened if Saddam Hussein *had* been deterred at that point—only to confront the world with a crisis several years later, but now armed with nuclear weapons.

When the consequences of alternative courses of action are so uncertain, even in hindsight, who in their right mind would defy Yogi Berra's famous advice that "it's a mistake to try to make predictions, especially about the future"?

Lessons of the Cold War

THE REFUSAL to remember the deep divisions and sharp debates over policy that took place during the Cold War is in some cases part of an effort to deny that there are any lessons to be learned from that long struggle, to put it all behind us. On the other side, some seem to believe that, since the policies that won the Cold War clearly worked, every effort should be made to keep them in place indefinitely. In the face of such advice we would do well to remember Lord Salisbury's advice that "The commonest error in politics is sticking to the carcass of dead politics." What

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is true, I believe, is that while policies must change as circumstances change, there are still valid lessons to be learned from the Cold War. Here are some of them:

• *Democracy Matters*

At the beginning of the Reagan administration, when Congress refused to confirm the administration's first nominee as assistant secretary of state for Human Rights, some saw this as an opportunity to do away entirely with the State Department's Office of Human Rights. Fortunately, and due in large measure to the intervention of Reagan's personal friend and then-Deputy Secretary of State William Clark, the office was preserved and human rights and the promotion of democracy became enshrined as major features of the Reagan administration's foreign policy. There can be little doubt that this contributed in an important way to the triumph of democracy in the Cold War. Perhaps more surprising to Reagan's numerous critics, his administration also witnessed and supported an enormous advance of democracy in countries on "our" side of the Cold War, not only in Latin America but in some surprising places in Asia such as South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines.

Nothing could be less realistic than the version of the "realist" view of foreign policy that dismisses human rights as an important tool of American foreign policy. There are no doubt examples of human rights policies that can damage other U.S. interests, but often these are policies that are bad for human rights and democracy as well—for example, the notion that undermining the Shah's regime would have been a great advance for the Iranian people, or the belief that weakening South Korea's ability to defend itself from the North was necessary in order to advance human rights. What is more impressive is how often promoting democracy has actually advanced American interests.

Democratic change not only weakened our enemies, but helped strengthen our friends. This became clear to me when I was involved in drafting U.S. policy toward the Philippines in the mid-1980s, during the last years of the Marcos regime. As the United States put pressure on Marcos to reform, we were asked whether doing so would simply pave the way for a regime that would in retrospect make Marcos look good, as the Ayatollahs in Iran had done for the Shah. In fact, it was Marcos who was in the process of paving the way to victory for a particularly vicious communist insurgency, and there was available a true democratic alternative in the Philippines. Political change did indeed jeopardize American bases in the Philippines, but it seemed more important to have a healthy ally without American bases than a sick ally with them.

History has amply vindicated that judgment. Similarly, the transition to democracy in South Korea has not only been good for the Korean people but has significantly strengthened U.S.-Korean relations. As one contemplates the enormous problems of Indonesia today, one can only wish that the transition to a more representative government there had begun ten years earlier.

Promoting democracy requires attention to specific circumstances and to the limitations of U.S. leverage. Both because of what the United States is, and because of what is possible, we cannot engage either in promoting democracy or in nation-building simply by an exercise of will. We must proceed by interaction and indirection, not imposition. In this respect, the post-World War II examples of Germany and Japan offer misleading guides for the present. What proved feasible following total victory and prolonged occupation—in societies that were economically advanced but, at the same time, had profoundly lost faith in their own institutions—does not offer a

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model that applies in other circumstances.

One of the important lessons of the Cold War is that some regimes are more open to change than others, that there is indeed a difference between authoritarian and totalitarian governments. The Soviet Union itself was not ready for change until it became clear that it was losing the Cold War. Our ally South Korea was a very different matter, even though severe criticisms could be leveled at the Chun Doo Hwan regime of the 1980s. Reagan's willingness to receive Chun as his first foreign visitor at the White House was criticized by human rights groups, but it secured the reprieve of Kim Dae Jung's death sentence and his release from prison. Reagan's own visit to Korea two years later was also criticized, but it secured Chun's pledge to honor the Korean constitution and step down at the end of his term of office.

Harking back to Marcos again, it is important to recall that he only proved willing to heed advice that he step down when his own people had made his position completely untenable. Thus, another lesson that we should remember from our Cold War successes in promoting democracy is that such efforts require indigenous support to be effective. The chances of success without such support—say, in North Korea today—are small. It is the difference between pushing on a locked door and pushing on a balanced scale.

In the former cases, as in Afghanistan, our strongest weapon may be the oppressed people themselves. But we have an obligation to deliver the support we promise them. Kennedy's failure to make good on his pledges to the Cubans at the Bay of Pigs, like Clinton's abandonment of the Iraqi opposition in 1996, was a moral failure that was also costly to American power and credibility. Even when the promises are vague, or only implicit—as with Eisenhower encouraging the Hungarians in 1956 or Bush the Iraqis in 1991—we must remember that our reputation will be determined by what people believe we promised rather than what we intended. This is a reason to promise carefully and deliver on the promises we make—but it should not become an excuse for refusing our help to those who need it, like the Iraqi opposition today.

• *Deterrence Works*

It is surprising, after not only the Cold War experience but the earlier history of the twentieth century, that we still hear echoes of "Why die for Berlin?" or "Why die for Danzig?"

The purpose of extending security guarantees, such as the ones recently extended to NATO's newest members, is not to have to fight wars on behalf of others, but precisely to avoid having to do so. It is impressive how often American clarity during the Cold War worked, and how often ambiguity led to trouble. This is not to say that showing resolve will always suffice to ensure peace. But we should not entertain the illusion that a refusal to extend guarantees will enable us to avoid war. Chamberlain not only sacrificed Czechoslovakia at Munich, but brought on the wider war that he was trying to avoid. When Acheson implied that Korea was outside our defense perimeter he not only invited a North Korean attack but could not then keep the United States out of war when it came.

Here there seems to be a persistent difference between democracies, which look constantly for pragmatic solutions to resolve concrete problems in isolation, and those more ruthless and avaricious leaders who see every such effort as a sign of weakness and whose real goal is to change power relationships in a fundamental way. Henry Kissinger has observed that British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's "exploration" of pragmatic concessions to resolve the Berlin crisis in 1959 was seen by Khrushchev "as another confirmation of a favorable tilt in the bal-

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ance of forces and the augury of even better things to come", as were subsequent American efforts. It was only with the frustration of Khrushchev's final attempt to raise the ante—by placing missiles in Cuba—that he was finally forced to stop testing the West on Berlin.

• *America's Alliance Vocation*

Perhaps no Cold War lesson is more important than what can be learned from the remarkable record of the United States in building successful coalitions. This includes lessons about the importance of leadership and what it consists of: not lecturing and posturing and demanding, but demonstrating that your friends will be protected and taken care of, that your enemies will be punished, and that those who refuse to support you will live to regret having done so. It includes lessons about the difference between coalitions that are united by a common purpose, and collections of countries that are searching for the least common denominator and for easy ways out of a problem. And it includes important lessons that the "enemy of our friend" does *not* always have to be our enemy as well—whether dealing with Egypt and Israel, Israel and Saudi Arabia, Greece and Turkey, Russia and Ukraine, or China and Taiwan, the United States has demonstrated a remarkable capacity to work both sides of the street.

• *The Importance of Principle*

There is much else to be learned from the experience of the Cold War: conflicts breed arms races, and not the other way around; it is far better to equip others to fight for their country than to send Americans to fight for them; conversely, refusing to arm our friends, whether in Bosnia, or Cambodia or elsewhere, is a strategic as well as a moral mistake; and force, when used, should be used decisively—bluffing or "signaling" with military power should not be done without a careful calculation of what comes next.

As important as any other lesson, however, is that in international relations, as in other human activities, principles count. This is a practical as well as a moral point, because principle is a powerful force in politics, particularly in democratic politics. It cannot be an absolute because it must be applied to specific cases, requiring judgments about the facts and the stakes of each one. Even in the case of Munich, Churchill acknowledged that,

> No case of this kind can be judged apart from its circumstances. The facts may be unknown at the time, and estimates of them must be largely guesswork, coloured by the general feeling and aims of whoever is trying to pronounce. Those who are . . . ready to fight whenever some challenge comes from a foreign Power, have not always been right. On the other hand, those whose inclination is to bow their heads, to seek patiently and faithfully for peaceful compromise, are not always wrong. On the contrary, in the majority of instances they may be right, not only morally but from a practical standpoint.

There is, however, Churchill continued,

> one helpful guide, namely, for a nation to keep its word and to act in accordance with its treaty obligations to allies. . . . An exaggerated code of honour leading to the performance of utterly vain and unreasonable deeds could not be defended, however fine it might look. [At Munich], however, the moment came when honour pointed the path of duty, and when also the right judgment of the facts at that time would have reinforced its dictates.

China, Past and Future

THERE IS NO issue facing us today in which the past weighs more heavily on the present and on future prospects than that of our relationship with the People's Republic of

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China (PRC). China is an *emerging* major power, but it has not yet become one. Persuading an emerging power that the status quo should be changed only peacefully has always been a challenge historically, and the failure to do so with Germany and Japan in the last century had catastrophic consequences. That failure serves as a reminder of the stakes involved, but does not constitute a reason to be pessimistic about the outcome in the case of China.

Almost surely, China will not become an ideological threat like the old Soviet Union or try to conduct ideological crusades and campaigns of subversion as it did in the 1950s and 1960s. Not only is the ideological fervor gone in China, but also the ideology has no appeal internationally. However, China does have deep historical grievances, much more legitimate than those voiced a century ago by Germany or Japan. It remains to be seen whether China will come to accept that a peaceful status quo in the Western Pacific—albeit one in which the principal countries around the Pacific Rim are America's allies or friends—best serves its own interests.

Clearly China's growing strength will pose challenges to the United States, its allies and its friends, but on balance it is probably better to face the challenges of a strong China than a weak one. Certainly it would be a mistake to treat China like the Soviet Union, restricting its trade in order deliberately to weaken it or to use human rights as leverage. A weaker China might take longer to become a military competitor, but what we would gain in time we would lose in enmity. Moreover, a collapsed China would not be in our interest, quite apart from the fact that it would involve enormous human suffering.

The most important reason, however, for treating China differently from the old Soviet Union is because an evolution is taking place in the People's Republic, one that bears some resemblance to the earlier development of the Asian "tigers." Today's China is no longer a completely closed society in which the party and government dominate everything. There is a substantial private sector whose scope and sphere are growing. It is in the U.S. interest—and in that of Taiwan and Hong Kong and the region as a whole—to encourage such growth, which is heavily dependent on trade with the West. That is the most fundamental and important reason for continuing normal trade relations with China and encouraging Chinese membership of the WTO.

The U.S. interest in supporting democratic trends in China is more than "international social work." Although our capacity to influence the process is limited, the United States has a fundamental strategic interest in encouraging greater openness. Even though democracies are not as irenic as the extreme proponents of "democratic peace" like to argue, a China that governs its own peoples by force is more likely to try to impose its will on its neighbors. And in turn, China's neighbors and the United States will be more likely to trust it and accept its growing influence if it becomes a democracy. A government whose legitimacy rests on valid claims to be representative has less need to make dangerous appeals to nationalism. Finally, and not insignificantly, a democratic China would have a far better chance of coming to terms with Taiwan peacefully. I have even been told by a Chinese Communist Party member that what "terrifies those old men in Beijing" is the demonstration by Taiwan that Chinese *can* manage democracy successfully.

IS TAIWAN an obstacle in U.S.-China relations or might it actually be an opportunity? For the last twenty-five years, U.S.-China differences over the issue have been successfully managed within a framework that has two essential premises: first, these differences

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must be addressed peacefully; second, they must be resolved by agreement of both parties, without a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan. This is called the "One China" policy, although the policy rests on a fundamental ambiguity concerning its very name: both sides have different views of what "One China" means and the United States has never advanced a view of its own (although President Clinton's adoption of the PRC's "Three No's" formulation during his visit to Shanghai in 1998 was interpreted as a substantial tilt toward the PRC's view). "One China" is supposed to be open to any interpretation the two sides can agree on.

Although today's circumstances are vastly different from those that prevailed when the Shanghai Communiqué was signed in 1972, the "One China" policy remains the best available framework for handling a difficult and sensitive issue. It is a framework that preserves freedom, democracy and prosperity in Taiwan, even as it denies the island the formal independence that many of its citizens desire. At the same time, by avoiding a direct affront to mainland China's sovereignty, it helps to avoid military conflict. Yet it will be more difficult to sustain this framework in the post-Cold War period, because of the enormous changes that have occurred on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

The most important of these changes has been the establishment of genuine democracy in Taiwan. As recently as twenty years ago—another example of the rapidity of change—the island was still ruled by a brutal dictatorship. As welcome as it is, democratization complicates Taiwan's dealings with the mainland. The government in Taiwan must now answer to its people, the great majority of whom are native Taiwanese with little attachment to China. In the post-Cold War period, when flimsy mini-states such as Macedonia, the Kyrgyz Republic and East Timor have acquired independence, it is difficult to explain why a prosperous democracy of more than twenty million people is not so entitled.

From the PRC side, fear that pro-independence sentiment might lead to a *de jure* assertion of independence by Taiwan has apparently strengthened the view in some quarters that the aim of reunification must be pressed more rapidly. It may also be that Jiang Zemin, like some other world leaders, has an eye toward his personal legacy and believes that, following on Hong Kong and Macau, he can somehow complete reunification in his lifetime. Nor can one discount the possible influence of the kind of strategic thinking found in Chinese military circles that Taiwan is the "crucial point in the first chain of islands", the key to realizing Admiral Liu Huaqing's assertion that "the Chinese navy should exert effective control of the seas within the first island chain", defined as comprising the Aleutians, the Kuriles, Japan (including the Ryukyus), Taiwan, the Philippines and most of Indonesia.

The stiffening of the PRC's approach to Taiwan also reflects the changed geopolitical situation since the end of the Cold War. China no longer needs the United States to balance a threatening neighbor and may instead revel in the prospect of its own growing power. Not that the United States ever used its leverage very well in any case. All the talk about China as a "card" to be played in U.S.-Soviet relations obviously increased China's own sense of its bargaining power with the United States. George Shultz—who described his own attitude as "a marked departure from the so-called China-card policy"—observed at the time he became secretary of state that,

> When the geostrategic importance of China became the conceptual prism through which Sino-American relations were viewed, it was almost inevitable that American policymakers became overly solicitous of Chinese interests,

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concerns, and sensitivities. . . . On the basis of my own experience, I knew it would be a mistake to place too much emphasis on a relationship for its own sake. A good relationship should emerge from the ability to solve substantive problems of interest to both countries.

"You owe us a debt", Deng Xiaoping said to Kissinger in one negotiating session in 1974, referring to the American use of the "China card" in its dealings with Moscow. Yet in this case, as in so many others, China managed to convince the United States—or to help Americans convince themselves—that we needed the relationship more than they did, when the situation was more nearly the reverse. It is a mystery why the United States needed China's help to reach two Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties that conceded large advantages to the Soviet Union—the second of which, indeed, was so deeply flawed that it never gained Senate ratification. It is much more obvious what China gained from the relationship during a period when the Soviet Union was threatening preventive war against China.

Most amazingly of all, it was we Americans who sought a hasty conclusion of the normalization negotiations in late 1978. If any side urgently needed normalization then it was China, which was preparing to invade Vietnam, a country that had just signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union. But again, the United States acted as though the U.S.-China relationship was more important to us than to China. The result was easy to predict: an opportunity to achieve clarity on the crucial issue of arms sales to Taiwan was lost. Instead, the United States agreed to a moratorium on arms sales during the first year after normalization, mumbling an explanation that afterwards "the sale of selected, defensive arms . . . would continue in a way that did not endanger the prospects for peace in the region", while taking "note of China's continuing opposition to arms sales." This led directly to the crisis that culminated in the August 1982 communiqué on arms sales, an ambiguous resolution of the issue that rests on conflicting interpretations by the two sides.

Clarity is not always a virtue, and often ambiguity is a practical way to achieve an agreement with which both sides can live. The very term "One China" is ambiguous and the United States should leave any attempts at clarification to the parties themselves. By adopting the PRC's "Three No's" when he was in Shanghai in 1998, President Clinton foreclosed some possible avenues of agreement. More dangerously, he undermined the confidence of the Taiwanese in earlier U.S. assurances. Taiwanese anxiety was further heightened by the justifiable impression that the United States was surrendering to PRC pressure, as reflected in Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth's talk about an agreement on "interim measures", or China specialist Kenneth Lieberthal's proposal, shortly before joining the NSC, for a fifty-year interim agreement.

The more we seem to be pressing Taiwan to negotiate with China, the more fearful Taiwan becomes and the more we encourage the PRC to intensify its pressure. The United States needs to encourage *maximum* patience on this issue. For the status quo is quite satisfactory, and serious movement can only come if the PRC offers inducements to Taiwan, not pressure. Indeed, the record strongly suggests that the PRC and Taiwan—not unlike the Arab states and Israel—deal best with one another when they have to take responsibility for their own negotiating positions, with U.S. encouragement but without U.S. pressure. Under these conditions they negotiated joint membership of the Asian Development Bank in 1985 and of APEC in 1991.

The record further suggests that Taiwan-PRC relations improve when

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Taiwan—like so many others who have been dependent on the United States—feels secure in its reliance on America. Despite repeated warnings from various experts that strong U.S. demonstrations of support for Taiwan—the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, Reagan's 1982 refusal to terminate arms sales, the Indigenous Defense Fighter project in 1985, the sale of F-16s in 1992—would disrupt the relationship between Beijing and Taipei, a period of convivial relations followed each of these events. When trouble has arisen, it has been the product of mixed signals, as with the administration's shifting positions on the question of a visa for Lee Teng-hui in 1995, which indicated to both sides that U.S. policy might very well bend under pressure.

While ambiguity on the definition of "One China" is desirable and on the subject of arms sales is probably necessary, there are two areas involving American intentions where ambiguity serves no purpose. The first concerns the U.S. attitude toward the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue, the second our attitude toward Taiwanese independence.

A senior Clinton defense official reportedly told the Chinese that America's response to the use of force against Taiwan would "depend on the circumstances." At the same time, many in Taiwan believe that U.S. support remains unconditional. We have indulged misleading impressions on both sides. It would be a strategic as well as a moral mistake for the United States to let China have its way with Taiwan. No matter how much other countries in the region might criticize Taiwan for having contributed to the crisis, and no matter how much they might try to distance themselves from the United States, they would also view the U.S. response as a test of America's strategic will. At the same time, while making it clear to Taiwan that the United States will not abandon it or force it to negotiate under pressure, we should also convey that we expect reasonable behavior in return—which would include avoiding a unilateral declaration of independence.

There are some who wish that the Chinese civil war had ended with a more complete communist victory, so that we would not have to deal with the Taiwan "obstacle." One of my predecessors as assistant secretary of state for the Asia-Pacific region is reported once to have wished in jest that a tidal wave might literally wash the problem away. But this view is as unrealistic as it is morally blind. Once we accept the hand we have been dealt, obstacles can be turned into opportunities. We will not have peace in the Taiwan Strait if this promising democracy is made to disappear. We will only have peace when it is accepted as a fact of life. Only then will the friends of Taiwan be able to see why it is genuinely better for Taiwan to be joined with China, pointing the way to the kind of government that the great Chinese people deserve.

* * *

WHILE far from perfect, the only means available to us of anticipating what may lie ahead is to reflect as best we can on what has gone before. China is just one example of where reflecting on our Cold War experiences provides us a road map for the future. It is to be hoped that the next century will be one of great opportunity for the improvement of life on this planet and the expansion of human creativity, not one scarred by the deep tragedies that marked much of the last century. But we will have a far better chance of achieving that aim if we remember how we got to where we are today, rather than burying the divisions of the past in a warm and fuzzy nostalgia. □

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Globalization and American Power

Kenneth N. Waltz

ASSOCIATING interdependence with democracy, peace and prosperity is nothing new. Before World War I, the close interdependence of states was thought of as heralding an era of peace among nations, and democracy and prosperity within them. In his widely read book, *The Great Illusion*, Norman Angell summed up the texts of generations of classical and neoclassical economists and drew from them the dramatic conclusion that wars would no longer be fought because they would not pay. World War I instead produced the great disillusion, which reduced political optimism to a level that remained low almost until the end of the Cold War—"almost", because beginning in the 1970s a new optimism, strikingly similar to the old, began to resurface. Interdependence was again associated with peace, and increasingly with democracy, which began to spread wonderfully to Latin America, to Asia and, with the Soviet Union's collapse, to Eastern Europe. In 1989 Francis Fukuyama foresaw in these pages a time when all states would be liberal democracies, and more recently Michael Doyle projected that this would happen sometime between 2050 and 2100.[1]

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, in their 1977 book *Power and Interdependence*, strengthened the notion that interdependence promotes peace by arguing that simple interdependence had become complex interdependence, binding the economic and hence the political interests of states ever more tightly together. Now we hear from many sides that interdependence has reached yet another height, transcending states and establishing a *Borderless World*, the title and theme of Kenichi Ohmae's 1990 book. People, firms and markets matter more; states matter less. Each tightening of the economic screw raises the benefits of economic exchange and makes war among the more advanced states increasingly costly. The simple and plausible propositions are that as the benefits of peace rise, so do the costs of war; when states perceive wars to be immensely costly, they will be disinclined to fight them. Still, war is not abolished, because even the strongest economic forces cannot conquer fear or eliminate concern for national honor. Generally, however, economic interests dominate and markets begin to

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[1]Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), pp. 480-1.

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supplant politics at home and abroad. That economics depresses politics and limits its significance is taken to be a happy thought.

The State of the State

GLOBALIZATION is the fad of the 1990s, and globalization is made in America. Thomas Friedman's *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (1999) is perhaps the most exultant celebration of the American way, of market capitalism and liberal democracy. Free markets, transparency and flexibility are the watchwords. The "electronic herd" moves vast amounts of capital in and out of countries according to their political and economic merits. Capital moves almost instantaneously into countries with stable governments, progressive economies, open accounting and honest dealing, and out of countries lacking those qualities. States can defy the "herd", but they will pay a price, usually a steep one, as did Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and South Korea in the late 1990s. Some countries may defy the herd inadvertently (the countries just mentioned); others out of ideological conviction (Cuba and North Korea); some because they can afford to (oil-rich countries); others because history has simply passed them by (many African countries).

Countries wishing to attract capital and to gain the benefits of today's and tomorrow's technology must don the "golden straitjacket", a package of policies including balanced budgets, economic deregulation, openness to investment and trade, and a stable currency. The herd decides which countries to reward and which to punish, and nothing can be done about its decisions. The herd has no telephone number. When it decides to withdraw capital from a country, there is no one to complain to or petition for relief. Decisions of the herd are not made; they happen, and they happen because many individual investors make simultaneous decisions on similar grounds to invest or to withdraw their funds. Globalization is a process shaped by markets, not by governments.

Globalization means homogenization. Prices, products, wages, wealth, rates of interest and profit tend to converge the world over. Like any powerful movement for change, globalization encounters resistance—in America from religious fundamentalists, labor unions and their allies; abroad from anti-Americanists; everywhere from cultural traditionalists. The "end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism have discredited all models other than liberal democracy." The statement is by democratic theorist Larry Diamond, and Friedman repeats it with approval. There is but one best way, and America has found it. As Friedman puts it, "It's a post-industrial world, and America today is good at everything that is post-industrial." The herd does not care about forms of government as such, but it values and rewards "stability, predictability, transparency, and the ability to transfer and protect its private property." The message to all governments is clear: conform or suffer.

There is much in what Friedman says, and he says it very well. But how much? And, specifically, what is the effect of closer interdependence on the conduct of the internal and external affairs of nations?

First, we should ask how far globalization has proceeded. In fact, much of the world has been left out of the process: most of Africa and Latin America, Russia, all of the Middle East (except Israel), and large parts of Asia. Moreover, for many countries the degree of participation in the global economy varies by region. Northern Italy, for example, is in; southern Italy is out. Globalization is not truly global, but is mainly limited to northern latitudes. Linda Weiss points out that, as

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of 1991, 81 percent of the world stock of foreign direct investment was located in high-wage northern countries: the United States, followed by the United Kingdom, Germany and Canada. She adds that the concentration of investment in these countries has increased by 12 percent since 1967.[2] Obviously, the world is not one.

Second, we should compare the interdependence of nations today with interdependence earlier. The rapid growth of international trade and investment from the mid-1850s into the 1910s preceded a prolonged period of war, internal revolution and national insularity. During the years of post-World War II recovery, protectionist policies lingered as the United States opened its borders to trade while taking a relaxed attitude toward countries that protected their markets. One might say that from 1914 into the 1960s an interdependence deficit developed, which helps to explain the steady growth of interdependence thereafter. Among the richest twenty-four industrial economies (the OECD countries), exports grew at about twice the rate of GDP after 1960. In 1960 exports accounted for 9.5 percent of their national GDPs; in 1900 that figure was 20.5 percent.[3] Finding that the level of interdependence in 1999 approximately equals that of 1910 is hardly surprising. What is true of trade also holds for capital flows, again as a percentage of GDP.

Third, money markets may be the only economic sector that has become truly global. Finance capital moves freely across the frontiers of OECD countries and quite freely elsewhere. Still, with the movement of financial assets as with commodities, the present remains like the past. Despite today's ease of communication, financial markets in 1900 were at least as integrated as they are now.

Yet many globalizers underestimate the extent to which the new resembles the old. In any competitive system the winners are imitated by the losers. In political as in economic development, latecomers imitate the practices and adopt the institutions of the countries that have shown the way. Occasionally, someone finds a way to outflank, to invent a new way or to ingeniously modify an old way to gain an advantage; and then the process of imitation begins anew. That competitors begin to look like one another if the competition is close and continuous is a familiar story. But the apostles of globalization argue that the process has now sped up immensely. In the old political era, the strong vanquished the weak; in the new economic era, says Friedman, quoting Klaus Schwab, "the fast eat the slow." No longer is it "do what the strong party says or risk physical punishment", but "do what the electronic herd requires or remain impoverished." In a competitive system, a few do exceptionally well, some get along, and many bring up the rear.

If states must conform to the ways of the more successful among them or pay a stiff price for not doing so, we then have to ask what becomes of the state itself. The message of globalizers is that economic and technological forces impose on states a near uniformity of political and economic forms and functions. A glance at just the past seventy-five years, however, reveals that a variety of political and economic systems have produced impressive results and have been admired in their day for doing so.

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[2]Weiss, *The Myth of the Powerless State: Governing the Economy in a Global Era* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1998), p. 186.

[3]Robert Wade, "Globalization and its Limits: Reports of the Death of the National Economy are Grossly Exaggerated", in *National Diversity and Global Capitalism*, ed. Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 62. Cf. Weiss, *Myth*, Table 6-1.

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In the 1930s and again in the 1950s, the Soviet Union's economic growth rates were among the world's highest, so impressive in the 1950s that America feared being overtaken and passed by. In the 1970s, West European welfare states with managed and directed economies were highly regarded. In the late 1970s through the 1980s, the Japanese brand of neomercantilism was thought to be the wave of the future, and Western Europe and the United States worried about being able to keep up. Imitate or perish was the counsel of some; pry the Japanese economy open and make it compete on our grounds was the message of others. America did not do much of either, yet in the 1990s its economy, too, has flourished.

Yet it is odd—and intellectually reckless—to conclude from a decade's experience that the one best model has at last appeared. True globalization, if it were realized, would mean a near uniformity of conditions across countries. But even in the 1990s, one finds little evidence of this. The advanced countries of the world have enjoyed or suffered distinct fates. Major West European countries were plagued by high and persistent unemployment; many Northeast and Southeast Asian countries experienced economic stagnation or collapse, while China continued to do quite well; and we know about the United States.

Globalizers, to be sure, do not claim that globalization is complete, only that the process is irreversible. Some evidence supports the conclusion, some does not. Looking at the big picture, one notices that nations whose economies have faltered or failed have been more fully controlled, directed and supported by the state than has the American economy. Soviet-style economies failed miserably, in China only the free-market sector flourishes, the once much-favored Swedish model has proved wanting, and the economies of the European Union suffer from high unemployment and low growth. One can easily add more examples. From these it is tempting to leap to the conclusion that America has indeed found, or stumbled onto, the one best way.

Obviously, Thomas Friedman thinks so. Tip O'Neill, when he was a congressman from Massachusetts, declared that all politics are local. Wrong, Friedman now says, all politics have become global. "The electronic herd", he writes, "turns the whole world into a parliamentary system, in which every government lives under the fear of a no-confidence vote from the herd."

BUT IT IS hard to believe that economic processes direct or determine a nation's policies, that spontaneous individual decisions about where to place resources reward or punish a national economy so strongly that a government either does what pleases the "herd" or its economy fails to prosper or even risks collapse. We all recall recent cases, some of them mentioned above, that seem to support Friedman's thesis. Mentioning them both makes a point and raises doubts.

For one thing, even if all politics has become global, economies remain local to a surprising extent. Countries with large economies continue to do most of their business at home. Sectors of the American economy that are scarcely involved in international trade—such as government, construction, nonprofit organizations, utilities, and wholesale and retail trade—employ 82 percent of Americans.[4] As Paul Krugman observes, "The United States is still almost 90 percent an economy that produces goods

[4]Robert Z. Lawrence, "Workers and Economists II: Resist the Binge", *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 1994).

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and services for its own use." For the world's three largest economies—the United States, Japan, and the European Union taken as a unit—exports account for 12 percent or less of GDP.[5] The world, then, is less interdependent than is usually supposed. Moreover, developed countries, oil imports aside, do the bulk of their external business with one another, which means that their dependence on imported commodities that they could not easily produce themselves is further reduced.

Reinforcing the parochial pattern of productivity, the famous footloose corporations also turn out to be firmly anchored in their home bases. A study of the world's one hundred largest corporations concludes that not one of them could be called truly "global" or "footloose." Another study found exactly one multinational corporation that seemed to be leaving its home base: Britain's chemical company, ICI. On all the important counts—location of assets, site of research and development, ownership, management—the importance of a corporation's home base is marked. And the technological prowess of corporations corresponds closely to that of the countries in which they are located.

Again, within advanced countries at similar levels of development that are closely interrelated, one would expect uniformities of form and function to be most fully displayed. Indeed, GDP per work hour among seven of the most prosperous countries nearly came into alignment between the 1950s and the 1980s.[6] Yet, while countries at a high level of development do tend to converge in productivity, that is something of a tautology. Stephen Woolcock, looking at forms of corporate governance within the European Union, finds a "spectrum of approaches" and expects it to persist for the foreseeable future.[7] Since the 1950s, for example, the economies of Germany and France have grown more closely together as each became the principal trading partner of the other. But a study of the two countries concludes that France has copied German policies yet has been unwilling or unable to copy German institutions.[8]

THE MOST telling refutation of the belief that state power has sharply declined is to be found in the state's capacity for transformation. Because technological innovation is rapid, and because economic conditions at home and abroad change often, states that adapt easily to such changes enjoy considerable advantages. International politics remains inter-national. National systems display a great deal of resilience. Those that adapt well grow and prosper; others just manage to get along. In this spirit, Ezra Taft Benson, when he was President Eisenhower's secretary of agriculture, gave this kindly advice to America's small farmers: "Get big or get out."

Success in competitive systems requires the units of the system to adopt ways they would often prefer to avoid. The United States looked to be heavy-footed in the 1980s when Japan's economy was booming. It seemed that the Ministry of International Trade and Industry was manned by geniuses who guided Japan's economy effortlessly to its impressive accomplishments. Now it is the United States that appears light-footed.

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[5]Weiss, *Myth*, p. 176.

[6]Robert Boyer, "The Convergence Hypothesis Revisited: Globalization but Still the Century of Nations", in *National Diversity*, p. 37.

[7]Woolcock, "Competition among Forms of Corporate Governance in the European Community: The Case of Britain", in *National Diversity*, p. 196.

[8]Andrea Boltho, "Has France Converged on Germany?", in *National Diversity*, chap. 3.

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Students of American government point out that one of the advantages of a federal system is that the separate states can act as laboratories for socioeconomic experimentation. When some states succeed, others imitate them. The same thought applies to nations.

States adapt, but they also protect themselves. Different nations, with distinct institutions and traditions, protect themselves in different ways. Japan fosters industries, defends them, and manages its trade. The United States uses its political, economic and military leverage to manipulate international events to promote its interests. Thus, as David E. Spiro elaborately shows, international markets and institutions did not recycle petrodollars after 1974; the United States did. Despite many statements to the contrary, the United States worked effectively through different administrations and under different cabinet secretaries to undermine markets and thwart international institutions. Its leverage enabled it to manipulate the oil crisis to serve its own interests.[9]

Many of the interdependence boosters of the 1970s expected the state to wither and fade away. Charles Kindleberger, for example, wrote in 1969 that "the nation-state is just about through as an economic unit." Globalizers of the 1990s believe that this time it really is happening. The state has lost its "monopoly over internal sovereignty", Wolfgang H. Reinecke writes, and as "an externally sovereign actor" it "will become a thing of the past."[10] But even as this is being asserted it is striking that, internally, the range of governmental functions and the extent of state control over societies and economies has seldom been fuller than it is now. After World War II, West European governments spent about 25 percent of their nations' products; now the figure is about 50 percent. In many parts of the world the concern has been not over the diminished internal powers of the state but over their increase. And although state control has lessened somewhat recently, does anyone really believe that economically advanced states have returned to a 1930s level—let alone to a nineteenth-century level—of governmental regulation?

States perform essential political, social and economic functions, and no other organization rivals them in these respects. They foster the institutions that make internal peace and prosperity possible. In the state of nature, as Kant put it, there is "no mine and thine." States turn possession into property and thus make saving, production and prosperity possible. The sovereign state with fixed borders has proved to be the best organization for keeping peace internally and fostering the conditions for economic well-being.

We do not have to wonder what happens to society and the economy when a state begins to fade away, for we have all too many examples. A few obvious ones are China in the 1920s and 1930s and again during the Cultural Revolution, many African states since their independence, and currently post-Soviet Russia. The less competent a state, the more likely it is to dissolve into component parts or be unable to adapt to transnational developments. Challenges at home and abroad test the mettle of states. In modern times, enough states have always passed the test to keep the international system functioning as a system of states. The challenges vary but states endure. They have proved to be hardy survivors.

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[9]Spiro, *The Hidden Hand of American Hegemony: Petrodollar Recycling and International Markets* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), especially chap. 6.

[10]Reinecke, "Global Public Policy", *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 1997), p. 137.

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The State in International Politics

ECONOMIC globalization would mean that the world economy, or at least the globalized portion of it, would be not merely interdependent but integrated. The difference between an interdependent and an integrated world is a qualitative one and not a mere matter of proportionately more trade and greater and more rapid flows of capital. With integration, the world would look like one big state. Economic markets and interests, however, cannot perform the functions of government. Integration requires or presumes a government to protect, direct and control.

Interdependence, in contrast, is "the mere mutualism" of states, as Emile Durkheim put it. Interdependence is not only looser than is usually thought but is also politically less consequential. Interdependence did not produce the world-shaking events of 1989–91. A *political* event, the failure of one of the world's two great powers, did that. Had the configuration of international politics not fundamentally changed, neither the unification of Germany nor the war against Saddam Hussein would have been possible. The most important events in international politics are explained by differences in the capabilities of states, not by economic forces operating across states or transcending them. Interdependence theorists, and globalizers even more so, argue that the international economic interests of states work against their going to war. True, they do; yet if one asks whether economic interests or nuclear weapons inhibit war more strongly, the answer obviously is nuclear weapons.

Europe's great powers prior to World War I were tightly bound together economically. They nevertheless fought a long and bloody war. The United States and the Soviet Union were not even loosely connected economically. They nevertheless sustained an uneasy peace for four and a half decades. The most important causes of peace, as of war, are found in international-political conditions, including the weaponry available to states. Events following the Cold War dramatically demonstrate the political weakness of economic forces. The integration (not just the interdependence) of the parts of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, with all of their entangling economic interests, did not prevent their disintegration. Governments and people sacrifice welfare and even security in pursuit of national, ethnic and religious ends.

National *politics*, not international markets, account for many international *economic* developments. Many students of politics and economics believe that economic blocs are becoming more common. But economic interests and market forces do not create blocs; governments do. Without governmental decisions the Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community, and the European Union would not have emerged. American governments forged NAFTA, and it was Japan that fashioned an East and Southeast Asian producing and trading area. Governments intervene much more in international economic matters today than they did in the earlier era of interdependence. Before World War I, foreign ministry officials were famed for their lack of knowledge of, or interest in, economic affairs. Because governments have become much more active in economic affairs at home and abroad, interdependence has become less of an autonomous force in international politics.

The many commentators who exaggerate the closeness of interdependence, and even more so the extent of globalization, think of individual states rather than of the international political system as a whole. Many small states import and export large shares of their gross national

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products. But states with large GNPs do not. When most of the great powers were smaller, they depended heavily on one another both economically and militarily. Great Britain and Germany before World War I were each other's second-best customers for both exports and imports, and their trade accounted for a huge proportion of their GNPs—52 and 38 percent, respectively. After World War II, the world's two great powers were barely dependent on others, while a number of other states depended heavily on them. The terms of political, economic and military competition are set by the larger units of the international political system. Through centuries of multipolarity, with five or so great powers of comparable size competing with one another, the international system was highly interdependent. Under bipolarity and unipolarity the degree of interdependence has declined markedly.

States are differentiated from one another not by function but primarily by capability. For two reasons inequalities across states have greater political impact than inequalities across income groups within states. First, the inequalities of states are larger and have been growing more rapidly. Rich countries have become richer while poor countries have remained poor. Second, in a system without central governance, the influence of the units of greater capability is disproportionately large because there are no effective laws and institutions to direct and constrain them. They are able to work the system to their advantage, as the petrodollar example cited above shows.

In the international system as it exists today, the United States is truly blessed. Precisely because the United States depends relatively little on others, it has a wide range of policy choices and the ability both to bring pressure on others and to assist them. The "herd" with its capital may flee from countries when it collectively decides that they are politically and economically unworthy, but some countries abroad, like some firms at home, are so important that they cannot be allowed to fail. National governments and international agencies then come to the rescue. The United States is the country that most often has the ability and the will to step in. The agency that most often acts is the IMF, and most countries think of the IMF as the enforcement arm of the U.S. Treasury. Thomas Friedman believes that when the "herd" makes its decisions, there is no appeal, but often there is one, and it is for a bailout organized by the United States.

The international economy, like national economies, operates within a set of rules and institutions that have to be made and sustained. Britain to a large extent provided this service prior to World War I; no one did between the wars, and the United States has done so since.

The Unhidden Fist

IF, ECONOMICALLY, the United States is the world's most important country, militarily it is the decisive one. Thomas Friedman puts the point simply: the world is sustained by "the presence of American power and America's willingness to use that power against those who would threaten the system of globalization. . . . The hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist." But the fist is in full view.

On its military forces, the United States outspends the next seven biggest spenders combined. When force is required to keep or to restore the peace, either the United States leads the way or the peace is not kept. The Cold War militarized international politics. Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and among some other countries as well, came to be defined largely in a single dimension: the military one.

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Oddly, the end of the Cold War has elevated the importance of the military component in American foreign policy. Thus, William J. Perry and Ashton B. Carter, former secretary and assistant secretary of defense, have recently offered the concept of "preventive defense" as a guide to American policy. Preventive defense is conducted by American defense officials engaging in "security and military dialogue with regional states"; it calls for "a more robust defense to defense program."[11] Indeed, in many of the successor states of the Soviet Union, and in some other parts of the world as well, our defense personnel carry out what American policy there is.

The United States continues to spend, too, at a Cold War pace. In real terms, America's 1995 military budget approximately equaled the 1980 budget, and in 1980 the Cold War was at its height. The fact that most other countries have reduced their budgets more than the United States has heightened its military dominance. Some say that the world is not really unipolar because the United States often needs, or at least seeks, the help of others. The truth, however, remains: the stronger have many more ways of coping with adversities than the weak have, and the latter depend on the former much more than the other way around. The United States is the only country that can organize and lead a military coalition, as it did in Iraq and in the Balkans. Some states have little choice but to participate, partly because of the pressure the strong can bring to bear on the weak and partly because of the needs of the latter. West European countries and Japan are more dependent on Middle Eastern oil than is the United States, and Western Europe is more affected by what happens in Eastern Europe than is the United States.

As expected, the beneficiaries resent their benefactor, which leads to talk of righting the imbalance of power. Yet when the imbalance between one and the rest is great, catching up is difficult. French leaders especially bemoan the absence of multipolarity and call for greater European strength, but one cannot usefully will the end without willing the means. The uneven distribution of capabilities continues to be the key to understanding international politics.

America continues to garrison much of the world and to look for ways of keeping troops in foreign countries rather than withdrawing them, as one might have expected it to do at the Cold War's end.[12] The 1992 draft of the Pentagon's Defense Planning Guidance advocated "discouraging the advanced industrialized nations from . . . even aspiring to a larger global or regional role." The United States may at times seek help from others, but not too much help, lest it lose its leading position in one part of the world or another. The document, when it was leaked, provoked criticism. In response, emphasis was placed on its being only a draft, but its tenets continue to guide American policy.

Discontent in the Caboose

IN A SYSTEM of balanced states, the domination by one or some of them has in the past been prevented by the reaction of others acting as counterweights. The states of Europe held each other in balance through the first three hundred years of the modern state system. In the following fifty years,

[11]Perry and Carter, *Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), pp. 9, 11.

[12]Hans Binnendijk, for example, has urged Americans to develop a case for leaving American troops in South Korea even if the North should no longer be a threat. See *Strategic Assessment 1996: Instruments of U.S. Power* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996), p. 2.

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the United States and the Soviet Union checked each other, each protecting its sphere and attempting to manage affairs within it. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been alone in the world; no state or combination of states provides an effective counterweight.

What are the implications for international politics? The more interdependent the system, the more a surrogate for government is needed. Some Americans believe that the United States provides this service and that, because of its moderation, other states will continue to appreciate, or at least to accept, its managerial role. Benign hegemony is, however, something of a contradiction in terms. "One reads about the world's desire for American leadership only in the United States", a British diplomat has remarked. "Everywhere else one reads about American arrogance and unilateralism."

American leaders seem to believe that America's pre-eminent position will last indefinitely. The United States would then remain the dominant power without rivals rising to challenge it, a position without precedent in modern history. When Americans speak of preserving the balance in East Asia through our military presence, the Chinese understandably take this to mean that we intend to maintain the strategic hegemony we now enjoy in the *absence* of a balance of power. When China makes steady though modest efforts to improve the quality of its inferior forces, we see a future threat to our and others' interests. Whatever worries the United States has in East Asia and whatever threats it feels, Japan experiences them earlier, feels them more severely, and reacts to them. China then worries as Japan improves its airlift and sealift capabilities and as the United States bolsters its forces in Korea. The actions and reactions of China, Japan and Korea, with or without American participation, are creating a new balance of power in East Asia, which is becoming part of the new balance of power in the world.

In the Cold War, the United States won a decisive victory. Victory in war, however, often breeds lasting enmities. Magnanimity in victory is rare. Winners of wars, facing few impediments to the exercise of their wills, often act in ways that create future enemies. Thus Germany, by taking Alsace and most of Lorraine from France in 1871, earned its lasting enmity; and the Allies' harsh treatment of Germany after World War I produced a similar effect. In contrast, Bismarck persuaded the Kaiser not to march his armies along the road to Vienna after the great victory at Königgratz in 1866. In the Treaty of Prague, Prussia took no Austrian territory. Thus Austria, having become Austria-Hungary, was available as an alliance partner for Germany in 1879.

Rather than learning from history, the United States repeats past errors by expanding NATO eastward and extending its influence over what used to be the province of the vanquished. This alienates Russia and nudges it toward China instead of drawing it toward Europe and America. Despite much talk about the "globalization" of international politics, American political leaders to a dismaying extent think of East *or* West rather than of their interaction.

McGeorge Bundy once described the United States as "the locomotive at the head of mankind, and the rest of the world the caboose." America's pulling power is at a peak that cannot be sustained, for two main reasons. First, America is a country of 276 million people in a world of 6 billion, representing less than 5 percent of the world's total population. The country's physical capabilities and political will cannot sustain present international burdens indefinitely. Second, other countries may not enjoy being placed at the back of the train. Both friends and foes will react as countries

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always have to the threatened or real predominance of one among them: they will work to right the balance. The present condition of international politics is unnatural. Both the predominance of America and, one may hope, the militarization of international affairs will diminish with time.

Many globalizers believe that the world is increasingly ruled by markets. Looking at the state of states leads one to a different conclusion. The main difference between international politics now and earlier is not found in the increased interdependence of states but in their growing inequality. With the end of bipolarity, the distribution of capabilities among states has become extremely lopsided. Rather than elevating economic forces and depressing political ones, the inequalities of international politics enhance the political role of one country. Politics as usual prevails over economics. □

Identifying the Threat

As Gov. George W. Bush of Texas campaigns furiously through [Iowa] in the final days leading up to its caucuses on Monday, he is amassing examples of twisted verbiage and oratorical bloopers that bring to mind his famously tongue-tied father's forays into linguistic limbo. The most memorable one came Friday night, as he addressed a crowd in Council Bluffs. Mr. Bush was entering the span of his speech in which he normally compares the foreign policy paradigm of yesteryear, when the country's enemy was the Soviet Union, with the situation today, when threats are less predictable. But he skidded off the rails and into a bog of free-floating pronouns and absent antecedents. 'When I was coming up,' the Texas governor said, 'it was a dangerous world and we knew exactly who the they were. It was us versus them and it was clear who them was. Today, we're not so sure who the they are, but we know they're there.'

—Frank Bruni, *New York Times*, January 23, 2000

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The Present Danger

Robert Kagan and William Kristol

A LITTLE OVER twenty years ago, a group of concerned Americans formed the Committee on the Present Danger. The danger they feared, and sought to rally Americans to confront, was the Soviet Union.

It is easy to forget these days how controversial was the suggestion in the middle to late 1970s that the Soviet Union was really a danger, much less one that should be challenged by the United States. This was hardly the dominant view of the American foreign policy establishment. Quite the contrary: prevailing wisdom from the Nixon through the Carter administrations held that the United States should do its utmost to coexist peaceably with the USSR, and that the American people in any case were not capable of mounting a serious challenge to the Soviet system. To engage in an arms race would either bankrupt the United States or lead to Armageddon. To challenge communist ideology at its core, to declare it evil and illegitimate, would be at best quixotic and at worst perilous.

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When the members of the Committee on the Present Danger challenged this comfortable consensus, when they criticized détente and arms control, and called for a military build-up and a broad ideological and strategic assault on Soviet communism, their recommendations were generally dismissed as either naive or reckless. It would take a revolution in American foreign policy, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the disintegration of the Soviet empire to prove just how right they were.

Does this Cold War tale have any relevance today as Americans grapple with the uncertainties of the post-Cold War era? The Soviet Union has long since crumbled. No global strategic challenger has emerged to take its place, none appears visible on the horizon, and the international scene at present seems fairly benign to most observers. Many of our strategists tell us that we will not face another major threat for twenty years or more, and that we may as a consequence enjoy a "strategic pause." According to opinion polls, the American public is today less interested in foreign policy than at any time since before World War II. Intermittent fears of terrorist attack, worries about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, concerns about the possible outbreak of war in the Taiwan Strait or in the Balkans—all attract attention, but only fleetingly. The United States, both at the level of elite opinion and pop-

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ular sentiment, appears to have become the Alfred E. Newman of superpowers—its national motto, "What, me worry?"

But there *is* today a "present danger." It has no name. It is not to be found in any single strategic adversary. It does not fit neatly under the heading of "international terrorism" or "rogue states" or "ethnic hatred." In fact, the ubiquitous post-Cold War question—where is the threat?—is misconceived. Rather, the present danger is that the United States, the world's dominant power on whom the maintenance of international peace and the support of liberal democratic principles depend, will shrink its responsibilities and—in a fit of absentmindedness, or parsimony, or indifference—allow the international order that it created and sustains to collapse. Our present danger is one of declining strength, flagging will and confusion about our role in the world. It is a danger, to be sure, of our own devising. Yet, if neglected, it is likely to yield very real external dangers, nearly as threatening in their own way as the Soviet Union was a quarter century ago.

IN FACT, beneath the surface calm, there has already been an erosion of the mostly stable, peaceful and democratic international order that emerged at the end of the Cold War. Americans and their political leaders have spent the years since 1991 lavishing the gifts of an illusory "peace dividend" upon themselves, and frittering away the opportunity to strengthen and extend an international order uniquely favorable to the United States. The task for America at the start of the 1990s ought to have been obvious. It was to guard this extraordinary international system from any threats that might challenge it. It was to prolong the new period of relative stability and democratic progress as far into the future as possible. That meant, above all, preserving and reinforcing America's benevolent global hegemony, which undergirded what President George Bush rightly called a "new world order." The goal of American foreign policy should have been to turn Charles Krauthammer's "unipolar moment" into a unipolar era.

Throughout the 1990s, the United States has tended toward a course of gradual moral and strategic disarmament. Challenged by anti-American dictatorships in Baghdad and Belgrade, the Clinton administration responded by combining empty threats and indecisive military operations with diplomatic accommodation. Rather than press for changes of regime in Pyongyang and Beijing, the White House sought to purchase better behavior through bribes and "engagement." Rather than face squarely our world responsibilities, American political leaders chose drift and evasion.

In the meantime, the United States allowed its military strength to deteriorate to the point where its ability to defend its interests and deter future challenges is now in doubt. From 1989 to 1999, the defense budget and the size of the armed forces were cut by a third; the share of America's GDP devoted to defense spending was halved, from nearly 6 to around 3 percent; and the amount of money spent on weapons procurement and research and development declined by about 50 percent. By the end of the decade, the U.S. military was inadequately equipped and stretched to the point of exhaustion. And while defense experts spent the 1990s debating whether it was more important to maintain current readiness or to sacrifice present capabilities in order to prepare for future challenges, under the strain of excessive budget cuts the United States did neither.

Yet ten years from now, and perhaps a good deal sooner, we likely will be living in a world in which Iraq, Iran, North Korea and China all possess the ability to strike the United States with nuclear

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weapons. Within the next decade we may have to decide whether to defend Taiwan against a Chinese attack. We could face another attempt by Saddam Hussein to seize Kuwait's oil fields. An authoritarian regime in Russia could move to reclaim some of what it lost in 1991. While none of this is to argue that the world *must* become a vastly more dangerous place, the point is that the world can grow perilous with astonishing speed. Should it do so once more, it would be terrible to have to look back on the current era as a great though fleeting opportunity that was carelessly wasted. Everything depends on what we do now.

Cold War Distortions

CONTRARY to prevailing wisdom, the missed opportunities of the 1990s cannot be made up for merely by tinkering around the edges of America's current foreign and defense policies. The middle path many of our political leaders would prefer, with token increases in the defense budget and a "humble" view of America's role in the world, will not suffice. What is needed today is not better management of the status quo, but a fundamental change in the way our leaders and the public think about America's role in the world.

Serious thinking about that role should begin by recalling those tenets that guided American policy through the more successful phases of the Cold War. Many writers treat America's Cold War strategy as an aberration in the history of American foreign policy. Jeane Kirkpatrick expressed the common view of both liberal and conservative foreign policy thinkers when she wrote in these pages that, while the United States had "performed heroically in a time when heroism was required", the day had passed when Americans ought to bear such "unusual burdens." With a return to "normal" times, the United States could "again become a normal nation." In the absence of a rival on the scale of the Soviet Union, the United States should conduct itself like any other great power on the international scene, looking to secure only its immediate, tangible interests, and abjuring the broader responsibilities it had once assumed as leader of the Free World.

What is striking about this point of view is how at odds it is with the assumptions embraced by the leaders who established the guiding principles of American foreign policy at the end of World War II. We often forget that the plans for world order devised by American policymakers in the early 1940s were not aimed at containing the Soviet Union, which many of them still viewed as a potential partner. Rather, those policymakers were looking backward to the circumstances that had led to the catastrophe of global war. Their purpose was to construct a more stable international order than the one that had imploded in 1939: an economic system that furthered the aim of international stability by promoting growth and free trade; and a framework for international security that, although it placed some faith in the ability of the great powers to work together, rested ultimately on the fact that American power had become the keystone in the arch of world order.

American leaders in the early to mid-1940s rejected the notion that the United States could return to being a "normal" power after World War II. On the contrary, they believed that the "return to normalcy" that President Harding had endorsed in 1920 was the fatal error that led to the irresponsible isolationism of the 1930s. Franklin Roosevelt said in 1941, "We will not accept a world, like the postwar world of the 1920s, in which the seeds of Hitlerism can again be planted and allowed to grow." Men like James Forrestal and Dean Acheson believed that the United States had supplanted Great Britain as the world's leader and

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that, as Forrestal put it in 1941, "America must be the dominant power of the twentieth century."

Henry Luce spoke for most influential Americans inside and outside the Roosevelt administration when he insisted that it had fallen to the United States not only to win the war against Germany and Japan, but to create both "a vital international economy" and "an international moral order" that would together spread American political and economic principles—and in the process avoid the catastrophe of a third world war. Such thinking was reflected in Roosevelt's Atlantic Charter and, more concretely, in the creation of the international financial system at Bretton Woods in 1944 and of the United Nations a year later.

Thus, before American leaders came to view the Soviet Union as the great challenge to American security and American principles, they had arrived at the conclusion that it would be necessary for the United States (together, they hoped, with the other great powers) to deter aggression globally, whoever the aggressor might be. In fact, during the war years they were at least as worried about the possible re-emergence of Germany and Japan as about the Soviets. John Lewis Gaddis has summarized American thinking in the years between 1941 and 1946:

> The American President and his key advisers were determined to secure the United States against whatever dangers might confront it after victory, but they lacked a clear sense of what those might be or where they might arise. Their thinking about postwar security was, as a consequence, more general than specific.



Richard Johnson/National Post

Few influential government officials, moreover, were under the illusion that "collective security" and the United Nations could be counted on to keep the peace. In 1945 Harry Truman declared that the United States had become "one of the most powerful forces for good on earth", and the task now was to "keep it so" and to "lead the world to peace and prosperity." The United States had "achieved a world leadership which does not depend solely upon our military and naval might", Truman asserted. But it was his intention, despite demobilization, to ensure that the United States would remain "the greatest naval power on earth" and would maintain "one of the most powerful air forces in the world." Americans, Truman declared, would use "our military strength solely to preserve the peace of the world. For we now know that this is the only sure way to make our own freedom secure."

The unwillingness to sustain the level of military spending and preparedness required to fulfill this expansive vision was a failure of American foreign policy in the immediate aftermath of the war. It took the Iron Curtain and the outbreak of war in Korea to fully awaken Americans to the need for an assertive and forward-leaning foreign policy. But while the United States promptly rose to meet those challenges, a certain intellectual clarity was lost in the transition from the immediate

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postwar years to the beginning of the Cold War era. The original postwar goal of promoting and defending a decent world order became conflated with the goal of meeting the challenge of Soviet power. The policies that the United States should have pursued even in the absence of a Soviet challenge—seeking a stable and prosperous international economic order; playing a large role in Europe, Asia and the Middle East; upholding rules of international behavior that benefited Americans; promoting democratic reform where possible and advancing American principles abroad—all these became associated with the strategy of containing the Soviet Union. In fact, America was pursuing two goals at once during the Cold War: first, the promotion of a world order conducive to American interests and principles; and second, a defense against the immediate obstacle to achieving that order. Nevertheless, when the Cold War ended, many Americans recalled only the latter purpose.

The Shaping Hand

BUT THE COLLAPSE of the Soviet empire has not altered the fundamental purposes of American foreign policy. Just as sensible Americans after World War II did not imagine that the United States should retreat from global involvement and await the rise of the next equivalent to Nazi Germany, so American statesmen today ought to recognize that their charge is not to await the arrival of the next great threat, but rather to shape the international environment to prevent such a threat from arising in the first place. To put it another way: the overarching goal of American foreign policy—to preserve and extend an international order that is in accord with both our material interests and our principles—endures.

Certainly, the dramatic shift in international strategic circumstances occasioned by the Soviet collapse requires a shift in the manner in which this goal is pursued. But it is not a shift to "normalcy." In the post-Cold War era, the maintenance of a decent and hospitable international order requires continued American leadership in resisting, and where possible undermining, rising dictators and hostile ideologies; in supporting American interests and liberal democratic principles; and in providing assistance to those struggling against the more extreme manifestations of human evil. Americans must shape this order, for if we refrain from doing so, we can be sure that others will shape it in ways that reflect neither our interests nor our values.

We can hardly expect it to be otherwise. Today's international system is built not around a balance of power but around American hegemony. The international financial institutions were fashioned by Americans and serve American interests. The international security structures are chiefly a collection of American-led alliances. What Americans like to call international "norms" are really reflections of American and West European principles. Since today's relatively benevolent international circumstances are the product of our hegemonic influence, any lessening of that influence will allow others to play a larger part in shaping the world to suit *their* needs. States such as China and Russia, if given the chance, would configure the international system quite differently. Their idea of international norms, needless to say, would also be quite different. American hegemony, then, must be actively maintained, just as it was actively obtained.

This does not mean that the United States must root out evil wherever and whenever it rears its head. Nor does it suggest that the United States must embark on a crusade against every dicta-

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torship. No doctrine of foreign policy can do away with the need for judgment and prudence, for weighing competing moral considerations. No foreign policy doctrine can provide precise and unvarying answers to the question of where, when and how the United States ought to intervene abroad. It is a good deal easier to say that the United States must have criteria for choosing when to intervene than it is to formulate those criteria. Henry Kissinger writes in *Diplomacy* that what is most needed in American foreign policy are "criteria for selectivity." But he does not venture to suggest exactly what those criteria might be. If one admits that closely linked matters of prestige, principle and morality play a role in shaping foreign policy, then rigid criteria for intervention quickly prove illusory. As Kissinger well knows, the complicated workings of foreign policy and the exceptional position of the United States should guard us from believing that the national interest can be measured in a quasi-scientific fashion, or that areas of "vital" national interest can be located, and other areas excluded, by purely geopolitical calculations. Determining what is in America's national interest is an art, not a science. It requires not only the measurement of power but also an appreciation of beliefs and passions, which cannot be quantified. That is why we choose statesmen, not mathematicians, to conduct foreign policy. That is why we will occasionally have to intervene abroad even when we cannot prove that a narrowly construed "vital interest" of the United States is at stake.

It is worth pointing out, though, that a foreign policy premised on American hegemony, and on the blending of principle with material interest, may in fact mean fewer overseas interventions than under the "vital interest" standard, not more. Had the Bush administration, for example, realized early on that there was no clear distinction between American moral concerns in Bosnia and America's national interest there, the United States might have been able to nip the Balkan crisis in the bud. With the enormous credibility earned in the Gulf War, President Bush might have been able to put a stop to Milosevic's ambitions with a well-timed threat of punishing military action. But because the Bush team placed Bosnia outside the sphere of "vital" American interests, the resulting crisis eventually required the deployment of thousands of troops on the ground.

The same could be said of American interventions in Panama and the Gulf. A passive world-view encouraged American leaders to ignore troubling developments that eventually metastasized into full-blown threats to American security. Manuel Noriega and Saddam Hussein were given reason to believe that the United States did not consider its interests threatened by their behavior, only to discover that they had been misled. In each case, a broader and more forward-leaning conception of the national interest might have made the later interventions unnecessary.

The question, then, is not whether the United States should intervene everywhere or nowhere. The decision Americans need to make is whether the United States should generally lean forward, as it were, or whether it should adopt a posture of relative passivity. A strategy aimed at preserving American hegemony should embrace the former stance, being more rather than less inclined to weigh in when crises erupt, and preferably before they erupt. This is the standard of a global superpower that intends to shape the international environment to its own advantage. By contrast, the vital interest standard is that of a "normal" power that awaits a dramatic

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challenge before it rouses itself into action.

Arms and Alliances

IS THE TASK OF maintaining American primacy and making a consistent effort to shape the international environment beyond the capacity of Americans? Not if American leaders have the understanding and the political will to do what is necessary. Moreover, what is required is not particularly forbidding. For much of the task ahead consists of building on already existing strengths.

The United States, for example, already wields the strongest military force in the world. It has demonstrated its prowess in war on several occasions since the end of the Cold War—in Panama in 1989, in the Persian Gulf in 1991, and most recently in the air war over Kosovo. Those victories owed their success to a force built in the Reagan years. This is a legacy off which the United States has lived for over a decade, and it cannot last. Today the United States spends too little on its military capabilities, both in terms of present readiness and investing in future weapons technologies. The gap between America's strategic ends and the means available to accomplish those ends is growing, a fact that becomes more evident each time the United States deploys forces abroad.

To repair these deficiencies and to create a force that can shape the international environment today, tomorrow and twenty years from now will probably require spending some $60–100 billion per year above current defense budgets. This price tag may seem daunting, but in historical terms it will represent only a modest commitment of America's wealth to defense. And in a time of large budget surpluses, spending a tiny fraction on defense ought to be politically feasible. For the United States to have the military capability to shape the international environment now and for the foreseeable future, it would be necessary to spend about 3.5 percent of GDP on defense, still low by the standards of the past fifty years, and far lower than most great powers have spent on their militaries throughout history. Is the aim of maintaining American primacy not worth a hike in defense spending from 3 to 3.5 percent of GDP?

The United States also inherited from the Cold War a legacy of strong alliances in Europe and Asia, and with Israel in the Middle East. Those alliances are a bulwark of American power and, more important still, they constitute the heart of the liberal democratic civilization that the United States seeks to preserve and extend. Critics of a strategy of American pre-eminence sometimes claim that it is a call for unilateralism. It is not. The notion that the United States could somehow "go it alone" and maintain its pre-eminence without its allies is strategically misguided. It is also morally bankrupt. What would "American leadership" mean in the absence of its democratic allies? What kind of nation would the United States be if it allowed Great Britain, Germany, Japan, Israel, Poland and other democratic nations to fend for themselves against the myriad challenges they will face?

In fact, a strategy aimed at preserving American pre-eminence would require an even greater U.S. commitment to its allies. The United States would not be merely an "offshore balancer", a savior of last resort, as many recommend. It would not be a "reluctant sheriff", rousing itself to action only when the townsfolk turn to it in desperation. American pre-eminence cannot be maintained from a distance, by means of some post-Cold War version of the Nixon Doctrine, whereby the United States hangs back and keeps its powder

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dry. The United States would instead conceive of itself as at once a European power, an Asian power, a Middle Eastern power and, of course, a Western Hemispheric power. It would act as if threats to the interests of our allies constituted threats to us. It would act as if instability in important regions of the world, and the flouting of civilized rules of conduct in those regions, were threats that affected us with almost the same immediacy as if they were occurring on our doorstep. To act otherwise would make the United States a most unreliable partner in world affairs, a perception that would erode both American pre-eminence and the international order. Eventually, the crises *would* appear at our doorstep.

This is what it means to be a global superpower with global responsibilities. The costs of assuming these responsibilities are more than made up by the benefits to American long-term interests. It is short-sighted to imagine that a policy of "keeping our powder dry" is either safer or less expensive than a policy that aims to preclude and deter the emergence of new threats, that has the United States arriving quickly at the scene of potential trouble, that addresses threats to the national interest before they have developed into full-blown crises. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison expressed a common view last year when she wrote that, "Superpowers preserve their superpower status by not engaging in regional conflicts." In fact, this is precisely the way for a superpower to cease being a superpower.

A strong America capable of projecting force quickly and with devastating effect to important regions of the world would make it less likely that challengers to regional stability will attempt to alter the status quo in their favor. It might even deter them from undertaking expensive efforts to arm themselves for such a challenge. An America whose willingness to project force is in doubt, on the other hand, can only encourage such challenges. In Europe, in Asia and in the Middle East, the message we should be sending to potential foes is: "Don't even think about it." That kind of deterrence offers the best recipe for lasting peace, and it is much cheaper than fighting the wars that would follow should we fail to build such a deterrent capacity.

This ability to project force overseas, however, will increasingly be jeopardized over the coming years as smaller powers acquire weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to launch them at American forces, at our allies and at the American homeland. The *sine qua non* for a strategy of American global pre-eminence, therefore, is a missile defense system that can protect all three of these. Only a well-protected America will be capable of deterring—and when necessary moving against—"rogue" regimes when they rise to challenge regional stability. Only a United States reasonably well shielded from the blackmail of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons will be able to shape the international environment to suit its interests and its principles.

With the necessary military strength, strong and well-led alliances, and adequate missile defense, the United States can set about making trouble for hostile and potentially hostile nations, rather than waiting for them to make trouble for us. Just as the most successful strategy in the Cold War combined containment of the Soviet Union with an effort to undermine the moral legitimacy of the regime in Moscow, so in the post-Cold War era a principal aim of American foreign policy should be to bring about a change of regime in hostile nations—in Baghdad and Belgrade, in Pyongyang and Beijing, and wherever tyrannical governments acquire the military power to threaten their neighbors, our allies and the United States itself.

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Regime Change

THE IDEA, common to many foreign policy minimalists and commerce-oriented liberals alike, that the United States can "do business" with any regime, no matter how odious and hostile to our basic principles, is both strategically unsound and ahistorical. The United States has in the past worked with right-wing dictatorships as a bulwark against communist aggression or against radical Muslim fundamentalism. It has at times formed tactical alliances with the most brutal regimes—with Stalin's Soviet Union against Nazi Germany, and with Mao's China against the Soviet Union. But these should properly be viewed as tactical deviations from a broad strategy of promoting liberal democratic governance throughout the world, the result of circumstances in which our security was immediately threatened.

Relationships with tyrannical regimes, moreover, are inherently difficult to sustain. The problem is not merely that such relationships become distasteful to Americans. More important, in today's environment American interests and those of tyrannical regimes inevitably clash. For the force of American ideals and the influence of the international economic system, both of which are upheld by American power and influence, tend to corrode the pillars on which authoritarian and totalitarian regimes rest.

To bolster their legitimacy, regimes such as those in Beijing and Baghdad therefore resort frequently to provocation, either with arms build-ups designed to intimidate both the United States and its allies, as in the cases of China and North Korea, or by regional conquest, as in the cases of Iraq and Serbia. With no means of acquiring legitimacy for their domestic policies, they, like the Soviet rulers described by George Kennan, seek the nationalist legitimacy that comes from standing up to an external enemy. Hence, the Chinese government knows there can be no real "strategic partnership" with the United States. The North Korean government knows there can be no true "normalization" with South Korea and the West. Saddam Hussein knows he cannot simply give up the struggle and try to live peaceably with his neighbors and with his own people. Slobodan Milosevic knows that he cannot truly integrate himself into the European community. The price of such accommodations would be most regimes' hold on power.

When it comes to dealing with such regimes, then, the United States will not succeed in persuading them to play by the existing, which is to say American, rules of the game. We cannot expect to limit their acquisition or sales of dangerous weapons by relying on their voluntary adherence to international non-proliferation agreements. We cannot hope to stem their aggression by appealing to their consciences and asking them to accept the "norms" of the civilized world. For those "norms" serve as obstacles to their ambitions and even threats to their existence. They have, and will continue to have, a clear and immutable interest in flouting them.

Here we would do well to cast another glance backward, for this is hardly the first time we have confronted the question of how to manage relations with dictatorial adversaries. During the 1970s, the view of U.S.-Soviet relations promulgated by much of the American foreign policy establishment was that the key to peace and stability lay in an effort to reach mutual understanding with Moscow. The way to deal with the threat of apocalypse posed by the Soviet and American nuclear arsenals was through mutual arms control. The way to cope with Soviet adventurism abroad was to bind Moscow's leaders into a "web of interdependence" and thereby compel

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them to recognize the advantages of responsible international behavior.

These measures proved futile, as Soviet leaders could not fulfill their side of the proposed bargain without undermining their rule at home. The source of confrontation between the two sides was not mutual misunderstanding, a lack of interdependence, or the military arsenals amassed by both sides. It was the nature of the Soviet regime. When that regime came to an end, so did the arms race, so did Russian aggression beyond its borders, and so did the Cold War. This lesson can be applied to the post-Cold War era. The most effective form of non-proliferation when it comes to regimes such as those in North Korea and Iraq is not continuing efforts to bribe them into adhering to international arms control agreements, but efforts aimed at the demise of the regimes themselves.

True, the United States cannot simply wish hostile regimes out of existence. An American strategy that included regime change as a central component would neither promise nor expect rapid transformations in every rogue state or threatening power. The United States would not dispatch troops to topple every regime we found odious. But such a strategy would depart from recent American policy in fundamental ways. Instead of ending the Gulf War in 1991 after the liberation of Kuwait, an American strategy built around the principle of regime change would have sent U.S. forces on to Baghdad to remove Saddam Hussein from power, and it would have kept U.S. troops in Iraq long enough to ensure that a friendlier regime took root. Such a strategy would not only have employed ground forces in Kosovo last year but would have sent sufficient NATO forces to Serbia to topple the Milosevic regime. Those who believe such efforts would have been impossible to implement, or who caution of the difficulties of occupying and reforming such countries, or who insist that the removal of one man provides no solution to a problem, may wish to reflect on the American experiences in Germany and Japan—or even the Dominican Republic and Panama. In any case, if the United States is prepared to summon the forces necessary to carry out a Desert Storm, and to take the risks associated with expelling the world's fourth-largest army from Kuwait, it is absurd, and in the event self-defeating, not to complete the job.

Not all regime change can or need be accomplished by military intervention. Tactics for pursuing a strategy of regime change should vary according to circumstances. In some cases, the best policy might be support for rebel groups, along the lines of the Reagan Doctrine as it was applied in Nicaragua and elsewhere. In some cases, it might mean support for dissidents by either overt or covert means, and/or economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation. These tactics may or may not succeed immediately and would have to be adjusted as circumstances changed. But the purpose of American foreign policy ought to be clear. When it comes to dealing with tyrannical regimes, especially those with the power to do us or our allies harm, the United States should seek not coexistence but transformation.

To many, the idea of America using its power to promote changes of regime in nations ruled by dictators rings of utopianism. In fact, it is eminently realistic. There is something perverse in declaring the impossibility of promoting democratic change abroad in light of the record of the past three decades. After we have already seen dictatorships toppled by democratic forces in such unlikely places as the Philippines, Indonesia, Chile, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Taiwan and South Korea, how utopian is it to imagine a change of regime in a place like Iraq? How utopian is it to work for the fall of the Communist Party

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oligarchy in China after a far more powerful and, arguably, more stable such oligarchy fell in the Soviet Union? With democratic change sweeping the world at an unprecedented rate over these past thirty years, is it "realistic" to insist that no further victories can be won?

If anything, we ought to be fairly optimistic that such change can be hastened by the right blend of American policies. The Chinese regime, for example, shows many signs of instability. The inherent contradiction between its dictatorial rule and its desire for economic growth so preoccupies the Beijing government that it feels compelled to crack down even on non-political sects like the Falun Gong. The United States and the West can either make it easier or more difficult for the PRC to resolve these contradictions. Our policy in this instance ought to be the latter, so that we can hasten the day when the conflicting currents of Chinese society prove beyond the capacity of its dictatorial government to manage.

But a strategy aimed at preserving American pre-eminence cannot and should not be based on any individual threat. We need not go searching for an enemy to justify the requirement for a strong military and a strong moral component in our foreign policy. Even if the threat from China were to disappear tomorrow, that would not relieve us of the need for a strong and active role in the world. Nor would it absolve us of the responsibilities that fate has placed on our shoulders. Given the dangers we know, and given the certainty that unknown perils await us over the horizon, there can be no respite from this burden.

IT IS FAIR to ask how the rest of the world will respond to a prolonged period of American hegemony. Those regimes that find an American-led world order inhospitable to their existence will seek to cut away at American power, will form tactical alliances with other dictatorships and "rogue" states for the common purpose of unsettling such an order, and will look for ways to divide the United States from its allies. China's proliferation of weapons and selling of weapons technologies to Iran, its provision of financial support to Milosevic, its attempt to find common ground with Russia against American "hegemonism"—all represent opportunistic attempts to undercut American dominance. Russia can similarly be expected to search for opportunities to weaken U.S. political, diplomatic and military preponderance in the world. Even an ally such as France may be prepared to lend itself to these efforts, viewing a unified Europe as a check on American power and using the UN Security Council as an arena for forging diplomatic roadblocks, along with China and Russia, against effective U.S.-led international action, whether in the Balkans or in the Persian Gulf.

All this is to be expected as part of the price for American global pre-eminence. It does not, however, add up to a convincing argument against preserving that pre-eminence. The main issue of contention between the United States and most of those who express opposition to its hegemony is not American "arrogance." It is the inescapable reality of American power in its many forms. Those who suggest that these international resentments could somehow be eliminated by a more restrained American foreign policy are engaging in pleasant delusions. Even a United States that never again intervened in a place like Kosovo or never expressed disapproval of China's human rights practices would still find itself the target of jealousy, resentment and in some cases even fear. A more polite but pre-eminently powerful United States would still stand in the way of Chinese ambitions in East Asia, would still exist as a daily reminder

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of Russia's vastly diminished standing in the world, and would still grate on French insecurities. Unless the United States were prepared to shed its real power and influence, allowing other nations genuinely to achieve a position of relative parity on the world stage, would-be challengers of the international order—as well as those merely offended by the disparity of power—would still have much to resent.

But neither should Americans fear that any effective grouping of nations is likely to emerge to challenge American power. Much of the current international attack on American "hegemonism" is posturing. Allies such as the French may cavil about American "hyperpower", but they recognize their dependence on the United States as the guarantor of an international order that greatly benefits France. (Indeed, it is precisely this dependence that breeds French resentment.) As for Russia and China, the prospect of effective joint action between those two nations against the United States is slight. Their long history of mutual mistrust is compounded by the fact that they do not share common strategic goals—even with regard to the United States. While Chinese leaders consider the United States an enemy, a democratizing Russia has a more ambivalent view. Post-Soviet Russia seeks inclusion in an American-led West, both for economic and ideological reasons.

As a practical matter, as William Wohlforth has argued, it will be very difficult for other nations to gang up on the United States precisely because it is so powerful. But their unwillingness to do so also has something to do with the fact that the United States does not pursue a narrow, selfish definition of its national interest, but generally finds its interests in a benevolent international order. In other words, it is precisely because the United States infuses its foreign policy with an unusually high degree of morality that other nations find they have less to fear from its otherwise daunting power.

Our Inheritance

AT THE beginning of this century, Theodore Roosevelt worried that Americans had become so "isolated from the struggles of the rest of the world, and so immersed in our material prosperity", that they were becoming "effete." Roosevelt implored Americans to look beyond the immediate needs of their daily lives and embrace as a nation a higher purpose in the world. He aspired to greatness for America, and he believed that a nation could only be great if it accepted its responsibilities to advance civilization and improve the world's condition. "A nation's first duty is within its borders", Roosevelt declared, "but it is not thereby absolved from facing its duties in the world as a whole; and if it refuses to do so, it merely forfeits its right to struggle for a place among the people that shape the destiny of mankind."

In appealing to Americans to support a robust brand of internationalism, Roosevelt possessed the insight to appeal to their sense of nationalism. It was a nationalism, however, of a uniquely American variety—not an insular, blood-and-soil nationalism, but one that derived its meaning and coherence from being rooted in universal principles, first enunciated in the Declaration of Independence. Roosevelt was no utopian; he had contempt for those who believed the international environment could be so transformed as to rid the world of war, put an end to international conflict, and, indeed, put an end to the nation itself. Roosevelt was an idealist of a different sort. He did not attempt to wish away the realities of power, but insisted that the defenders of civilization must exercise their power

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against civilization's opponents. "Warlike intervention by the civilized powers", he insisted, "would contribute directly to the peace of the world."

Americans should once again embrace a broad understanding of the "national interest", one in keeping with Roosevelt's vision. In recent years, many American foreign policy thinkers, and some politicians, have come to define the "national interest" as consisting of plots of ground, sea lanes, industrial centers, strategic chokepoints and the like. This was a definition of interests foisted upon our foreign policy establishment by "realists" at the turn of the century. It is not a definition that would have been welcomed by previous generations of Americans. If someone had asked Alexander Hamilton what the "national interest" was, he would have cited prosperity and security, but he would also have invoked the need to lift his young country into a place of honor among the world's great powers. Past American presidents and statesmen would never have imagined that the national interest, a term that can encompass a people's noblest aspirations, would come to possess a meaning as narrow and limited as many American thinkers give it today.

Honor and greatness used to be understood as worthy goals of American foreign policy. In insisting that the "national interest" extended beyond material security and prosperity, and in summoning Americans to seek honor as a nation, Roosevelt echoed the views of the American Founders. And almost fifty years after Roosevelt, Reinhold Niebuhr insisted that America's "sense of responsibility to a world community beyond our own borders is a virtue", and this virtue was in no way diminished by the fact that this sense of responsibility also "derived from the prudent understanding of our own interests." Common wisdom holds that Americans do not care about their nation's role in the world. But it has been a long time since any of their leaders asked them to care, or made an appeal to the elevated patriotism that joins interest and justice, and that has characterized the American republic from its beginning.

The American-led world that emerged after the Cold War is a more just world than any imaginable alternative. A multipolar world, in which power were shared more equally among great powers—including China and Russia—would be far more dangerous, and far less congenial to democracy and to individual liberties. Americans should understand that their support for American pre-eminence is as much a boost for international justice as any people is capable of giving. It is also a boon for American interests, and for what might be called the American spirit. George Kennan wrote more than fifty years ago that the American people should feel a

> certain gratitude to a Providence, which by providing [them] with this implacable challenge, has made their entire security as a nation dependent on pulling themselves together and accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them to bear.

The "implacable challenge" facing Americans has, of course, changed. Our fundamental responsibilities have not. □

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To Fight the Good Fight

Elliott Abrams

THE BLOODIEST century in history has closed with a new idea: that lives can be saved if foreign troops are willing to shoot human rights violators before they begin, or at least before they complete, their tasks—and that if lives can be saved this way, morality requires that we not shrink from acting, wherever it takes us.

The theory of humanitarian intervention is very much the product of the twentieth century. It is, first of all, a response to decade after decade of massive human rights violations, including genocide. Perhaps it is only survivors' guilt that motivates democratic countries to wonder if they could have done more—for the Jews or the Cambodians or the Kosovars or Rwandans or Sudanese or Timorese. But humanitarian intervention depends on timely knowledge, itself a product of modern technology that allows news to travel everywhere fast, and on the ability to respond, a product of modern military technology. Today we can watch the horrors of mass killing on television and airlift soldiers in by nightfall. But the question remains: When may, or must, the United States and its allies intervene in the affairs of other sovereign states in order to "stop the killing"?

Prior to the recent rise of humanitarian intervention, state sovereignty was the organizing principle of world affairs—not least in the United Nations, which is after all a collection of states and not of peoples. In a twist on the old saw that in America "all politics is local", in world politics all crimes, including human rights crimes, were local too. There was no appeal beyond the national capital. Indeed, the UN Charter well-nigh prohibits intervention across state borders, allowing only two exceptions: self-defense in cases of "armed attack" (Article 51) and actions taken with Security Council approval as matters of collective security (Chapter VII). Humanitarian intervention without Security Council approval is, under the Charter, illegal. The British Foreign Office summed up the traditional view in a 1986 statement:

> The overwhelming majority of contemporary legal opinion comes down against the existence of a right of humanitarian intervention, for three main reasons: first, the UN Charter and the corpus of modern international law do not seem to specifically incorporate such a right; secondly, State practice in the past two centuries, and especially since 1945, at best provides only a handful of genuine cases of

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humanitarian intervention, and, on most assessments, none at all; and finally, on prudential grounds, that the scope for abusing such a right argues strongly against its creation. . . . In essence, therefore, the case against making humanitarian intervention an exception to the principle of non-intervention is that its doubtful benefits would be heavily outweighed by its costs in terms of respect for international law.[1]

But the British were fighting a rearguard action. At both the state and individual levels, change has been coming for years. The Genocide Convention permits, and may even be said to require, intervention. Time after time in the last half century, nations crossed borders and named humanitarian motives as their key concerns: India in East Pakistan in 1971, Vietnam in Cambodia in 1978, Tanzania in Uganda in 1979, as well as the more recent cases of the United States in Somalia or Haiti, and NATO (with the British Foreign Office in the lead) in Kosovo. If some of these claims of humanitarian motivation were laughable, they fit La Rochefoucauld's definition of hypocrisy: the tribute vice pays to virtue. A century ago, a country need do no more than invoke its national interest to justify military action; more recently, it is usually necessary at least to mention humanitarian motives.

The turning point was, of course, the end of the Cold War. Today, intervention in local disputes and internal abuses will not escalate into a superpower conflict and risk a major war. At the same time, whatever restraints the superpowers placed on their client states during the Cold War are gone as well, so that both potential abusers and potential interveners are freer to act. The resulting change in the international system is evident: humanitarian intervention is a fact of international life as much as are trade treaties. Labor standards, environmental regulations, regional bodies such as the European Union or Mercosur, and international human rights conventions now abound, adding layers of new rules to the older set that long governed international commerce. But while treaties continue to work fairly well and will no doubt remain in force at the end of the twenty-first century, humanitarian intervention, a far newer phenomenon, may not. For so far, it works badly in practice and not at all in theory. The question is whether its flaws are intrinsic and unavoidable, or can be fixed.

Krauthammer's Law

THE MOST serious pragmatic problem posed by humanitarian intervention is that the willingness of the intervening country to place lives and resources at risk is determined by the degree of national interest involved. Charles Krauthammer has described the resulting problem in an article in these pages, in which he calls the notion of humanitarian war "an idea whose time has come, and gone." He elaborates: "The central contradiction—the Iron Law of Humanitarian War—is this: *Humanitarian war requires means that are inherently inadequate to its ends.*" The first reason that humanitarian war has no future, in his view, is that it involves "a contradiction of means: bloodless war."[2]

Krauthammer's point is well taken, as is his observation that the very effort to avoid bloodshed (your own or the opponent's) may prolong a war. When the motive is purely humanitarian, national interests vague or nonexistent, and the risks high, humanitarian intervention will not, ironically, be an attractive option.

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[1]UK Foreign Office Policy Document No. 148, *The British Yearbook of International Law 1986*, p. 614.

[2]Krauthammer, "The Short, Unhappy Life of Humanitarian War", *The National Interest* (Fall 1999), pp. 6-8. [emphasis in original]

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There are, however, cases where conditions are more favorable. Sometimes the risks seem low due to a huge disproportion of power between the interveners and the target state; sometimes a measure of national interest is involved. For example, when the United States intervened in Haiti for "humanitarian" reasons, did we not also want a decent government in place there so that we could in good conscience send back Haitian "boat people"?

In fact, absolutely pure humanitarian interventions may be the exception rather than the rule. To diminish Krauthammer's gap between ends and means, it is necessary only to reduce the risks a bit and raise the national interest rewards above zero, and at some point a balance may be found. Indeed, considering the cases in which the world either did not intervene at all or did so without much energy—as in the cases of Rwanda and Tibet—Krauthammer's problem solves itself: when ends and means are too far out of whack, there will be no intervention. The decision to intervene is, after all, still being made most often by political leaders whose pursuit of humanitarian ends will continue to be tempered by their need to win elections.

Krauthammer's suggestion that means will be limited by ends—that humanitarian goals presage a weak-kneed effort that will fall short—may be wrong as well. Acting with absolute certainty of our moral rightness, we may be willing to pound the malefactors into the ground. In Kosovo, that is what happened: while the NATO effort began weakly, it later became so intense that some (including myself) complained of the civilian casualties being caused in Serbia. The moral arithmetic here became perverse: we were unwilling to risk many American casualties in air or ground combat but, given the rightness of our cause, we felt justified in a high-altitude bombing campaign that inevitably killed civilians. Instead of Krauthammer's limited war dilemma, we may in the future find ourselves confronted with a much different problem if we choose to ignore the "just war" doctrine of proportionality: we may just blast the bastards to smithereens—and feel better about it than we have any business feeling, especially in the humanitarian context.

These are practical problems: how hard do you fight, how much do you risk, how many do you kill when direct national interests are quite limited? To these questions one more must be added: how likely is success? To impose hardship and to take lives when there is little chance of solving anything is not only feckless but immoral. Krauthammer argues powerfully that few cases will provide any reasonable chance of a positive outcome because the social rifts deep enough to produce massive human rights crimes cannot be solved by a brief bit of international policing. We may stop the bloodshed while we are there, only to see it take off again when we leave.

In many cases, we will indeed be too ignorant about the society in question to do much good except keep the human rights violators apart from their intended victims for a while. Or we will be willing to intervene briefly but unwilling to meet the costs of the prolonged stay that real change requires. On other occasions our self-interested intervention will be wrongly labeled humanitarian, and we will advance our own national goals even if the locals benefit little (as in the case of Haiti). In all these situations, humanitarian intervention may achieve little long-term improvement in the lives of the people it claims to help.

But not always. The practical difficulties of successful humanitarian intervention remind us that our goal is to do good rather than feel good, but they should not block action when there is something useful to be done. Sometimes the problem may be an individual dictator: Panama, for example, is clearly better off with

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General Noriega in jail (whether one calls the U.S. intervention there humanitarian or imperialist) and has become a working democracy. Sometimes even deep social divisions can exist without sectarian violence or mass murder, and a period of foreign intervention may open a new phase in the political life of a nation. The "realist" school provides important warnings against allowing moralizing to replace judgment, but prudence does not always dictate inaction or indifference.

A Theoretical Vacuum

AS DIFFICULT as these practical issues are, the doctrinal problems involved in humanitarian intervention may be worse. It is a practice in search of a theory.

The traditional defense of humanitarian intervention under international law and in the United Nations was that it is meant to solve a threat to international peace. This argument is both non-humanitarian and simply unpersuasive. It helps when you are trying to shoe-horn things into UN categories, but the argument doesn't hold up in the real world: while all human rights crimes may not be local, they are not all international either. Sometimes borders can be sealed. The "threat to peace" argument must be reserved for appropriate cases; in others the "forfeiture of sovereignty" argument is better. This argument posits the following: sovereignty rests in the people. There cannot be popular consent to severe human rights violations, hence the state is acting against the true sovereign (the people) when it commits human rights crimes. The intervention is then undertaken on behalf of the "true" sovereign and does not represent a breach of sovereignty.

For Americans, weaned on "We the People", this formulation is attractive. In fact, the forfeiture of sovereignty doctrine can be applied to many cases of human rights abuse. But before applying this doctrine too widely, we should consider its implications. What about crimes committed willingly by a sovereign majority against a small minority, up to and including genocide? Here the "general will" may be to slaughter a particular sect or religious or racial group, and the sovereignty argument fails. The interveners must instead simply impose their morality on the local majority, insisting that there is a global standard of human rights law that no one may breach. The Genocide Convention and the Convention Against Torture are codified examples of such laws, and it may be that in this new century their narrow confines will be widened. Courts in England have ruled in the Pinochet case that under international law, torturers are like pirates: they may be captured anywhere because there is a universal interest in stopping torture. One can imagine broader and broader categories of human rights violations being brought under international oversight, providing justifications not only for court actions against individual abusers but for some forms of intervention as well. Why only genocide? Why large-scale atrocities and not smaller scale ones? Why not mass murder, or political murder, or violent repression?

Such questions lead to other practical ones, such as who would have the stomach for constant intervention in the dozens of countries that fall short of peaceful and democratic politics, but again there are also doctrinal issues to consider. Who has the right to decide that a human rights crime is being committed, or that it rises to the level of offense covered in some treaty or convention? Who has the right to organize an intervention force? If the moral prerequisites for intervention fall (allowing or demanding it at ever lower levels of human rights crimes), the procedures for intervention must be improved. Since almost every

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intervener claims some moral basis for his action, expanding the opportunities for intervention expands those for mischief as well. In recent years, the intellectual battle has been fought mostly by human rights activists favoring intervention. They have in the main strung together arguments justifying moves by the great.democracies to rescue people in reasonably backward places. In the not-so-distant future, they may wish to direct their attention to the other side of the coin: standards and procedures aimed at preventing misbegotten military ventures whose goals are flimsily clothed in the language of humanitarianism. Stopping a bogus humanitarian intervention may come to be as pressing a challenge as launching a genuine one.

A Growing Problem

WHAT WILL THE coming decades bring? There is reason to believe that humanitarian intervention will be needed more often, rather than less. The last decades of the twentieth century suggest that ethnic and religious identities, long expected to decline in the face of "modernity", are instead rising in salience to millions of people, not just in the former Yugoslavia or in East Africa but around the globe.[3] Sectarian strife may well become more prevalent, especially when combined with renewed nationalism. For the collapse of the Soviet empire and the end of the Cold War have unquestionably unleashed (or, to use a more neutral term, liberated) and strengthened desires to have a state coterminous with the nation and representing its true aspirations—whether in Eritrea, East Timor, Kurdistan or Chechnya. Moreover, increased religious devotion has in some areas led to human rights violations against non-believers, and in others has combined with nationalism in an explosive brew that threatens minority rights. It seems that as the world economy becomes more integrated, the desire for, indeed the intensity of feelings about, narrower religious and national identities is strengthened. And when identity politics becomes violent, the preconditions for large-scale human rights abuses and thus for humanitarian intervention are in place.

It is probably true as well that the "creative destruction" we associate with capitalism will add to these trends. Globalization of trade and finance can often disrupt society in a beneficial manner and hasten the arrival of democracy; it did so in South Korea, Taiwan and Chile, to take three familiar examples. But modernization may also be disruptive to manners and morals, thereby producing a counter-reaction: a search for stronger traditional identities, the reassurance and security of group membership, and the comforting exclusion of those who are different. One sees this phenomenon at its most benign when the government in London cedes sovereignty "up" to Brussels—or "down" to the Scottish and Welsh assemblies. It will appear in a less benign guise elsewhere.

The concept of sovereignty, already under pressure, will be weakened further if this scenario is accurate. To use a corporate legal analogy, we have already "pierced the veil" of inviolable state frontiers, and there will be no turning back. Practical objections to particular armed interventions will prevent some, but the cards are stacked against indifference. In many Third World situations the victims are Christians whom the leading Western powers will find it politically difficult to ignore. Meanwhile, ignoring victims who are very poor and non-white will offend the world's preten-

[3]See Peter L. Berger, ed., *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1999).

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sions to believe in the equal dignity of all mankind. Humanitarian nightmares that are the product of nationalism are very likely to involve border wars or border changes, and therefore legitimately to involve other countries and the international community. Samuel Huntington's vision in *The Clash of Civilizations* is proving to be prescient.

Finally, the so-called "revolution in military affairs" may play a role as well. If the greatest pragmatic limit on intervention is the unwillingness of potential interveners to bear great risks and to take many casualties, new weaponry may lighten their load. Pilotless planes, robot vehicles, smart bombs, information warfare and the like can reduce the risks to a politically acceptable level. The war in Kosovo, like the Gulf War intervention against Iraq, may be a harbinger of a huge military imbalance that would allow leading powers to intervene without much risk of sacrificing soldiers. Who would not want to rescue thousands of desperate people if the only risk were that a few robots would have to die for their country?

Use It or Lose It

CURIOUSLY, even the efforts to establish rules and limits for intervention will erode traditional views of sovereignty. It is difficult to imagine what practical standards can be written into international law—when should a large-scale human rights violation be handled with speeches or boycotts, and when is armed force justified? The words international lawyers choose will never provide much guidance or much restraint. It is far more likely that a requirement of collective action will be imposed; that is, armed intervention is justified under international law when some *group* of nations says so: the Security Council, the General Assembly, NATO or *ad hoc* combinations that may be assembled in a particular case. The requirement for group action revives the ideals of collective security that we associate with the League of Nations and United Nations and appeals to the hope that the burdens of intervention will be widely shared. But its main effect will be to disallow any single capital from deciding to use armed force, and this is a large interference with a right once thought to be at the very heart of sovereignty.

This requirement of collective action is inevitable, and on the whole a positive development. Humanitarian intervention is defined not by means but by ends. The tools of humanitarian intervention are military, just as they are in cases of blatant aggression, so we can only distinguish the moral from the immoral intervention by making a judgment about motives. It is unlikely today that an armed action aimed at repression or characterized by aggressive intent will capture much international support. It is equally unlikely that an action aimed at saving lives will elicit no such support. To return to realpolitik, it is unlikely in the foreseeable future that a powerful American diplomatic effort will not be able to drum up support for any action that we feel we must take. Moreover, our military dominance makes intervention without our own approval and participation difficult and often impossible.

For Americans, this most idealistic of discussions cannot escape the debate over the uses of our extraordinary power. Those who fear that the United States leans always to imperial adventures and to the support of repressive regimes will have no trouble in urging great restraint, but this camp has shrunk a good deal since the end of the Cold War. As we saw in Kosovo, many who attacked American interventionism repeatedly during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s—even many who voted against U.S. intervention in the

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Gulf War—were loudly calling for more of it in the 1990s. Today the more consequential debate is between those who believe power is bolstered when it is husbanded, and those in the "use it or lose it" camp. The former group argues that the United States is uniquely able to mount an operation like Operation Desert Storm or to counterbalance growing Chinese power in East Asia, and should save its powder for those requirements. To use our resources in interventions that could be undertaken by lesser powers is to squander them—and with them the political will to intervene. The interventionists counter that it is our moral leadership that will be squandered if we stand aloof when massive human rights abuses are being committed and our allies are considering action. Successful interventions, they argue, breed confidence in our will and our ability, engendering more political support at home and abroad; they may also deter tomorrow's human rights abuser.

The outcome of this debate over the use of American power will tell us more about the future of humanitarian intervention than any other single factor. Such is the power and reputation of the United States as this century begins, so remarkable its cultural and military dominance, that humanitarian intervention has neither "come and gone" nor is it about to take over world politics. Like almost everything else in global affairs, its future depends largely on where the Americans come out.

THERE will be no clear and final answer to that question. The coming decades will bring circumstances where violent human rights abuses are frequent, the temptation and opportunity for intervention appears, and there are no insurmountable obstacles to action. We will then be faced with a myriad of practical and legal objections, for our moral standards have gotten ahead of international law and practice, and far ahead even of our ability to change the world. The situation unavoidably will be messy: there will often be no clarity as to when we fall on the side of the line where armed action is permissible, desirable or required, and when we are about to do something stupid. We will return again and again to the same debate, amongst ourselves and with other democratic nations that share our desire to deter, diminish, stop or punish human rights violations. If we will sometimes find a case where action or inaction seems an easy conclusion, we will face more cases where it is hard to figure out whether anything truly useful can be done. At the back of our minds we will worry about the costs we must pay, the impact on our reputation and self-esteem of action or inaction, and whether in the end we would be better off in a world where national sovereignty has all the legitimacy of the divine right of kings.

Yet this is exactly the debate we should be having, and these are exactly the doubts we should be entertaining. If, as I started by saying, the theory of humanitarian intervention is a product of the twentieth century, the practice of it is the product of the unique circumstances at that century's end and at the beginning of this one. The current international debate over humanitarian intervention reflects some advance in moral standards, but it reflects more fundamentally a single fact: that for the first time in human history a democratic society is the dominant world power. We Americans are all engaged in a novel enterprise: judging whether and how our nation's power, combined with that of like-minded friends and allies, can be used to eliminate or at least reduce abuses of the rights of man. In the course of the last century, those rights were more and more carefully elaborated in international conventions that were, usually, not worth the paper

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they were printed on. They were signed by the likes of Stalin and coexisted with a vast empire of repression that took in much of the world's population. In a few short years we can now envision, indeed we are actively engaged in, making those words real—not for all mankind, but for an ever increasing portion of it.

It is to be expected that this effort, tangled as it is with the great debate over the uses of American power, confuses and divides us as it does friends of human rights everywhere. We must get used to it, for this effort, and this debate, will characterize international politics and much of our own in the coming decades. □

Fruits of Victory

Particularly among the younger generation of Albanians, who have known Serbs only as remote oppressors, there is a growing intolerance of all ethnic others (including Roma and Muslim Slavs). People under thirty make up more than half the population and young Kosovars manifest a thirst for revenge that sickens not just foreigners but also many among the older generation of Kosovars, who still have personal memories of peaceful coexistence with the Serbs.

Just before I arrived, an elderly Serb professor was lynched by a mob celebrating the Albanian 'flag day' in Pristina. There used to be some 40,000 Serbs living in Pristina; now there are just a few hundred. . . . It is entirely fitting to speak, in this context, of reverse ethnic cleansing. Yet this ethnic cleansing has been carried out under the very noses and tank barrels of more than 40,000 international troops. . . .

Meanwhile, the Albanian mafia has entered with a vengeance. Young women are afraid to go out at night in Pristina for fear of being kidnapped into forced prostitution. Drug consumption among the students has soared, as the pushers get to work. In the last week of November, there were twenty-two recorded murders, several of them cold-blooded executions. . . . Before and during the war, Kosovars kept assuring me that Kosova would not be like Albania: corrupt, anarchic, ruled by the gun and the gang. Increasingly, it is. The Albanization of Kosova is taking place in a way no ordinary Kosova Albanian wanted. The gangsters have stepped into the vacuum left by the slowness of the West.

—Timothy Garton Ash, *New York Review of Books*, February 10, 2000

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Asia in the 21st Century

Power Politics Alive and Well

Rajan Menon and S. Enders Wimbush

AFTER DECADES of Cold War-induced predictability, Asia today is rapidly transforming into something new and unrecognizable. The very term "Asia" has lost its clarity. As a consequence of a revolution in communications and the frenetic pace of globalization, parts of Asia that have traditionally been distinguished by their geography—East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia—tend increasingly to blur and merge. Developments in one region shape the strategies of distant states in another with unprecedented rapidity. This new "Asia" really sweeps from the Pacific to Russia's western border and from the Arctic to the Indian Ocean.

The region's breadth is equaled only by its volatility. Russia, the long-dominant Eurasian power, is in decline, and its very territorial integrity is in question. In contrast to much of the last century, Russia's weakness—rather than its strength—will have a determining influence on Asia. Along its vast periphery new coalitions are forming and new competitions are taking shape. China and India, for example, both view themselves as emerging powers destined to shape the region's future. And Japan—for half a century the most dynamic presence in Asia, the key American outpost there and the principal prism through which the United States assesses its interests throughout the region—has languished in the doldrums for the better part of a decade. Today it faces significant challenges and the prospect of a possible American retreat from the Pacific Rim.

As the hierarchy among Asian states has changed, so too have the political orders within them. Many are plagued by political turmoil, ethnic and religious strife, and economic collapse. Some may even disintegrate or disappear: Russia, Indonesia, Pakistan and Afghanistan seem poised for reconfiguration, if not extinction. From some of these upheavals, new states and confederations with distinctly new interests and strategic alignments will surely emerge.

Compounding these familiar sources of instability are threats of an unfamiliar kind. In Asia today, the very meaning of national economic policy is becoming unclear. Forces beyond the control of individual states have prompted capital to flee, currencies to plummet, and prices to soar. The costs of staying competitive in an unforgiving global marketplace are reforms that invariably worsen the lot of

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already impoverished citizenries. Social unrest looms as an ever present danger as budgets are slashed and subsidies eliminated; those who rule appear rudderless while those who are ruled grow ever more resentful. Some regimes will survive the storm, while others will watch as their already tenuous legitimacy crumbles around them.

In addition, the fragile consensus in Asia against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is beginning to disintegrate. States such as China and Russia have sought to improve their strategic leverage by transferring nuclear and missile technology to allies. Within a decade, accurate, long-range missile systems will be available to most of the region's players, as will a variety of other weapons that may dramatically alter the current balance of power.

Power Transitions and New Alignments

THE KEY determinant of the Asian balance of power in the next century will be China. If it remains stable and maintains the impressive rate of economic growth it has achieved since 1978, China's influence on the Asian order will rapidly increase. In a way that is characteristic of rising powers—democratic or authoritarian—it will seek to refashion the received order, one that was forged when it was weak, and to dominate its neighbors in the process. China's long economic tentacles already extend into Southeast Asia, Central Asia and, increasingly, the Russian Far East. An unstable or weak China could—some would say is likely to—pursue similar objectives, but in a different, more dangerous manner. Such a China would be more



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inclined to project military force beyond its borders to achieve the same results more quickly, if only to prop up the failing communist regime's legitimacy.

China's power will in turn likely expand in equal or greater proportion to the decline in the power of the United States. Here we should note that a unified Korea is a virtual certainty; the only questions remaining are how and when. Whatever the modality of Korean unification—a benign and peaceful one analogous to Germany's, or a violent affair with war, internal disorder and massive outpourings of refugees that shake surrounding countries—once it does happen, the continued presence of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula will likely be deemed unnecessary. China, which will undoubtedly participate in managing reunification, will almost certainly make the phased withdrawal of American troops a condition for its cooperation. The departure of U.S. forces from the peninsula may in turn generate pressure for an American military withdrawal from Japan as well. The Japanese would not wish to be the sole remaining platform for American troops and materiel in Northeast Asia, and the misgivings of Japanese citizens over U.S. bases on their soil would only be strengthened by the demise of the Pyongyang regime.

Even apart from the fate of Korea, political support for the U.S.-Japan alliance appears likely to erode in both countries unless a persuasive new rationale can be created for it. The incantation that Japan is the key bilateral partner of the United States is a bromide that will not prevent the weakening of an alliance that is bereft of a compelling mission, and in which the truly dangerous responsibilities are unevenly distributed. Absent such a new rationale, the Asian balance of power could well be recast by a radical change in Japanese defense policy. Japan already has the world's third-largest defense budget, and "Self-Defense Force" is a euphemism for what is, in fact, a small but state-of-the-art military machine.

Though Japanese military power has for the past half a century been maintained at a level far below that of which it is financially and technologically capable, the continuation of this moderation should not be taken for granted; certain features of the Northeast Asian balance of power underpin it, and Japanese defense strategists have already begun to anticipate changes that will reduce Japan's security and increase its vulnerability—with such taboo topics as military forces capable of significant power projection and even nuclear weapons now part of the discussion. The American view that Japan is frozen in a posture of military restraint is, in any case, ahistorical. The country's history since the Meiji Restoration of 1868 is characterized by dramatic and rapid shifts in both its domestic politics and foreign policy, usually set in motion, although not determined, by events beyond Japan's borders.

While a rearmed and more assertive Japan is a distinct possibility, Japan's aging population will be increasingly strained to meet the financial demands of both social entitlements and military expansion. A population that is projected to be approximately half of its current size within a century is unlikely to wish to hasten its demise by engaging in war with powers possessing highly lethal weaponry. Hence, the pressure of what the Japanese call their "strategic demography" may impel Japan to accommodate itself to, or enter into an alliance with, a powerful and assertive China.

Japan is also likely to seek other defense alignments that could alter dramatically the Asian strategic equation. It could make common cause with Russia because each is a flanking power for the other against China. If Korea unifies and tacks toward an increasingly powerful

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China, and the United States disengages from the Pacific, Japan could seek such allies in several directions. It might arm Taiwan, including with nuclear weapons. Or it might pursue a looser strategic alignment with India, again in order to flank China, but also to bolster the security of the sea lanes and straits that constitute Japan's energy lifeline. Japan could well pursue all three of these options simultaneously.

INDIA IS LESS certain about its geopolitical ambitions, and the reach of its military forces is limited. But India is stirring, and its strategic thinkers are looking beyond nearly half a century of introspection and self-reliance at a variety of new challenges and opportunities—in the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia—that will afford their country geopolitical prominence. India's economic prospects have brightened as well. Its economy has grown at the annual rate of 6.5 percent since 1992, while the population growth rate, now at 1.8 percent per year, has been slowing.

Much has been written about the possibility that India—which, with its unwieldy size and heterogeneity, conjures up memories of the old Habsburg Empire—could come unglued. Yet the country has in fact proven remarkably stable. Its politics has remained democratic (if imperfectly so), with national elections now established as the means for acquiring and transferring power. The political system has weathered the assassination of its founding father and two prime ministers. The army has stayed out of power (a miraculous achievement considering the prevailing pattern in the Third World). Upheavals have been contained, whether they involve ethno-religious violence in Kashmir or the Punjab, or between Muslims and Hindus elsewhere, or between opponents and proponents of making Hindi the national language. Ironically, what many perceive to be the Achilles' heel of India may in fact be its major strength: its size and chaotic character. Because of its relatively decentralized political order and its breathtaking ethnic and linguistic diversity, India's crises are localized and seldom spread through the system. It is difficult for people living in, say, Kerala in the deep south to get exercised by what happens in the Punjab or Kashmir.

Though a remarkably durable polity, India, unlike China, has yet to remove the many impediments that have prevented it from realizing its economic potential. But it clearly has some of the prerequisites for breaking into the ranks of the great powers. It has a vast pool of scientists and engineers; a thriving high-tech industry; and an advanced and promising missile program complemented by advances in the design of its nuclear warheads. Still, poverty, illiteracy and an entrenched bureaucracy continue to weigh India down. And for all of its pretension, India's foreign policy seems often to be little more than a Pakistan policy.

Change in the subcontinent will not come easily, but there are encouraging signs. While no national consensus has been achieved, much of India's elite now dismisses the Nehruvian emphasis on self-reliance and self-sufficiency, no doubt because it has become painfully evident that India can achieve neither. In particular, the demise of the Soviet Union, and with it the Soviet-Indian strategic alignment, has left India strategically anchored. India cannot tackle challenges such as those in the Gulf, Central Asia, the Bay of Bengal and Southeast Asia alone, for it has neither the military reach nor the economic resources to do so. Most Indian strategists do not take Moscow's current offer of an India-Russia-China alliance seriously, seeing it as exactly what it is: a failing Russia's desperate attempt to be more than it can be.

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By contrast, an India-Japan alignment would make strategic sense for both countries. Such an alliance would require China to spread its military forces as widely as possible, and would secure the oil routes from the Persian Gulf to Northeast Asia. Taiwan, too, might become a party to such a coalition, if it were to decide to resist unification and opt for independence. Other states wary of China's newfound assertiveness, including Vietnam and Russia, might be attracted as well. But the principal partners—the bookends—will be India and Japan.

If the growing power of India and China shapes the emerging Asian order, Russia will be central to that order because of its declining power. Once a superpower, Russia now faces a situation in which not a single index of power is moving in a favorable direction. During the Cold War, the overriding preoccupation of the West and its allies was whether the Soviet Union would expand beyond its borders. Today, Russians worry that others, and particularly China, will expand *into* Russia. The two countries share a 2,666-mile border, and the low density of population on the Russian side stands in marked contrast to the masses of Chinese on the other. Moreover, the economic contrast between the shopworn Russian Far East and the rapidly developing Chinese northeast makes for an imbalance of power as well as population.

Russia's decline is welcomed by some states in Asia. Experience has taught them that there is an inverse relationship between Russian power and their own security. Yet the progressive weakening and disunity of Russia will have some pernicious consequences. The strength of Russian organized crime and the scope of its transnational operations will expand. The danger of nuclear accidents and environmental pollution (such as the dumping of nuclear waste into the oceans) will increase. Weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies will be more available to those with money to spend. Refugees fleeing violence or economic hardship will strain the capacity and, even more quickly, the hospitality of neighboring countries. Disease will overwhelm Russia's already failing public health system, and epidemics such as AIDS are all but inevitable. Having ceased to be Asia's superpower, Russia is fast becoming its sick man.

THERE are now four nuclear powers in this part of the world: Russia, China, India and Pakistan. The first two are rivals and potential adversaries, their current talk of a strategic partnership notwithstanding; the latter two have fought three wars since becoming independent. In the summer of 1999, having recently tested their nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan embarked on yet another round of fighting in Kashmir, casting doubt on the common assumption that nuclear weapons make even stubborn enemies retreat from the brink of war.

Taiwan, North Korea, South Korea, Iran and Japan are also candidates to acquire nuclear weapons. Even Turkey, which has Asian ambitions, will be hard pressed not to acquire nuclear weapons once Iran or Iraq does so. The motives and events that might induce these states to obtain nuclear arms vary considerably. For Taiwan—particularly if it continues down the path of independence—it will be the cold reality of a friendless world in which, when push comes to shove, few if any can be counted on to counterbalance Chinese power. For North Korea, the motive may be the calculation that nuclear weapons provide the only leverage to blackmail rich states. For Iran, the inducement will be that, as the examples of India and Pakistan demonstrate, nuclear weapons confer lasting respect and only temporary condemnation. For Japan, the nuclear option will be attrac-

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tive if any of three conditions come to pass. The first is a belief among Japanese leaders that, for one reason or another, the United States is no longer a reliable protector. The second is the rise of an increasingly powerful and assertive China. The third is the advent of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula.

In the twenty-first century, chemical and biological weapons will also become part of the region's arsenals. The hope that these weapons will never be used because they are inhumane is naive and unrealistic. They lack the lethality of nuclear bombs when measured by the number of immediate fatalities a single weapon can cause, but they are inexpensive, easy to manufacture, and will be fairly simple to deliver on target by widely available means.

Energy, too, will be a key concern for Asian states, as Asia will become the world's largest energy consumer within the first two decades of the twenty-first century. China, which became a net importer of energy in 1993, will dominate Asian demand. Its onshore production is declining, and the search for offshore oil has proved to be expensive and disappointing. Nor has the energy bonanza anticipated from the Tarim River Basin in Xinjiang been realized. Thus, China has moved with determination into Central Asia, the Bay of Bengal, Iraq and much of the rest of the energy-producing world in search of oil and gas. To reduce its dependence on sea lanes, China plans to build and link a long, expensive pipeline from Kazakhstan to the centers of consumption in eastern China.

All of these options, if successfully exploited, will ease China's energy problems, but the overwhelming share of its oil will still come from the Middle East. This dependence will cause China to expand its naval power to protect the sea lanes that connect it to that region through Southeast Asian waters. China's commitment to building a powerful navy will accelerate if Indonesia continues to be wrecked by disorder. Japan, which is entirely dependent on imported oil—and India, which also draws heavily on the Gulf—would then expand their own naval power. Japan may have to do so not only because of what China does, but because there may no longer be a stable, united Indonesia guarding the shipping routes that convey Japan's oil supplies. The stage is then set for rivalries in which the anticipation of hostilities proves more decisive than malign motives and unfriendly acts.

The competition for energy is also likely to extend to oil-rich Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. If Central Asia turns out to be an unstable region, China will forge alliances and possibly establish military bases there to protect investments, pipelines and friendly governments. Russia will have few means with which to resist such moves. But Russia will not be the only state unhappy with a Chinese sphere of influence in Central Asia: India sees the region as a promising market, a source of energy, as well as an area in which Pakistan's influence and the threat of militant Islamic movements pose serious threats. India regards Central Asia as its "extended strategic neighborhood." And it would be profoundly disturbed by an enhanced Chinese presence there. For those Central Asians seeking to contain an increasingly assertive Chinese policy in their region that is met by only meager Russian resistance, India may offer an increasingly attractive counterbalance.

Sources of Internal Upheaval

WHILE a balance of power may be established in Asia over time, the continent will continue to experience civil unrest created by separatist and irredentist nationalism, ethnic strife, and mass move-

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ments with the capacity to overwhelm fragile political institutions. Asia is rife with such disorders. Russia's troubles in the Caucasus and Central Asia have been well documented. Afghanistan continues to be torn by the latest variant of the civil war that has plagued it since 1978. Pakistan's calculation that it will gain from a friendly and dependent Afghanistan (as distinct from the unfriendly and pro-Indian governments that have held power in Kabul since 1945) may be misplaced. Should the Taliban consolidate its power there, it could reactivate irredentist claims against Pakistan's northwest frontier province, which is separated from Afghanistan by a nineteenth-century demarcation, the legality of which has been challenged by successive Afghan governments. Tajikistan has disappeared as a functioning state and is now an arena for drug smugglers, private armies and assassins, with the Russian army providing what passes for order. Separatist sentiments are running strong in Xinjiang, Tibet, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Burma and Indonesia, and they will alter the shape and size of states throughout Asia.

The Chinese province of Xinjiang provides a glimpse of what may be in store for much of the region. The Chinese leadership has finally acknowledged what outsiders have long known, namely, that Uighur nationalism, rebellion and violence persist in Xinjiang. Protests and bombings have increased since the fall of the Soviet Union and the establishment of predominantly Turkic countries in Central Asia that share borders with Xinjiang. The Chinese determination to expand communications and commerce with Central Asia will only further inflame Uighur passions. The traffic of weapons, political literature and insurgents has prompted the Chinese to increase surveillance in Xinjiang and, intermittently, to close its border with Pakistan.

Nationalist rebellions could, of course, be quelled by violence, and the danger of losing public support would be much smaller than if the government's guns were turned against ethnic Chinese protestors. Yet even if it could be accomplished in short order, repression of ethnic minorities would hardly be compatible with China's desire to attract foreign investment. Under Deng Xiaoping China opted to pursue economic development and national power by engaging the global economy and leaving behind the days of autarchy, Red Guards and millenarianism. Thus far it has stayed the course. But to succeed, it must maintain the confidence of investors, assistance from international financial organizations, and good relations with the world's leading economic powers. Accordingly, as China's integration with the world's economy proceeds, its leadership will find that its choices for dealing with domestic unrest have narrowed.

Globalization—the rapidity and multiplicity of ways in which "here" is hostage to "there"—is commonly portrayed as a stern disciplinarian, a foe of particularism, inefficiency and waste. It punishes unwise economic policies and forces states that seek advancement in the global marketplace to get their economic houses in order. It promotes aspirations, values and fashions that transcend borders and cultures. But globalization has another side. Under its sway states are subject to swift and sharp economic downturns that can reduce the legitimacy of governments. Individuals are exposed to new ideas from abroad that call into question outlooks and interpretations propagated by their governments. The disparities in wealth and power between "us" and "them" are transmitted immediately, vividly and viscerally. The freedom and ferocity with which governments—at least those that want to participate in the global economy—can resort to repression is

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reduced dramatically. This increases the freedom to maneuver and the publicity available to disgruntled national minorities. States in which ethnic minorities are geographically concentrated, and politically and culturally disenfranchised, find that coercion is more costly because it is more easily observed and publicized by the outside world.

Globalization can promote integration among states. But it can also foster conflict and disintegration within them by exposing the limitations and ineptitude of governments, by generating traditionalist backlashes against alien values that present themselves as universal, and by creating huge disparities of wealth and power among nationalities, regions and classes. These effects will prove especially burdensome for the states that have risen from the detritus of the Soviet Union, as well as for the many other states of Asia—including China, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Indonesia—that share such traits. Identity based on myth, language, religion and culture may not be strong enough to hold these states together, or, if they do remain territorially intact, to provide them with adequate political stability. China, which has a more cohesive populace, may be better suited to weather the shocks of globalization. But the Chinese leadership will learn that not all effects of globalization are benign. As levels of investment, access to information through email and the Internet, and travel and residence abroad increase, the tension between China's economy, society and polity will surely grow.

Implications for American Policy

THIS PORTRAIT of the emerging Asia is at least as plausible as, and perhaps more so than, that of the Asia that most American policymakers seem to see unfolding incrementally, on the basis of linear projections of today's observable trends. Admittedly, the intellectual enterprise of extracting lessons from the past to predict the future is by its very nature an imprecise one, but it takes little to imagine that the new Asia of the early twenty-first century will not follow projected or preferred paths. Events there will cascade and generate many second and third-order consequences. Key states and groups will acquire new capabilities and pursue new objectives through new strategies. "Wild card" occurences—such as natural catastrophes or accidents—will yield rapid and unexpected consequences. In the face of all this, alliances that have served America well for half a century in Asia may slowly disintegrate. Maintaining political commitments to, and a military presence in, Asia will become much more difficult once the requisite network of bases is no longer available. New centers of power—China, Japan and India—will emerge, and they and the United States will participate in a new balance of power contest with alignments that bear little resemblance to those of the latter part of the twentieth century.

Yet in the United States one cannot detect any inclination to develop new strategic partners in Asia. Few U.S. policymakers seem to appreciate that new strategic partners are likely to be found among former adversaries—India, Iran or Vietnam, for example. Instead they are quick to embrace short-term measures for short-term gains—sanctions against India or Iran, for example—that will make it harder to find and develop such partners.

Then, too, a growing number of states and groups in the new Asia will soon have access to weapons of mass destruction, despite U.S. efforts to prevent their spread. In such a world, it does not make sense to remain blindly committed to the aim of non-proliferation,

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when in fact the selective spread of these weapons to states whose interests converge with those of the United States might advance our aims. Preaching nonproliferation to the Indians, whose determination to establish a nuclear deterrent is logical and understandable, simply verges on the comical—especially when the preacher is standing on a mountain of his own nuclear weapons. America's refusal to adjust to the reality—in its rhetoric and its policy—of a nuclear India will simply breed anti-American sentiment in that country, and prevent the necessary shift from an outdated adversarial relationship.

Those Asian states that look to the United States for reassurance are clearly less assured today than they were during the Cold War, unipolarity notwithstanding. American military interventions in the Clinton years—in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo—characterized as they have been by a gap between threats and action, unseemly exits, and the application of force from beyond the horizon and well above the clouds, have done little to dispel these doubts. Asian states that have traditionally relied upon the United States discern little evidence that Washington understands its own interests in Asia, let alone theirs. And they wonder whether the American public will continue paying in blood and treasure for the protection of distant (and now prosperous) allies.

How can the United States contribute to stability and security in Asia? Military power will continue to be important in the new balance of power contest. A more fluid presence and a greater reliance on sea power and impermanent basing rights will be required. But non-traditional threats less easily dealt with through deterrence or the application of force will become even more pronounced. These include transnational criminal and drug networks, nuclear and other environmental accidents, the fragmentation of states, the increasing salience of groups with significant military resources, the movement of peoples across state boundaries because of economic crises and civil unrest, and the dislocations created by globalization. With new uncertainties generated by new rivalries and new threats, and with the relative decline in American power, the cooperation needed to draw states together to address such common problems will prove even more difficult than it is now. To maintain the balance of power, the United States will have to use methods other than the ones that worked so well during the Cold War.

If the Asia of the twenty-first century bears a significant resemblance to that described here, the United States will find itself in an environment qualitatively different from that of the final years of the twentieth century. But who among key policymakers—or among foreign policy advisers in the presidential campaigns—thinks this way? Discussions of what Asia might look like and how it might challenge U.S. interests invariably suggest that the future will bear a strong resemblance to the past; the conventional wisdom rules. Few are willing to consider that Asia could present threats that are truly different. The first and most important challenge that the emerging Asia poses, then, is to prevailing thinking. □

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Islam and Islamism

Faith and Ideology

Daniel Pipes

ONE CANNOT emphasize too much the distinction between Islam—plain Islam—and its fundamentalist version. Islam is the religion of about one billion people and is a rapidly growing faith, particularly in Africa but also elsewhere in the world. The United States, for example, boasts almost a million converts to Islam (plus an even larger number of Muslim immigrants).

Islam's adherents find their faith immensely appealing, for the religion possesses an inner strength that is quite extraordinary. As a leading figure in the Islamic Republic of Iran maintains, "Any Westerner who really understands Islam will envy the lives of Muslims." Far from feeling embarrassed about its being temporally the last of the three major Middle Eastern monotheisms, Muslims believe that their faith improves on the earlier ones. In their telling, Judaism and Christianity are but defective variants of Islam, which is God's final, perfect religion.

Contributing to this internal confidence is the memory of outstanding achievements during Islam's first six or so centuries. Its culture was the most advanced, and Muslims enjoyed the best health, lived the longest, had the highest rates of literacy, sponsored the most advanced scientific and technical research, and deployed usually victorious armies. This pattern of success was evident from the beginning: in A.D. 622 the Prophet Muhammad fled Mecca as a refugee, only to return eight years later as its ruler. As early as the year 715, Muslim conquerors had assembled an empire that extended from Spain in the west to India in the east. To be a Muslim meant to belong to a winning civilization. Muslims, not surprisingly, came to assume a correlation between their faith and their worldly success, to assume that they were the favored of God in both spiritual and mundane matters.

And yet, in modern times battlefield victories and prosperity have been notably lacking. Indeed, as early as the thirteenth century, Islam's atrophy and Christendom's advances were already becoming discernible. But, for some five hundred years longer, Muslims remained largely oblivious to the extraordinary developments taking place to their north. Ibn Khaldun, the famous Muslim intellectual, wrote around the year 1400 about Europe, "I hear that many developments are taking place in the land of the Rum, but God only knows what happens there!"

Such willful ignorance rendered Muslims vulnerable when they could no

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longer ignore what was happening around them. Perhaps the most dramatic alert came in July 1798, when Napoleon Bonaparte landed in Egypt—the center of the Muslim world—and conquered it with stunning ease. Other assaults followed over the next century and more, and before long most Muslims were living under European rule. As their power and influence waned, a sense of incomprehension spread among Muslims. What had gone wrong? Why had God seemingly abandoned them?

The trauma of modern Islam results from this sharp and unmistakable contrast between medieval successes and more recent tribulations. Put simply, Muslims have had an exceedingly hard time explaining what went wrong. Nor has the passage of time made this task any easier, for the same unhappy circumstances basically still exist. Whatever index one employs, Muslims can be found clustering toward the bottom—whether measured in terms of their military prowess, political stability, economic development, corruption, human rights, health, longevity or literacy. Anwar Ibrahim, the former deputy prime minister of Malaysia who now languishes in jail, estimates in *The Asian Renaissance* (1997) that whereas Muslims make up just one-fifth of the world's total population, they constitute more than half of the 1.2 billion people living in abject poverty. There is thus a pervasive sense of debilitation and encroachment in the Islamic world today. As the imam of a mosque in Jerusalem put it not long ago, "Before, we were masters of the world and now we're not even masters of our own mosques."

SEARCHING FOR explanations for their predicament, Muslims have devised three political responses to modernity—secularism, reformism and Islamism. The first of these holds that Muslims can only advance by emulating the West. Yes, the secularists concede, Islam is a valuable and esteemed legacy, but its public dimensions must be put aside. In particular, the sacred law of Islam (called the Shari'a)—which governs such matters as the judicial system, the manner in which Muslim states go to war, and the nature of social interactions between men and women—should be discarded in its entirety. The leading secular country is Turkey, where Kemal Atatürk in the period 1923–38 reshaped and modernized an overwhelmingly Muslim society. Overall, though, secularism is a minority position among Muslims, and even in Turkey it is under siege.

Reformism, occupying a murky middle ground, offers a more popular response to modernity. Whereas secularism forthrightly calls for learning from the West, reformism selectively appropriates from it. The reformist says, "Look, Islam is basically compatible with Western ways. It's just that we lost track of our own achievements, which the West exploited. We must now go back to our own ways by adopting those of the West." To reach this conclusion, reformers reread the Islamic scriptures in a Western light. For example, the Koran permits a man to take up to four wives—on the condition that he treat them equitably. Traditionally, and quite logically, Muslims understood this verse as permission for a man to take four wives. But because a man is allowed only one in the West, the reformists performed a sleight of hand and interpreted the verse in a new way: the Koran, they claim, requires that a man must treat his wives equitably, which is clearly something no man can do if there is more than one of them. So, they conclude, Islam prohibits more than a single wife.

Reformists have applied this sort of reasoning across the board. To science, for example, they contend Muslims should have no objections, for science is

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in fact Muslim. They recall that the word algebra comes from the Arabic, *al-jabr*. Algebra being the essence of mathematics and mathematics being the essence of science, all of modern science and technology thereby stems from work done by Muslims. So there is no reason to resist Western science; it is rather a matter of reclaiming what the West took (or stole) in the first place. In case after case, and with varying degrees of credibility, reformists appropriate Western ways under the guise of drawing on their own heritage. The aim of the reformists, then, is to imitate the West without acknowledging as much. Though intellectually bankrupt, reformism functions well as a political strategy.

The Ideological Response

THE THIRD response to the modern trauma is Islamism, the subject of the remainder of this essay. Islamism has three main features: a devotion to the sacred law, a rejection of Western influences, and the transformation of faith into ideology.

Islamism holds that Muslims lag behind the West because they're not good Muslims. To regain lost glory requires a return to old ways, and that is achieved by living fully in accordance with the Shari'a. Were Muslims to do so, they would once again reside on top of the world, as they did a millennium ago. This, however, is no easy task, for the sacred law contains a vast body of regulations touching every aspect of life, many of them contrary to modern practices. (The Shari'a somewhat resembles Jewish law, but nothing comparable exists in Christianity.) Thus, it forbids usury or any taking of interest, which has deep and obvious implications for economic life. It calls for cutting off the hands of thieves, which runs contrary to all modern sensibilities, as do its mandatory covering of women and the separation of the sexes. Islamism not only calls for the application of these laws, but for a more rigorous application than ever before was the case. Before 1800, the interpreters of the Shari'a softened it somewhat. For instance, they devised a method by which to avoid the ban on interest. The fundamentalists reject such modifications, demanding instead that Muslims apply the Shari'a strictly and in its totality.

In their effort to build a way of life based purely on the Shar'i laws, Islamists strain to reject all aspects of Western influence—customs, philosophy, political institutions and values. Despite these efforts, they still absorb vast amounts from the West in endless ways. For one, they need modern technology, especially its military and medical applications. For another, they themselves tend to be modern individuals, and so are far more imbued with Western ways than they wish to be or will ever acknowledge. Thus, while the Ayatollah Khomeini, who was more traditional than most Islamists, attempted to found a government on the pure principles of Shiite Islam, he ended up with a *republic* based on a *constitution* that represents a *nation* via the decisions of a *parliament*, which is in turn chosen through popular *elections*—every one of these a Western concept. Another example of Western influence is that Friday, which in Islam is not a day of rest but a day of congregation, is now the Muslim equivalent of a sabbath. Similarly, the laws of Islam do not apply to everyone living within a geographical territory but only to Muslims; Islamists, however, understand them as territorial in nature (as an Italian priest living in Sudan found out long ago, when he was flogged for possessing alcohol). Islamism thereby stealthily appropriates from the West while denying that it is doing so.

Perhaps the most important of these borrowings is the emulation of Western

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ideologies. The word "Islamism" is a useful and accurate one, for it indicates that this phenomenon is an "ism" comparable to other ideologies of the twentieth century. In fact, Islamism represents an Islamic-flavored version of the radical utopian ideas of our time, following Marxism-Leninism and fascism. It infuses a vast array of Western political and economic ideas within the religion of Islam. As an Islamist, a Muslim Brother from Egypt, puts it, "We are neither socialist nor capitalist, but Muslims"; a Muslim of old would have said, "We are neither Jews nor Christians, but Muslims."

Islamists see their adherence to Islam primarily as a form of political allegiance; hence, though usually pious Muslims, they need not be. Plenty of Islamists seem in fact to be rather impious. For instance, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York, Ramzi Yousef, had a girlfriend while living in the Philippines and was "gallivanting around Manila's bars, stripjoints and karaoke clubs, flirting with women." From this and other suggestions of loose living, his biographer, Simon Reeve, finds "scant evidence to support any description of Yousef as a religious warrior." The FBI agent in charge of investigating Yousef concluded that, "He hid behind a cloak of Islam."

On a grander level, Ayatollah Khomeini hinted at the irrelevance of faith for Islamists in a letter to Mikhail Gorbachev early in 1989, as the Soviet Union was rapidly failing. The Iranian leader offered his own government as a model: "I openly announce that the Islamic Republic of Iran, as the greatest and most powerful base of the Islamic world, can easily help fill up the ideological vacuum of your system." Khomeini here seemed to be suggesting that the Soviets should turn to the Islamist ideology—converting to Islam would almost seem to be an afterthought.

Contrary to its reputation, Islamism is not a way back; as a contemporary ideology it offers not a means to return to some old-fashioned way of life but a way of navigating the shoals of modernization. With few exceptions (notably, the Taliban in Afghanistan), Islamists are city dwellers trying to cope with the problems of modern urban life—not people of the countryside. Thus, the challenges facing career women figure prominently in Islamist discussions. What, for example, can a woman who must travel by crowded public transportation do to protect herself from groping? The Islamists have a ready reply: she should cover herself, body and face, and signal through the wearing of Islamic clothes that she is not approachable. More broadly, they offer an inclusive and alternative way of life for modern persons, one that rejects the whole complex of popular culture, consumerism and individualism in favor of a faith-based totalitarianism.

Deviations From Tradition

WHILE Islamism is often seen as a form of traditional Islam, it is something profoundly different. Traditional Islam seeks to teach humans how to live in accord with God's will, whereas Islamism aspires to create a new order. The first is self-confident, the second deeply defensive. The one emphasizes individuals, the latter communities. The former is a personal credo, the latter a political ideology.

The distinction becomes sharpest when one compares the two sets of leaders. Traditionalists go through a static and lengthy course of learning in which they study a huge corpus of information and imbibe the Islamic verities much as their ancestors did centuries earlier. Their faith reflects more than a millennium of debate among scholars, jurists and

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theologians. Islamist leaders, by contrast, tend to be well educated in the sciences but not in Islam; in their early adulthood, they confront problems for which their modern learning has failed to prepare them, so they turn to Islam. In doing so they ignore nearly the entire corpus of Islamic learning and interpret the Koran as they see fit. As autodidacts, they dismiss the traditions and apply their own (modern) sensibilities to the ancient texts, leading to an oddly Protestant version of Islam.

The modern world frustrates and stymies traditional figures who, educated in old-fashioned subjects, have not studied European languages, spent time in the West, or mastered its secrets. For example, traditionalists rarely know how to exploit the radio, television and the Internet to spread their message. In contrast, Islamist leaders usually speak Western languages, often have lived abroad, and tend to be well versed in technology. The Internet has hundreds of Islamist sites. François Burgat and William Dowell note this contrast in their book, *The Islamist Movement in North Africa* (1993):

> The village elder, who is close to the religious establishment and knows little of Western culture (from which he refuses technology a priori) cannot be confused with the young science student who is more than able to deliver a criticism of Western values, with which he is familiar and from which he is able to appropriate certain dimensions. The traditionalist will reject television, afraid of the devastating modernism that it will bring; the Islamist calls for increasing the number of sets . . . once he has gained control of the broadcasts.

Most important from our perspective, traditionalists fear the West while Islamists are eager to challenge it. The late mufti of Saudi Arabia, 'Abd al-'Aziz Bin-Baz, exemplified the tremulous old guard. In the summer of 1995, he warned Saudi youth not to travel to the West for vacation because "there is a deadly poison in travelling to the land of the infidels and there are schemes by the enemies of Islam to lure Muslims away from their religion, to create doubts about their beliefs, and to spread sedition among them." He urged the young to spend their summers in the "safety" of the summer resorts in their own country.

Islamists are not completely impervious to the fear of these schemes and lures, but they have ambitions to tame the West, something they do not shy from announcing for the whole world to hear. The most crude simply want to kill Westerners. In a remarkable statement, a Tunisian convicted of setting off bombs in France in 1985–86, killing thirteen, told the judge handling his case, "I do not renounce my fight against the West which assassinated the Prophet Muhammad. . . . We Muslims should kill every last one of you [Westerners]." Others plan to expand Islam to Europe and America, using violence if necessary. An Amsterdam-based imam declared on a Turkish television program, "You must kill those who oppose Islam, the order of Islam or Allah, and His Prophet; hang or slaughter them after tying their hands and feet crosswise . . . as prescribed by the Shari'a." An Algerian terrorist group, the GIA, issued a communiqué in 1995 that showed the Eiffel Tower exploding and bristled with threats:

> We are continuing with all our strength our steps of jihad and military attacks, and this time in the heart of France and its largest cities. . . . It's a pledge that [the French] will have no more sleep and no more leisure and Islam will enter France whether they like it or not.

The more moderate Islamists plan to use non-violent means to transform their

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host countries into Islamic states. For them, conversion is the key. One leading American Muslim thinker, Isma'il R. Al-Faruqi, put this sentiment rather poetically: "Nothing could be greater than this youthful, vigorous and rich continent [of North America] turning away from its past evil and marching forward under the banner of Allahu Akbar [God is great]."

This contrast not only implies that Islamism threatens the West in a way that the traditional faith does not, but it also suggests why traditional Muslims, who are often the first victims of Islamism, express contempt for the ideology. Thus, Naguib Mahfouz, Egypt's Nobel Prize winner for literature, commented after being stabbed in the neck by an Islamist: "I pray to God to make the police victorious over terrorism and to purify Egypt from this evil, in defense of people, freedom, and Islam." Tujan Faysal, a female member of the Jordanian parliament, calls Islamism "one of the greatest dangers facing our society" and compares it to "a cancer" that "has to be surgically removed." Çevik Bir, one of the key figures in dispatching Turkey's Islamist government in 1997, flatly states that in his country, "Muslim fundamentalism remains public enemy number one." If Muslims feel this way, so can non-Muslims; being anti-Islamism in no way implies being anti-Islam.

Islamism in Practice

LIKE OTHER radical ideologues, Islamists look to the state as the main vehicle for promoting their program. Indeed, given the impractical nature of their scheme, the levers of the state are critical to the realization of their aims. Toward this end, Islamists often lead political opposition parties (Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia) or have gained significant power (Lebanon, Pakistan, Malaysia). Their tactics are often murderous. In Algeria, an Islamist insurgency has led to some 70,000 deaths since 1992.

And when Islamists do take power, as in Iran, Sudan and Afghanistan, the result is invariably a disaster. Economic decline begins immediately. Iran, where for two decades the standard of living has almost relentlessly declined, offers the most striking example of this. Personal rights are disregarded, as spectacularly shown by the re-establishment of chattel slavery in Sudan. Repression of women is an absolute requirement, a practice most dramatically on display in Afghanistan, where they have been excluded from schools and jobs.

An Islamist state is, almost by definition, a rogue state, not playing by any rules except those of expediency and power, a ruthless institution that causes misery at home and abroad. Islamists in power means that conflicts proliferate, society is militarized, arsenals grow, and terrorism becomes an instrument of state. It is no accident that Iran was engaged in the longest conventional war of the twentieth century (1980–88, against Iraq) and that both Sudan and Afghanistan are in the throes of decades-long civil wars, with no end in sight. Islamists repress moderate Muslims and treat non-Muslims as inferior specimens. Its apologists like to see in Islamism a force for democracy, but this ignores the key pattern that, as Martin Kramer points out, "Islamists are more likely to reach less militant positions because of their exclusion from power. . . . Weakness moderates Islamists." Power has the opposite effect.

Islamism has now been on the ascendant for more than a quarter century. Its many successes should not be understood, however, as evidence that it has widespread support. A reasonable estimate might find 10 percent of Muslims following the Islamist approach. Instead, the power that Islamists wield reflects their status as a

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highly dedicated, capable and well-organized minority. A little bit like cadres of the Communist Party, they make up for numbers with activism and purpose.

Islamists espouse deep antagonism toward non-Muslims in general, and Jews and Christians in particular. They despise the West both because of its huge cultural influence and because it is a traditional opponent—the old rival, Christendom, in a new guise. Some of them have learned to moderate their views so as not to upset Western audiences, but the disguise is thin and should deceive no one. □

Pawns of Hope

There are those who understand how to manage hope, by keeping it at arm's length and worrying about its abuse. (The fantasy of perfection in the next world is certainly less dangerous than the fantasy of perfection in this world.) But others have a harder time. Hope fills them with impatience, and with certainty; and it looks to them less like a dream and more like a plan. Communism addressed itself most successfully to the pawns of hope. And there still is a certain nostalgia, even among some Western intellectuals, for the confidence and the righteousness of the Communist way, and the 'certainties' of Communist ideology, compared with the amoralities and the insecurities of a market-driven society and the ideology of Mammon. It is the requirement that they 'shut the door on utopia', as Malia puts it, that holds so many back from a complete rejection of the outlook that issued in all these catastrophes. . . .

Arriving at a proper understanding of our century's disastrous entanglement in a criminal ideology, and atoning for the colossal cost in human lives and human misery (and for our complicity in it), is a more urgent task for the left than for the right. It is also an essential prerequisite for taking up anew, and with the proper anti-revolutionary modesty, the business of the betterment of the human condition.

—Michael Scammell, *The New Republic*, December 20, 1999

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Pragmatic Theocracy

A Contradiction in Terms?

Ray Takeyh

FOR TWO DECADES now, the Islamic Republic of Iran has confounded the American foreign policy community, whose members have oscillated wildly between urgent appeals to normalize relations with Tehran and equally determined bids to contain its influence. In the latest swing of the pendulum, a chorus of voices—including those of former National Security Advisers Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, former Representative Lee Hamilton, and a parade of retired diplomats—has been calling for a rapprochement.

The basis of their petition was the outcome of Iran's 1997 presidential election, which brought to power Ayatollah Muhammad Khatemi. The replacement of the implacable Koranic figures who formerly ruled Iran with a smiling cleric who reads John Locke and professes a commitment to democratizing his nation's Islamic polity has led to a certain euphoria amongst Iran watchers in the West and, specifically, to widespread anticipation of a more moderate Iranian foreign policy. But far from confining themselves to recommendations for normalized relations, the most ardent of the Iran "engagers" have been touting the "New Iran" as an agent of regional stability. One of the most vocal enthusiasts, Thomas Friedman of the *New York Times*, has emphasized that the key to unraveling Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq is to be found in a strategy "that can be summed up in one word—Iran." Echoing that appraisal, Robin Wright and Shaul Bakhash have recommended in the pages of *Foreign Policy* that "the Islamic Republic could underwrite Persian Gulf security, as it did during the reign of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi."

This optimism has proved contagious and, not surprisingly, has eroded the resolve of the Clinton administration. Since his election in 1992, President Clinton has repeatedly maintained that improved U.S.-Iranian relations depend on Iran halting its attacks on the Arab-Israeli peace process, its support for terrorism, and its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Lately, however, the administration has perceptibly softened its stance. "We have to find a way to get dialogue", President Clinton now argues. "Going into denial when you're in conversation with somebody who has been your adversary, in a country like Iran that has often worried about its independence and its integrity, is not exactly the way to begin." Then, too, the administration's chief Middle East strategist, Assistant Secretary of State Martin Indyk, has stressed that "it is time for the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran to

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engage each other as two great nations—face to face, and on the basis of equality and mutual respect."

Alas, the latest shift in American attitudes seems to be driven less by actual developments in Tehran than by uniquely Western assumptions about President Khatemi and, more generally, about the putative link between political liberalization and foreign policy moderation. Iran, though, is not playing by Western rules. To begin with, the center of power in the Republic is not the institution of the presidency but its religious establishment, particularly the office of the Supreme Spiritual Leader. Its edict affects every aspect of Iranian national life, from decisions concerning war and peace, to legislation, to the appointment of key figures, to the judiciary and the validation of election returns. Until his death, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini occupied the post. In 1989 he was succeeded by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was appointed on an interim basis but has managed to prolong his tenure. But Khamenei lacks theological credentials and the assured backing of Iran's religious elite. Accordingly, he has sought to prove his *bona fides* by feeding its members a steady diet of anti-American proclamations. Yet even the influence of the Supreme Leader is not absolute. For the clerical Republic is governed by a system of collective leadership in which no individual can unilaterally alter national policy. If either Khamenei or Khatemi were inclined to a dramatic reorientation of Iran's foreign policy—and there is no evidence to suggest such an inclination—the intricate web of institutions and personalities beneath them would obstruct their efforts at every turn.

Rather than glean Iran's intentions from the nuances of its domestic political discourse, then, we might do better simply to examine its behavior abroad. Whereas Iran's political terrain is highly factionalized, in matters of foreign affairs a relative consensus persists. Upon his election to the presidency, Khatemi declared that "the Iranian people have paid a heavy price for the revolution and are not going to give it up so easily." Iran's new foreign minister, Kemal Kharrazi, likewise stressed that "Iran's foreign policy before and after the election of President Khatemi remains the same and continuity prevails." Indeed, the Islamic Republic's international aims rest on certain geopolitical constants, ones to which mullahs of whatever political temper steadfastly adhere. Ideology may no longer be the driving force behind Iran's international conduct, and Iran may indeed be evolving into a "normal country", but its foreign policy objectives—particularly as they concern the United States—remain basically unchanged.

Perceptions of America

IN THE aftermath of Khomeini's death in 1989, Iran's clerical estate was plunged into an intense debate about the direction of the revolution. Iran's domestic political scene soon became polarized, as competing factions of pragmatists and hardliners waged a turf war over the nature and scope of domestic political and economic reforms, an argument that continues to this day.

On policy toward the United States, however, the two wings of Iran's body politic converge. Both factions agree that the extension of Iran's regional influence, an aim shared by moderates and hardliners alike, requires a corresponding retraction of American power in the Middle East—the difference being that, whereas the hardliners continue to depict America as a socio-cultural threat, the pragmatists view the United States mainly as a strategic challenger. Accordingly, Khamenei still castigates America as the "Great Satan", while the more moderate Khatemi sees it merely as a "neocolonial-

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ist menace." Yet, whether the United States is seen as a morally debilitating agent of cultural imperialism or a domineering superpower, the prescription—that Iran's regional influence must eclipse that of its American adversary—has stayed the same.

Iran's pragmatists certainly perceive the need to redefine Khomeini's problematic legacy. Khomeini's Iran thrashed about the Middle East seeking to undermine established authorities in the name of Islamic revolution. But in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War, there developed a growing conviction within the clerical estate that Khomeini's divisive conduct had not only isolated Iran in the region, but had paved the way for a more robust American presence. Hence, the Grand Ayatollah's successors soon abandoned the mission of exporting revolution, supplanting it with an approach based on more conventional measures of national interest. Tehran's path would now be more gradual, seeking to further its regional aspirations less through confrontation than accommodation with its neighbors. The shift, however, has been one of means rather than ends.

As with his predecessors, President Khatemi routinely proclaims that Iran, by virtue of its location, demography and resources, has earned the role of dominant regional power, particularly in the Persian Gulf. Unlike them, he is driven more by considerations of realpolitik than religious fervor. That, however, does not mean that Iran's foreign policy objectives will soon coincide with those of the United States. For Iran's regional ambitions remain frustrated, first and foremost, by the absorption of the Middle East into the American imperium. Hence, Khatemi emphasizes to his Gulf neighbors that "the security of the area will only be preserved through the evacuation of the alien forces from the region." And he routinely affirms that "the most important foreign policy will be to distance the enemy [the United States] from" the Persian Gulf.

As a scholar with a keen sense of history, Khatemi appreciates that there is nothing inevitable or necessarily permanent about America's alliances in the Middle East. In the twentieth century, Islamic states have only entered into military compacts with occidental powers under compulsion or when confronted with a significant territorial threat, as during the Gulf War. Accordingly, Khatemi has sought to construct an alternative network of alliances, with Iran at its core. The focus of this effort has been the Persian Gulf. Iran rightly views the Gulf as its link to the international petroleum market, and as such has legitimate security concerns in the waterway. Given the effective collapse of Iraq as a contender for supremacy in the Gulf, the United States remains Iran's primary geopolitical rival there. Khatemi's genteel pledges of solidarity with the Gulf's sheikdoms are meant to persuade them that the most effective method of containing Iraq and ensuring the stability of the region lies not in closer ties to the United States, but rather in a collective defense network organized by Iran.

In a reversal of Khomeini's policy, Iran no longer plots the overthrow of the princes but appeals to their accommodationist instincts and traditional aversion to reliance on Western powers. Such realism has already reaped dividends. Iran and Saudi Arabia have harmonized their oil policies and dramatically expanded diplomatic, trade and cultural relations. Since Khatemi's historic visit to Riyadh in May 1999, the two Gulf giants have also initiated a variety of coordinated defense measures.

Khatemi's deft employment of realpolitik in the Persian Gulf finds its complement in the eastern Mediterranean. From Tehran's perspective, the most omi-

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

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Khamenei: Partial to Khomeini

nous development there has been the emergence of close relations between two of America's staunchest allies—Israel and Turkey. This is commonly interpreted in Tehran as proof of an American-Israeli stratagem to encircle Iran with a network of hostile powers. As Khatemi has put it, the Turkish-Israeli alliance is yet another indication that the United States and Israel have "taken hostage nations whose governments believe that they are big powers while their resources are put at the disposal" of their sponsors. The transformation of Iran into a major regional power, Tehran's leaders complain, is imperiled by the potential incorporation of the Levant into a Washington-Jerusalem-Ankara framework.

ACCORDINGLY, Iran has sought to construct a counter-alliance encompassing the militant Arab states and Islamist movements of the region, all of whom share its anxieties about American power. As Iran's defense minister, Ali Shamkhani, has put it, "Iran is trying to create an Iran-Arab common front with regards to the dangerous threat" posed by the encroachment of Israeli and American influence in the Arab East. The contours of this policy became manifest during Khatemi's recent trip to Syria, where the two states pledged to design common foreign and defense policies. Tehran has consolidated its presence in Lebanon, too, by increasing assistance to Hizballah and other Islamist groups operating in that benighted country.

And in his boldest strategic move yet, Khatemi has been actively seeking to link Iran's alliances in the eastern Mediterranean with its fledgling Gulf network—promoting Saudi-Syrian reconciliation, for instance, and mediating disputes between the Gulf sheikdoms and Islamist opposition movements. Khatemi, of course, is not the first Middle Eastern leader to aspire to such dreams of unity, nor is he the first Iranian politician to contend for the prize of regional leadership. Leaders as varied as Gamal Abdul Nasser and Ayatollah Khomeini, armed with ideologies as distinct as Arab nationalism and Pan-Islamism, have sought the same end. To be sure, Khatemi's vision is more cir-



AP Photo/Charles Krupa

Khatemi: Prefers Locke

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cumscribed and his methods decidedly more nuanced. But he too is likely to fail at this task, as inter-regional rivalries and divisions are probably too intense and deeply rooted to be dispelled.

Although Khatemi is unlikely to realize his vision of regional unity, Iran under his stewardship will continue to challenge the United States in other ways. There is, to begin with, Iran's response to the U.S.-sponsored Arab-Israeli peace process. Washington, of course, hopes that Iran will tacitly acquiesce to an eventual settlement. Gary Sick, a former National Security Council official and a leading Khatemi enthusiast, assures us that "if the parties come to an agreement, Tehran will accept it." And should Iran persist in its rejectionist stance, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft stress that "opposition to [the Oslo] process by another country should not be grounds for international excommunication." The proponents of normalization, however, overlook how Iran's opposition to the peace process is rooted in strategic calculations that preclude friendly relations with the United States.

For Iran's clerical oligarchs, Israel is not merely an adversary or strategic competitor, but an American aircraft carrier. It is both the agent of a pernicious ideology (Zionism) and the client of a strategic rival (the United States). Typically, the election of the moderate Ehud Barak was greeted in Tehran with a terse statement by the Foreign Ministry declaring that, "Iran's stance vis-à-vis the Zionist regime of Israel is the same as before and has not undergone any changes." Khatemi understands well that the resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute could significantly enhance America's influence in the region and alter the prevailing balance of power—the Turkish-Israeli alliance offering a possible preview of worse things to come. For Tehran, then, obstructing the peace process has the twin purpose of diminishing both Israeli and American influence. Moreover, through active support for Hamas and Islamic Jihad, Iran can present itself as a pillar of Muslim resistance to "Zionist and American encroachment" at a time when the secular states of Turkey and Jordan appear to be accommodating Jerusalem and Washington. By contrast, a powerful Israel at peace with its neighbors and closely aligned with the United States is sure to isolate Iran and its radical allies.

Going Nuclear

IN THE post-Cold War period, one of the principal concerns of the United States has been to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Among the greatest obstacles to this end is Iran, which sees in the chaos of the former Soviet Union an unprecedented opportunity to acquire nuclear technology and expeditiously revise the balance of power in the Middle East.

Iran's pursuit of the nuclear option stems from a number of interlocking motives. As a state that is determined to project regional influence, it requires a credible military establishment capable of defending its interests and advancing its objectives. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Tehran has embarked on an extensive program of expanding and modernizing its military forces. The imperative of reviving a moribund economy, however, has diminished enthusiasm within the clerical establishment for bearing the heavy cost of maintaining a large conventional army. To bridge the gap between its aspirations and capabilities, Iran has therefore shifted its resources to the acquisition of missile technology and weapons of mass destruction. As with the New Look strategy in America during the 1950s, nuclear weapons satisfy Iran's defense posture at an acceptable cost to its fiscal health.

Beyond its regional pretensions, Iran's motive for acquiring nuclear weapons also

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derives from the need for a credible deterrent capability. Although in the 1990s the United States has reduced its overall force levels in the Middle East, it still maintains a sizable forward presence in the Persian Gulf and has enshrined in official policy a doctrine of containing Iran. Understandably, then, Tehran's clerical elite is obsessed with the imperative of deterring a potential U.S. attack, a task which the Gulf War proved even a massive conventional force cannot accomplish. The former Iranian defense minister, Akbar Torkan, declared, "Can our air force take on the Americans, or our navy take on the American navy? The way to go about dealing with such threats requires a different solution entirely." Nor would Iranian defense planners be misguided if they sought that solution in a nuclear arsenal. The Clinton administration, after all, has proved quite gentle in its dealings with a nuclear-armed North Korea, while pummeling a militarily weak Serbia and Iraq—a distinction surely not lost on Tehran.

Weapons of mass destruction also offer the best means by which to negate Israel's military advantage. Khatemi has stressed that "the Zionist regime which has acquired nuclear arms with the assistance of the Westerners has not been exposed to any pressure; instead it enjoys the support and encouragement from certain states." Or as the head of Iran's judiciary, Ayatollah Muhammad Yazdi, said recently, "We are living at a time when the United States supports Israel, which has the biggest arsenals of mass destruction and nuclear weapons; an atomic power is needed in the world of Islam to create a balance in the region." This aim recently acquired an additional sense of urgency with Israel's procurement of long-range Jericho missiles and cruise missile-capable submarines. Israel's alliance with Turkey and recent reports of Israeli strike aircraft stationed at the Turkish-Iranian border have also raised alarms in Tehran.

Khatemi promptly signaled his commitment to Iran's ongoing nuclear research program when he appointed one of the Islamic Republic's more competent officials, the former oil minister Gholarmreza Aghazadeh, to head its Atomic Energy Organization. The newly revitalized atomic agency has intensified its cooperation with Russia, and Moscow has pledged to assist in the construction of uranium-producing reactors. Already, hundreds of Russian scientists are involved in the construction of Iran's Bushehr nuclear complex, while an increasing number of Iranian scientists are being trained at Russian academies. Beyond Russia, Iranian agents have been pursuing plutonium and weapons-grade uranium in the former Soviet republics, North Korea and South Asia, while also attempting to recruit unemployed South African nuclear physicists. The pattern of Iran's procurement efforts has led Hans Blix, the former chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to conclude that, "One cannot avoid suspecting that there are organizations in Iran that are preparing a nuclear weapons program."

The Utility of Terror

LAST, BUT NOT trivial, there is the matter of Iran's sponsorship of international terrorism. Since the 1979 revolution, the Islamic Republic has conducted two types of terrorist campaigns: the assassination of Iranian dissidents abroad and support for radical Islamist groups who target Western citizens. As to the first of these, Khatemi has purged the hit squads that until recently hunted down Iranian émigrés. The new president quickly recognized that the habit of dispatching assassination teams to European capitals had exacted a steep price in terms of Iran's

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public relations and commercial ties. Unlike his predecessors, Khatemi is not obsessed with the enervated opposition groups abroad, and, in any case, assassinating their spokesmen hardly furthered Iran's national security aims.

However, to the extent that terrorism does advance Iran's regional objectives, there has been no break with past practice. Tehran's support for Hizballah, for example, provides it with a means by which to influence the direction of Lebanese politics, while in Hamas Iran has found a proxy club with which to strike Israel. Far from renouncing such groups, Khatemi has averred that "supporting peoples who fight for their land is not, in my opinion, terrorism." The nature of Iran's conduct has led the Clinton administration's point man on terrorism, Michael Sheehan, to stipulate:

> Iran continues to be involved in a range of terrorist activities. These include providing material support and safe-haven to some of the most lethal terrorist groups in the Middle East, notably Hizballah, Hamas and PIJ [Palestinian Islamic Jihad].

In his recent trip to Washington, King Abdullah of Jordan similarly conveyed to the White House his concern that Iran had intensified its support for rejectionist Palestinian factions.

Then there is the unresolved Khobar Towers bombing that claimed the lives of nineteen American servicemen. Circumstantial evidence points to the involvement of Iran working through its surrogates in Saudi Arabia. State Department Spokesman James Rubin recently confirmed that, "We do have specific information with respect to the involvement of Iranian Government officials." It is important to note, however, that the Khobar bombing preceded Khatemi's election, and the president has since severed ties with the radical Saudi groups, which no longer serve Iran's interests in the Gulf.

As elsewhere, Iran's approach to terrorism suggests that it is motivated by carefully considered policy objectives as opposed to irrational temptations. But that still does not make it a friend of the United States. True, Iran is no longer a revolutionary power. But for Tehran, the intensely coveted aim of regional mastery requires as its precondition the retraction of U.S. power in the Middle East and the marginalization of America's leading ally, Israel. Iran and the United States are, in short, two states competing over the same territory. And this is where a strategy of accommodation falters. For no degree of internal liberalization is likely to alter this fundamental clash of interests. Khatemi may have discarded the Khomeini regime's intemperate rhetoric and inflammatory strategy, but he has remained loyal to its hegemonic aspirations. A more pragmatic Iran, then, is likely to offer the United States only slightly less of a challenge than its revolutionary predecessor. □

The Usual Suspects

A peculiar alliance has recently come into life. Forces from the extreme left, the extreme right, environmentalist groups, trade unions of developed countries and some self-appointed representatives of civil society are gathering around a common endeavor: to save the people of developing countries from development.

—President Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico, *Wall Street Journal*, January 31, 2000

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What Mahathir Has Wrought

David Martin Jones

A PRE-PAID electronic "Touch and Go" card offers the best way to negotiate the toll booths along the north-south superhighway that traverses the Malay Peninsula from Johore to the Thai border. By an unintended irony, the title of the card captures the current condition of the Malaysian polity. On the one hand, Malaysia has emerged from the Asian financial meltdown relatively unscathed economically. On the other, a series of political scandals and a bitterly contested election campaign in November 1999 have rocked the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), the ruling party that has overseen the development of this multi-ethnic state—composed of 62 percent Malays, 30 percent Chinese and 9 percent Indians, the beliefs of whom traverse the spectrum of spiritual possibility from animism to Islam.

Almost daily revelations of alleged corruption and sexual misdeeds involving former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, his adopted brother and his chauffeur have disturbed the quiescence of the recently urbanized Malay middle class, whose undivided loyalty has until now underwritten UMNO rule. This *arriviste* class, itself the product of state policy, had previously left the demands of modernization to UMNO's guidance. Revelations about buggery in the upmarket Kuala Lumpur (KL) suburb of Bangsar, and allegations of attempts to poison, both literally and metaphorically, the still popular Anwar have, however, tended to disturb middle-class faith in party guidance. At the same time as the state-controlled media revel in the gory details of Anwar's alleged private life, the government bans *Austin Powers: The Spy Who Shagged Me* in deference to Islamic sensibilities.

The contradictory demands of tradition and modernity, dramatized by the Anwar case, are daily apparent on the streets of the nation's capital, Kuala Lumpur, where professional Malay women seek to marry their mobile phones to their elegantly cut *baju kurang*, Raybans and matching head scarves. Glass and chrome temples to Mammon sit uneasily beside the sinuous lines of the city's oldest mosque, the Masjid Jamek, and the Courts of Justice, built at the turn of the century. Symbolizing the perceived need to build a dynamic, Asian modernity, the eighty-two stories of the Gothamesque Petronas Towers dominate the until recently sleepy colonial capital. From the towers a state-of-the-art, rapid transport system crosses the city. Ultimately it will join the recently opened KL International Airport, an air conditioned symphony of chrome, glass and

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marble, with boutiques dedicated to Ferregamo and Bally.

The transformation of Kuala Lumpur and the modernization of Malaysia are the realization of one man's vision—that of the country's longest serving prime minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad. Unfortunately, the economic meltdown of the late 1990s required the more grandiose elements of his vision to be put on hold, as the incomplete concrete pillars of the KL rapid transport system bear silent witness. Elsewhere along the north-south highway the costs of short-term loans funding long-term investment is evident. To the north, the empty hotels that line the beaches of Batu Ferenghi on Penang Island illustrate the capricious nature of international tourism. Elegant hotels like the Bayview and the Rasa Sayang, which in the heyday of the Asian miracle catered to discerning Germans and Swedes, are now reduced to hosting pasty-faced, package holiday Brits with a penchant for warm beer and "curry half and half" (half rice, half french fries). Meanwhile further down the coast, Malacca, the pre-colonial center of the Malay world, gradually decays into the sludge of the straits named in its honor. When buildings are not being constructed in Malaysia, they are falling down. The Mah Kota complex on the outskirts of Malacca is a case in point. The hotel is a postmodern pink palace surrounded by recently built streets of empty boutiques catering to tourists who never came. An unfinished aquarium surrounded by rotting corrugated iron advertising SEA-WORLD in faded lettering indicates where the miracle died and rotted beneath the tropical rain.

Neil Rabinowitz/CORBIS

An uneasy coexistence.

Mahathir sought to address the malaise that gripped his tiger economy by imposing currency controls in 1998. With characteristic insouciance he has also forged ahead with plans to build an "intelligent city" of the future. It will run from the Petronas Towers in downtown Kuala Lumpur to a building site in the jungle, forty kilometers to the south. The building site houses a partially completed paperless administrative center, Putrajaya, and a yet-to-be-built multimedia supercorridor called Cyberjaya. Mahathir intends this $10 billion exercise in Ozymandian hubris to cap his vision of Malaysia transformed.

In order to fund this silicon *kampung*, however, Mahathir must attract multinational investment in the shape of Sun Microsystems, Microsoft, Intel, Nokia and British Telecom, whose CEOs turned up for the multimedia equivalent of a rumble in the jungle in July 1999. As they approached the Cyberjaya site they were greeted by a curious monochromatic image on a billboard depicting rioters demolishing a car. Above the image a message warned: "Foreign Influence is a threat to National Security."

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This capacity to reject foreign influence yet promote foreign direct investment suggests that modernization, Malaysian style, represents an Asian version of doublethink (memorably defined by George Orwell as "the capacity of holding two contradictory views in one's mind simultaneously and accepting both of them"). The impressive postwar growth of Malaysia depended upon its membership in the Western alliance during the Cold War, its openness to the post-Bretton Woods liberal trade order in the Asia-Pacific, and its export-oriented economic strategy. Yet throughout the 1980s Mahathir and his ruling UMNO railed against Western liberalism, launched a Buy British Last campaign, and instituted a Look East economic policy. At regional forums like Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Malaysia continues to promote a Japan-led East Asian Economic Caucus.

Mahathir's illiberal "heresy" (as he himself termed it) in suspending the repatriation of foreign funds invested on the KL stock exchange[1] and arresting his reform-minded deputy Anwar Ibrahim prompted commentators as diverse as Amnesty International, Indonesian President B.J. Habibie, George Soros and Al Gore to direct a chorus of disapproval at Malaysia's political and economic failings. Given Malaysia's dependence on foreign direct investment and manufacturing exports, it is curious that Mahathir regards foreign influence and the global market with such unbridled suspicion. Does that suspicion simply reflect the uncertain mood swings of an Asian gerontocrat unwilling to go quietly into the political night? Or does it—and the authoritarianism and rhetorical dissonance that go with it—mask irresoluble tensions at the heart of the late developing state that Mahathir christened "Malaysia Incorporated"? What, moreover, will be the future for the once acclaimed but now widely disparaged Malaysian version of the Asian model, after UMNO's somewhat uncertain electoral victory in November 1999?

Constructing Malaysians

THE incoherent character of contemporary Malaysian politics reflects the contingent factors that shaped Malaysia's development. Modernizing states, as Ernest Gellner remarked, require nations. As in many other post-colonial states, building the Malaysian nation has been an anxious affair. There were few cultural resources upon which to draw. Apart from Islam, which wafted over on the boats of spice traders from Moghul India, and the Malacca sultanate that fell to the Portuguese in 1511, there was little in the way of tradition to support a national identity. Somewhat disturbingly for Malaysian *amour propre*, just as it was the British architect A.B. Hubbock who designed the mosque and railway station that give the nation's capital a distinctively oriental flavor, so it was the British Colonial Office that first cobbled the new state together from the fragments of its Southeast Asian possessions: the Federated Malay States that accepted British advisers, the independent northern sultanates, Sarawak and Sabah on the island of Borneo, and, initially, Singapore.

In the aftermath of World War II, the British made various efforts to create a viable political arrangement to unite these disparate parts, a task made more urgent by the serious communist insurgency on the peninsula. After a couple of false

[1]The move froze approximately $10 billion in foreign emerging market funds in Malaysia and left $2 billion of shares in limbo on the Singapore Central Limit Order Book. It also led to Malaysia being removed from the Morgan Stanley Capital International Index and the International Finance Corporation Index.

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starts, these culminated in the creation of a Malaysian Federation in 1963. While it solved the problem of disunity, the Federation served to make the question of Malay identity and its relationship to an evolving national consciousness a matter of political urgency. In the uncertain and unstable world of postwar Southeast Asian politics, the very formation of the new state exacerbated regional tension. The Malayan Emergency caused by the communist insurgency (1948–58), followed by confrontation with Indonesia (1963–66), whose irascible first president, Sukarno, violently objected to the new entity, fed a burgeoning siege mentality in the leaders of the new state. Not only were the boundaries of Malaysia a source of anxiety, but the notion of what constituted a Malay—let alone a Malaysian—was equally unclear. Thus, traditionally, to be Malay was to be *kerajaan*, or unconditionally loyal to the sultan. At the same time, after 1946 UMNO's brand of populist nationalism emphasized the shared and equal identity of the *bangsa Melayu* (the Malay nation). But, differently again, to be Malay was to be Muslim. For the more religiously disposed Malays—who eventually were to form the backbone of the Parti Islam se-Malaysia (PAS)—the fact that the privileged status of Islam was written into the 1957 constitution bequeathed by the departing British intimated the future possibility of an Islamic state. For pragmatic political leaders, however, the pressing need for a sustainable Malay unity tended to override these conflicting understandings of feudally, ethnically and religiously defined allegiance.

Related to the uncertain character of Malay identity, there existed the problem of establishing the terms of interracial engagement in the multiracial, postcolonial state. (At the time, of Malaysia's population of around ten million, 56 percent were Malays, 34 percent Chinese, and 10 percent Indian.) Between 1955 and 1969, this meant an electoral "alliance" between UMNO, the Malay Chinese Association and the Malay Indian Congress. This coalition of ethnic elites



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presided uncertainly over a friable community. The arrangement initially provided for the political dominance of Malay aristocrats, epitomized by post-independence Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, whose urbane style afforded considerable latitude for Chinese economic influence. But the alliance fell apart in the course of the 1960s, and the fear that Chinese economic power might translate into political domination prompted Singapore's expulsion from the Federation in 1965. Subsequently, in the wake of elections that saw UMNO's parliamentary dominance threatened, serious interracial riots involving hundreds of deaths erupted in Kuala Lumpur in May 1969.

The events of May 1969 represented the year zero of the new state. Subsequently, official state ideology animadverted against "communalism." To reinforce this, UMNO altered the constitution, "removing issues considered sensitive from public discourse", and redrew electoral boundaries in favor of rural, ethnic Malay constituencies. The "consociational" contract was renegotiated to facilitate increased Malay economic participation. After a period of emergency rule, Malaysia's second prime minister, Tun Razak, announced a New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1972 that defined the terms of the new contract. Henceforth, the government actively engaged in economic management to ensure that *bumiputeras* (sons of the soil) directly participated in and benefited from economic growth.

The renegotiated social contract was, moreover, extended to include the offshore states of Sabah and Sarawak. The evolving understanding that the native peoples of East Malaysia shared a common identity with the native Malays, which distinguished them from the non-indigenous, urbanized Chinese, facilitated this development. UMNO's capacity to dominate a new multi-ethnic Barisan Nasional (National Front) coalition in the Malay interest, maintain a two-thirds majority in the federal parliament, and, without quite the same urgency, dominate the state assemblies of the peninsula and East Malaysia was subsequently central to political stability. As Mahathir caustically observed in 1971, Malaysia's internal politics were "racial politics" and its evolving democracy a limited and elite-guided one "to ensure that the mutually antagonistic races of Malaysia will not clash."

The Doctor's Prescription

ON THE BASIS OF this revised contract, Malaysia's post-colonial elite, unlike that of several of its Southeast Asian neighbors, sustained economic growth with equity and maintained political stability without undue recourse to political violence or "extrajudicial killing." Given the inauspicious conditions that shaped the emergence of Malaysia, it was an impressive achievement on the part of UMNO that between 1969 and 1998 Malaysia was transformed from a commodity-based colonial economy of 10 million people into an urbanized manufacturing economy of 22 million with a per capita GDP of $5,000. In the process, the incursion of the party into economic, social and political engineering facilitated both a concentration and centralization of power, as well as an ideological understanding of the state as an incorporated enterprise association.

The deliberate construction of a "nation incorporated" particularly appealed to Malaysia's fourth prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad. Given the Malay conception of power and the need for unswerving loyalty, the political ideology of contemporary Malaysia is largely reducible to the personality of its leader. Mahathir is a self-proclaimed "man in a hurry" who brooks no interference with the realization of his visions. Uncharacteristically for a Malay

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ruler, he is a self-made man who avoids the elaborate courtesies that elsewhere define Malay social and political etiquette. The son of a Kelantan schoolmaster of Indian Islamic extraction and a Malay mother, Mahathir apparently developed early on an anxiety about identity, an acute sensitivity to the humiliation of subjection (particularly the colonial variety), and a consuming desire to build a new, self-confident Malay released from feudal tutelage and adapted to the needs of a rational modernity.

His involvement in nationalist politics dates from the colonial era, when as an unassuming medical student in Singapore he compiled pseudonymous articles for the Malay press. Indeed, a surgical approach to political problems, combined with anxiety about his own miscegenated provenance and the need to overcome Malay backwardness, seems to constitute the psychological template through which Mahathir assesses such problems. He considers politics

> a good profession for people with medical training. Doctors go through the process of observing a patient, recording his or her medical history, then you make a physical examination, do lab tests and finally arrive at a diagnosis. The process is basically the same in politics.[2]

Medical science also contributed a distinctively eugenic and Social Darwinian flavor to his world-view. As early as 1971 Mahathir had controversially identified *The Malay Dilemma*, the title of a book he wrote in that year. This consisted of the eugenic and climatologically induced Malay propensity to an inbred dependence, fatalism and apathy. The need to address these flaws in the Malay character through state intervention along the lines prescribed by "Dr. UMNO" was of such urgency that dissent from the proposed course of treatment could not be tolerated. Mahathir's political aggression thus masks an acute sensitivity to Malay weakness and an awareness of a need to strengthen the country in order to catch up with a West whose economic achievement he wishes to emulate, but whose free-market blandishments and democratic rhetoric he considers an insidious attempt to reimpose colonial subjection.

Fervent belief in his own diagnostic rectitude, exacerbated by anxiety at the prospect of being left behind, contributed to an evolving climate of political confrontation and crisis after Mahathir became prime minister in 1981. Indeed, he admits to relishing a fight. It permits him to isolate the disease, whether feudal, Islamic, communalist or Western, and surgically remove the infection from the body politic. This mixture of "surgical" ruthlessness, pragmatism and narcissism has consistently characterized Mahathir's approach to the economy, to the Malaysian constitution, to the inchoate opposition and to foreign relations.

Malaysia, Inc.

AS EARLY AS 1971 Mahathir had envisaged the NEP redistributing socioeconomic goods to the economically deprived Malay and other indigenous communities, thereby building a self-confident, entrepreneurial, new Malay identity. While the earlier administrations of Razak and Hussein Onn had seen the NEP as inaugurating a new era of state intervention, it was Mahathir who gave the policy urgency and a definitive shape. After 1981, Mahathir and his favorite financial adviser, Daim Zainuddin, promoted a Malaysia Incorporated strategy creating a *bumiputera* capitalist class through the partial privatization of state-owned banks and industries. UMNO's investment arm, the

[2]Mahathir, *A New Deal for Asia* (Kuala Lumpur: Pelanduk, 1999), pp. 20-1.

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Renong conglomerate, with its various media, finance, infrastructure and tourist interests, exemplified a policy Mahathir has variously described as "affirmative action" and "constructive protection." In 1985 the Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia launched a national car, the Proton Saga (really a Mitsubishi Lancer assembled in Malaysia), which seemed to symbolize the success both of industrialization and of the Japan-focused Look East strategy.

The evolution of the NEP under Mahathir also distorted the character of Chinese economic activity. The large Chinese trading conglomerates, like Quek Leng Chan's Hong Leong Group and Vincent Tan's Inter-Pacific Group, increasingly cultivated close ties with key figures in the UMNO elite—like Mahathir, Daim and Anwar—and functioned as their business proxies. The evolving developmental coalition thus co-opted the conglomerates into UMNO business politics, while the recently created *bumiputera* enterprises became inured to state dependence. While business became entangled in politics, the governmental bureaucracy developed an institutional investment in shielding corporate activity from public scrutiny.

The increasing malleability of the constitution and the money politics that became inseparable from the Malaysian electoral process further enhanced both single-party rule and the evolution of state corporatism. In all elections held since 1969, including the most recent one in November 1999, UMNO and its coalition partners have secured the two-thirds majority in parliament necessary to amend the constitution, and they have not been reticent in using it. The constitution has now been altered thirty-four times. Increasingly, the party treats the document merely as a technical mechanism for securing political ends. Through judicious constitutional manipulation Mahathir has eroded judicial independence and the rule of law; undermined the autonomy of state assemblies and the traditional authority of the sultanate; and increased the authority of the party in general and the office of prime minister in particular.

As a commoner and a political outsider who was excluded from UMNO in 1971 for his attacks on the aristocracy's indifference to Malay backwardness, Mahathir particularly has sought to detach the Malays from their feudal past. In that same year, he accused Tunku Abdul Rahman of playing the "grand vizier." In 1983 as prime minister, he succeeded in removing the monarch's power to veto parliamentary bills. And in 1992, when the sultan of Johore assaulted the state hockey coach for questioning his son's big match temperament, Mahathir took the opportunity to curb the aristocracy's extrajudicial authority.

In the same vein, in 1988 Mahathir manipulated an internal UMNO crisis to sack the Lord President of the Supreme Court and two other judges. Subsequently, the judiciary was made directly accountable to the executive. This development, together with the Internal Security Act dating from British rule and the Malayan Emergency—which permitted detention without trial and trial without jury—effectively undermined the rule of law. In the course of the 1980s, a leading critic of Mahathir's growing autocracy observed that parliament, the judiciary and the royalty had surrendered their power to the UMNO executive "to which everything else in the country is subservient."[3]

[3]Chandra Muzaffar, *The NEP, Development and Alternative Consciousness* (Penang: Aliran, 1989), p. 318. See also the Report of the Committee on International Human Rights of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, "The Decline in the Rule of Law in Malaysia and Singapore" *The Record* (January/February 1991), p. 10.

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Alongside a compelling amalgam of incentives and intimidation, building Malaysia Incorporated also required selective ideological recourse to tradition, in order to reinforce party guidance and the rule of the man of prowess rather than the rule of law. Mahathir required Malay loyalty to be transferred from the sultans to the state, while Islam was syncretically blended with the requirements of the latest development policy. Such ideological guidance suited the new affluent and urbanized Malay middle class, the creation of which has been the most significant social achievement of the Mahathir era. Elite demands for *musyawarah* (deliberation) and *muafakat* (consensus) evoke a positive response from this psychologically and economically dependent class. Significantly, the Malay *nouveaux riches* "do not have the same reasons for contributing to politics or speaking out because they would rather not change the system as long as they are the beneficiaries." It is "snob appeal that motivates the middle class" and reinforces a traditional pattern of deference.[4] As another government critic has observed, the Malay middle class "doesn't care" about political liberalization; "as long as they live comfortably people are happy."[5]

The state-controlled media reinforce this predilection and the government designs elaborate mass mobilization campaigns like *Semarak*[6] and *Malaysia Boleh* (Malaysia Can Do) to enhance "social cohesion." The assertion of "Asian values" in the course of the 1990s offered a further source of organic bonding and an additional prophylactic to counter the new external threat posed by "intolerant" Western democrats. Indeed, by 1996 Anwar could detect an "Asian Renaissance" in progress, one that provided a veneer of shared, if ill-defined, Asianness that glossed over both internal and regional differences.

Nevertheless, while Mahathir continues to promote distinctive Asian values, he excoriates Islam and Malay conservatism if either interferes with his latest growth plan. And while he seeks to build a new Malay identity, it is not entirely clear whether it includes or excludes those descendants of nineteenth-century migrants from southern India and China, who are not indigenous *bumiputeras*.

A related ambivalence governed the attempt to impose Asian values in the regional economic and security arena in the course of the 1990s. To counter what he considered a crude Western plot to reassert colonialism through the "fanatical" advocacy of human rights, Mahathir promoted a pan-Asian policy. Regionally, this took the form of an expanding Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), good interpersonal relations among the leaders of its member states, and non-interference in their internal affairs. For Mahathir, events like the financial meltdown and the recent UN-sponsored intervention in East Timor only underline the need for Asian cohesion against Caucasian "belligerency."

Yet behind the rhetorical assertiveness, it was difficult to detect what precisely post-meltdown Asian polities had in common. Indeed, the inability to move beyond the increasingly otiose formula of non-interference, to which Mahathir is addicted, has left ASEAN impotent and embarrassed in the face of mounting regional ethnic and religious tension. The bankruptcy in Mahathir's Asian bonding strategy became apparent when both Presidents Habibie of Indonesia and Estrada of the Philippines criticized the

[4]M.K. Mahadzir, *Straits Times*, July 13, 1994.

[5]Murray Hiebert, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 6, 1995.

[6]*Semarak*, the Malay for "glow" or "luster", was also an acronym for *Setia Bersama Rakyak* (Loyalty with the People).

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removal of Anwar, while Thailand argued for a policy of "constructive engagement" toward regional problems.

And, curiously, given their shared preference for non-interference, the political elites of both Singapore and Malaysia seem unable to refrain from picking at the scab that formed after Singapore's expulsion from the Malaysian Federation in 1965. In 1997 Lee Kuan Yew's insensitive description of "crime infested" Johore inflamed Malay sensitivities. Subsequently, the ill-timed publication of Lee's memoirs, which once more dwelt on the separation, exacerbated tensions, while the propensity of Singapore banks to speculate on the ringgit hastened Mahathir's decision to impose currency controls and suspend trade in Malaysian shares on the Singapore stock market in September 1998. As the financial crisis deepened, bilateral ties frayed over a range of seemingly innocuous issues, from the provision of water supply and the infraction of air space to the Singapore government's construction of a new customs post. Bilateral tension reflects both Singapore's anxiety over the fact that the largely Chinese island rests in what Lee considers a "sea of Malay people", and Mahathir's worries that Singapore's rulers treat Malaysians like "country bumpkins." Whatever else this increasingly fractious relationship entails, it belies a harmonious consolidation of shared values.

The Downside

DOMESTICALLY, the ambiguity in the evolution of Malaysian corporatism has evoked a countervailing centrifugal pull both at the periphery of the new state and within UMNO itself. The continuing appeal of the Democratic Action Party for the Chinese population, particularly in Penang; the Parti Bersatu Sabah of the Christian Kadazans in East Malaysia; and the Islamic PAS in underdeveloped and Islamic northeast Malaysia—all these reflect intractable racial and religious cleavages. Mahathir characteristically sees these attachments as internal threats rather than the basis for political pluralism. To the manifestation of differences, the party-state reacts with a familiar Asian recipe involving a combination of repression, corruption and conciliation. This strategy is most apparent in UMNO's dealings with PAS. Because of its potential national appeal, and its capacity to challenge Malay unity, UMNO considers the PAS brand of Islam its most serious political threat. Between 1969 and 1978, UMNO contained the Islamic party within the National Front coalition, but increasing tension over control of the state government in Kelantan, together with the impact of Islamic fundamentalism on a new generation of Malays, prompted PAS to leave the coalition.

For Mahathir a retreat to fundamentalism would undermine the arduous task of nation-building. During the 1980s, therefore, he was engaged in the tricky enterprise of defining Islamic values in a way that both promoted social cohesion and marginalized Islamic radicalism. The recruitment and rapid rise of Anwar Ibrahim, who emerged from a background of Islamic student activism into the foreground of an UMNO "vision team", facilitated this strategy. Depicting PAS as rigidly doctrinaire enabled the UMNO leadership to undermine its national standing. Nevertheless, PAS retained regional control of the government of Kelantan and, after elections in 1999, has extended its grip to neighboring Terengganu.

The underlying propensity to political fragmentation becomes particularly acute in times of economic stress, when elite disagreement at the center reinforces religious and ethnic tension at the periph-

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ery. This was evident in the recession of 1986, when members of the UMNO elite questioned opaque government-business links and Mahathir's increasingly autocratic leadership. Elite factionalism culminated in a challenge to Mahathir during the party general assembly in 1987. The narrow failure of this "Team B" challenge prompted its leader, Tunku Razaleigh Hamzah, and his supporters to leave UMNO and form an "unholy" alliance with the other ethnic and religious-based opposition parties. Typically, however, the coalition found difficulty in agreeing on anything apart from distaste for Mahathirism, and it failed to disturb UMNO's vital two-thirds majority in parliament. By 1996 Razaleigh and his supporters had returned, somewhat sheepishly, to the UMNO fold. With Mahathir apparently endorsing Anwar as his heir and thereby settling the question of succession, UMNO's continuing hold on government seemed assured into the new Pacific Century.

Bouncing Back

THE EVENTS of 1997–99 have severely dented this assurance. The summer of 1998 saw a massive sell-off on the KL stock exchange, the collapse of the ringgit, and Malaysian business more illiquid than Manhattan during prohibition. The crisis questioned the continuing viability of both Mahathir and Malaysia, Inc. in a globalized marketplace. By early September 1998, differences between prime minister and deputy over how to address the economic crisis exacerbated intergenerational tension over the septuagenarian Mahathir's reluctance to relinquish power. Anwar and his advisers saw little alternative to an IMF-style reform of Malaysia's crony capitalism. They also considered political reform its necessary corollary. *Reformasi*, they felt, offered the opportunity to redress the "mute syndrome" that inhibited the Malaysian governmental process. In a telling reversal of Mahathir's favorite analogy, the poet laureate Shahnon Ahmed compared the prime minister to a blockage in the bowels of the body politic.

In September 1998, following his breach with Mahathir, Anwar and seventeen supporters were detained. In November of that year, Anwar underwent a form of trial on a charge of "abuse of power." Found guilty by the state-appointed chief justice, he received a six-year jail sentence. The detention prompted popular demonstrations. It was not entirely clear whether Anwar's *reformasi* entailed Islamization or liberalization. After Anwar's imprisonment his wife, Wan Azizah, formed a new party to clarify this, Keadilan Nasional (National Justice), which attempted to transcend ethnic and religious cleavages. At the same time, however, the new party joined forces with the ethnic and religious-based opposition parties, leaving its message still somewhat ambiguous.

The factionalism that rent the UMNO elite during this period and disturbed the quiescence of the usually apathetic middle class rapidly escalated into a political challenge to Mahathir's leadership, demonstrating once again the difficulty that Southeast Asian political cultures encounter in retiring aging men of prowess. It also showed Mahathir's skill in dealing with internal and external threats—both real and imagined—his economic pragmatism, and capacity for ruthless political surgery.

While Anwar's supporters perceived that speculation and the pursuit of "pharaohnic" visions like the Multimedia Supercorridor had caused Malaysia's recession, Mahathir and his finance minister, Daim, saw little wrong with the developmental state. Instead, they maintained, Malaysia had been viciously mugged by global hedge funds.

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Consequently, the National Economic Action Council used the state-imposed currency stability to restructure its foreign debt. Malaysia looked east for liquidity. Japanese loans, together with judicious raids on the state pension fund, provided the capital necessary to re-float faltering UMNO-linked conglomerates.

In August 1999 the Malaysian Central Bank announced plans to combine fifty-eight banks and finance companies into six financial groups (subsequently modified to ten). Interestingly, the proposed financial restructuring only reinforces the corporatist links between party and business, for the terms of amalgamation depend not on their bottom lines but on their ties to politically favored UMNO patrons. Fueled by a cheap currency, the Malaysian economy rebounded strongly in the second quarter of 1999. If little else, the Malaysian case demonstrates that, structural weakness notwithstanding, the developmental model can survive the challenges of globalization. Moreover, as the economy recovered so too did Mahathir's prestige.

Mahathir's approach to depression economics received international plaudits—notably from the economist Paul Krugman.[7] At home, Mahathir reimposed his political authority. In the manner of the tales of the sixteenth century, *Sejaruh Melayu* (Malay Annals), the aging ruler removed the adherents of the disgraced pretender from his court and rebuilt links with previously excluded factions. Mahathir publicly reconciled himself with the leaders of Team B and appointed one of their more innocuous members, Abdullah Badawi, as his new deputy. To forestall any possible leadership challenge, Mahathir altered the party constitution, postponing its general assembly until after the federal election held in November 1999.

Outside the party, Mahathir took full advantage of the economic turnaround to revile the opposition and present himself as the defender of Malay and Malaysian interests. The incoherence of the opposition has enhanced his appeal. Thus he portrays the PAS demand for a restitution of Islamic law and their attack upon UMNO "infidels" as extremist, while National Justice, he contends, threatens the inter-ethnic pact that sustained growth and stability. To both the Chinese and the Malay communities, he emphasizes UMNO's pragmatism and evokes the specter of communalist violence perpetrated in the name of *reformasi* in neighboring Indonesia.

Internationally, he defends the national interest against interfering Western democrats, Jewish speculators and IMF economic colonialism.[8] Here Vice President Gore proved unexpectedly useful. Mahathir shrewdly exploited Gore's support for *reformasi*—maladroitly delivered at an APEC meeting in Kuala Lumpur in November 1998—to caricature Anwar and the opposition as "foreign stooges."[9] This capacity to play the nationalist and pan-Asian card was again evident in his attack in September 1999 on what he considers Australia's imperialist ambitions in East Timor. Mahathir's ability to appeal to different constituencies in different languages often appears—and often is—inconsistent. But at the same time, this rhetorical dissonance and the repression it necessitates hold together the fragile Malaysian enterprise association that he has so carefully crafted.

IN contemporary Malaysia, anxiety over national identity, the uncertainty of globalization, and the historic propensity to adopt a siege

[7]Krugman, *The Return of Depression Economics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), p. 145.

[8]Mahathir, *A New Deal for Asia*, p. 147.

[9]Sheila McNulty and Peter Montagnon, *Financial Times*, November 17, 1998.

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mentality legitimates the UMNO oligarchy and its machinery of corporatist controls. With the example of a disintegrating Indonesia close at hand, the UMNO elite, the Malay middle class (their misgivings over the treatment of Anwar notwithstanding) and the Chinese community all felt reluctantly constrained to support a reorganized UMNO leadership in the November elections. Mahathir milks this anxiety, presenting UMNO-style nationalism as moderate while excoriating opposition reformism as communalist and conducive to political fragmentation. Given the fundamental fragility of Malaysia, the uncertainty of economic recovery, and an external environment more unstable than at any time since the 1960s, pragmatic single-party rule remains central to political order.

The November election—in which PAS increased its representation in the federal parliament and in the rural northeast, and in which Wan Azizah was returned for the Penang seat of her jailed husband—left the succession question unresolved and the Malay community worryingly divided. The fact that the aging gerontocrat has announced that this will be his last term has merely exacerbated the problem. The issue that most troubles the Malaysian polity is not liberalism but succession. The alternative to a smooth leadership transition in an Asian political culture is not liberty but anarchy, and from the contingent perspective of Malaysia, Inc., to democratize will be to disintegrate. □

Neo-Exceptionalism

This enthusiasm for capital punishment is not easily explained. It flourishes at a moment when most other industrial nations have turned against it. Today it is either abolished or in disuse throughout Western Europe, in most of the former Eastern European Communist bloc countries, and in Russia. Israel, since its founding, has used it only once, with the hanging of Adolf Eichmann. The modern industrial world seems to have abandoned it out of some embarrassed sense that it is a barbaric vestige of an archaic culture. Professor McFeely is hard pressed to explain why the United States, 'with its claim to moral leadership of the world', has gone in precisely the opposite direction. Our 'vigorous use of the death penalty', he notes, puts us in company with Iran, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.'

—Russell Baker, *New York Review of Books*, January 20, 2000

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The Law of Increasing Returns

Ronald Bailey

TWO HUNDRED years after Thomas Robert Malthus published *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, demographers, ecologists, economists, biologists and policymakers still debate his theory of population.[1] Leading foundations spend scores of millions of dollars on population programs, while the United Nations holds international conferences on the topic and even has a specialized agency, the United Nations Population Fund, devoted to the issue. Last year the Fund portentously declared that the world's population reached six billion on October 12. Every year, hundreds of weighty studies and books pour from the universities and think tanks discussing what is to be done.

Malthus advanced two propositions that he regarded as completely self-evident. First, that "food is necessary for the existence of man", and second, that "the passion between the sexes is necessary and will remain nearly in its present state." Based on these propositions, Malthus famously concluded that

> the power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man. Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio. A slight acquaintance with numbers will show the immensity of the first power in comparison with the second.

Malthus illustrated his hypothesis using two sets of numbers: "the human species would increase in the ratio of—1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, &c. and subsistence as—1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, &c." He further asserted that "population does invariably increase where there are the means of subsistence." Malthus' dismal summary of the situation in which humanity finds itself is that some portion of mankind must forever be starving to death; and, further, efforts to aid the starving will only lead to more misery, as those initially spared from famine bear too many children to feed with existing food supplies.

In his first edition of the *Essay*, Malthus argued that there were two "checks" on population, "preventive" and "positive." Preventive checks, those that prevent births, include abortion, infanticide and prostitution; positive checks include war, pestilence and famine. In later editions, he added a third check that he called "moral restraint", which includes

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[1]For a recent edition, see Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, ed. Geoffrey Gilbert (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 12.

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voluntary celibacy, late marriage and the like. Moral restraint is basically just a milder version of the earlier preventive check. If all else fails to keep human numbers under control, Malthus chillingly concludes,

> Famine seems to be the last, the most dreadful resource of nature. The power of population is so superior to the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man, that premature death must in some shape or other visit the human race. The vices of mankind are active and able ministers of depopulation. They are the precursors in the great army of destruction, and often finish the dreadful work themselves. But should they fail in this war of extermination, sickly seasons, epidemics, pestilence, and plague, advance in terrific array, and sweep off their thousands and ten thousands. Should success be still incomplete, gigantic inevitable famine stalks in the rear, and with one mighty blow, levels the population with the food of the world.

Malthus' principle of population has proved to be one of the most influential and contested theories in history. It provided a crucial insight for Charles Darwin as he was developing his theory of natural selection. In his autobiography, Darwin wrote that in October 1838,

> I happened to read for amusement Malthus on Population, and being well prepared to appreciate the struggle for existence which everywhere goes on, from long-continued observation of the habits of animals and plants, it at once struck me that under these circumstances favourable variations would tend to be preserved, and unfavourable ones would be destroyed. The result of this would be the formation of a new species. Here, then, I had at last got a theory by which to work.

Naturalists, biologists and ecologists have since applied Malthusian theory not only to animals and plants, but to humans as well. Undeniably, his principle of population has an appealing simplicity, and has proved a fruitful hypothesis for ecology and population biology. It undergirds such biological concepts as carrying capacity, which is a measure of the population that a given ecosystem can support. The Kaibab Plateau deer, for example, is a famous case of an animal population outstripping its food supply. In the 1920s, the deer population expanded dramatically. In the absence of predators, a forage shortage ensued, which in turn led to a dramatic reduction of the deer population.

If the concept of carrying capacity can explain fluctuations in animal populations, some intellectuals have reasoned in the second half of the twentieth century, it should apply equally well to human populations. As Stanford University entomologist Paul Ehrlich has explained:

> To ecologists who study animals, food and population often seem like sides of the same coin. If too many animals are devouring it, the food supply declines; too little food, the supply of animals declines. . . . Homo sapiens is no exception to that rule, and at the moment it seems likely that food will be our limiting resource.

In the late 1960s, Ehrlich was one of many biologists and agronomists who began to issue dire warnings about human "overpopulation", the most famous of which appeared in his book, *The Population Bomb* (1968). "The battle to feed all of humanity is over", Ehrlich wrote. "In the 1970s, the world will undergo famines—hundreds of millions of people are going to starve to death in spite of any crash programs embarked on now." Later, in an article for the first Earth Day in 1970, Ehrlich outlined a horrific scenario in which 65 million Americans and 4 billion other people would die of starvation in a "Great Die-Off" between 1980 and 1989. And in

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1990 Ehrlich and his wife Anne published *The Population Explosion*, where they once again asserted that, "One thing seems safe to predict: starvation and epidemic disease will raise the death rates over most of the planet." In these gloomy forecasts, Ehrlich was far from alone. In 1967, William and Paul Paddock asserted in their book, *Famine 1975!*, that, "The famines which are now approaching . . . are for a surety, inevitable. . . . In fifteen years the famines will be catastrophic." Today, the Worldwatch Institute, a Washington, DC environmentalist advocacy group chaired by Lester Brown, still has a solid Malthusian focus.

Food is not the only resource said to be in short supply. In 1972 the Club of Rome, a group of politicians, businessmen and senior international bureaucrats, famously commissioned *The Limits to Growth* report, which concluded:

> If the present growth trends in world population, industrialization, pollution, food production, and resource depletion continue unchanged, the limits to growth on this planet will be reached sometime in the next one hundred years. The probable result will be a rather sudden and uncontrollable decline in both population and industrial capacity.[2]

This is Malthus writ large: not only will humanity run out of food, but it will also run out of non-renewable resources like minerals and fossil fuels.

Good Law or Bad?

IT IS AN INTERESTING fact of intellectual history that biologists and ecologists have so completely embraced a theory of population devised by an economist. Malthusian theory is one of the first formulations of the theory of "diminishing marginal returns." As one analyst explains it,

> While he argued that the quantity of arable land was fixed and someday might be completely occupied by farms, Malthus also recognized that land could be made more productive through intensive cultivation. With greater effort, farmers could gradually squeeze more produce from the same fixed amount of land—and herein lies the rub—at decreasing rates per each additional laborer. Thus each new worker sent to the field produces incrementally fewer crops or, as later economists would say, with diminishing marginal returns. . . . Malthus predicted diminishing marginal returns as farmers sought ways to feed the ever-increasing masses. The economic scarcity would arise because society would have to sacrifice increasingly more to obtain less on the margin. Whether measured by the number of field hands and their hoes, or by the money required to pay for that labor and equipment, the cost of extracting agricultural produce would increase.[3]

The law of diminishing returns clearly operates in the natural world, and, indeed, the Malthusian model accurately describes the experience of most species. But how has his principle fared with regard to the population whose behavior it was devised to explain—namely, human beings? As Malthus was writing, France became the first country in the world in which fertility began to decline. Malthus concluded that in many countries, humanity had already reached its limits to growth, which is why England and Europe were experiencing so much poverty, misery and vice.

But we also now know that just as Malthus was formulating his theory the

[2]Donnella Meadows et al., *The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind* (New York: New American Library, 1972), p. 29.

[3]J.E. de Steiguer, "Three theories from economics about the environment", *BioScience* (September 1995), p. 552.

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world was on the brink of the largest surge in both economic and population growth ever experienced by humanity. In the hundred years between the publication of his *Essay* and the beginning of the twentieth century, per capita income in England rose six-fold even as the country experienced a six-fold increase in population. Taking an even longer time period, world population quintupled between 1820 and 1992, while the world's economies grew forty-fold.

In his *Essay* Malthus claimed that he had proved "that population does invariably increase when the means of subsistence increase." His intellectual heirs insist that Malthus was right. "Making food still cheaper and more available for more people will encourage more population growth and thus ensure that life will, in many important respects, become worse", writes Garrett Hardin, emeritus professor of human ecology at the University of California, Santa Barbara. "The Malthusian thesis has been true and at work at all times. Population is regulated to food supply", writes the father of *The Limits to Growth* study, Jay Forrester, in his book *World Dynamics* (1971); and he adds that in his computer model "an abundance of food is assumed to raise the birth rate by a factor of 2." The race, then, is on between food and population, and famine will surely prevail.

Given this grim calculus, modern Malthusians often adopt their master's prescription that aid should be withheld from the poorest because it will only increase misery and vice later. Thus Garrett Hardin argues for "lifeboat ethics", analogizing countries to lifeboats that would sink if, in a fit of misdirected compassion, the occupants allowed drowning people on board. Adopting a similarly stark logic, Maurice King suggests judiciously rationing "mortality controls", arguing that procedures like simple oral rehydration therapy, which has saved countless millions of children from dying of diarrheal diseases, should not be taught to poor people in the developing world unless they first adopt stiff birth control measures. Other modern Malthusians go further, contending that such draconian measures should not be limited to the developing countries. Ecologist Michael Tobias foresees that

> we are going to probably have to counter a severely deteriorated environment with a severe loss of democratic principles in the sense that we will have to initiate laws and regulations that a lot of people are going to be very unhappy with. Limitations on basic freedoms will have to be drastically reduced [sic] because there will not be enough clean air and water to do whatever you want to do.

Is the human predicament really so dire as all this asserts? Contrary to the predictions of Malthus and his intellectual heirs, we find that the countries that are wealthiest and have the greatest access to food—the United States, Germany, Japan, France, Italy, Spain—are precisely those countries that have the lowest birth rates. It turns out that, for developed countries, more food does not mean more children; it means more fat people. In the past half century, demographers have in fact found that economic growth and steep declines in fertility rates go hand in hand. Demographer Robert Kates identifies four plausible reasons for this: less need for child labor, more for educated children; less need for more births because more children survive; less time devoted to childbearing and rearing, more to education and work; and more access to birth control technology, resulting in fewer births.[4]

So over the past two centuries, the law of diminishing returns appears to

[4]Kates, "Population, technology, and the human environment: a thread through time", *Daedalus* (Summer 1996), p. 43.

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have been violated. The fixed physical resources of the earth have not increased—land area remains the same; there is no more iron or copper in the earth's crust; and fresh water supplies have not increased. Yet, a much larger human population lives better than ever and a significant portion lives in material conditions—cars, vaccines, electric power, antibiotics, computers, airplanes, winter fruits and vegetables—that would seem unimaginably luxurious even to the wealthiest inhabitants of Malthus' England. How, then, did humanity defy the iron law of diminishing returns? That question has puzzled economists for nearly two centuries. Now new theoretical developments are shedding light on this issue, and perhaps pointing the way to a permanent escape from the Malthusian trap.

The Primacy of Ideas

FOR DECADES, economists essentially used a two-factor model in which economic growth was accounted for by adding more labor and more capital to create more goods. The problem with this model is that over time growth must halt when the marginal value of the goods produced equals the cost of the labor and capital used to produce them. This neoclassical model of economic growth was elaborated in the 1950s by Nobelist Robert Solow and his colleagues, and was later incorporated into *The Limits to Growth* computer model. Relying on it, MIT researchers predicted eventual collapse as the inevitable result of continued economic and population growth.

In the last two decades, economic forecasters, following the lead of economist Paul Romer, have made a conceptual breakthrough that has enabled them to describe more rigorously and accurately—and differently—how economic growth occurs and how, with the proper social institutions, it can continue for the foreseeable future. Romer explains this approach, which has come to be known as the New Growth Theory:

> New growth theorists now start by dividing the world into two fundamentally different types of productive inputs that can be called 'ideas' and 'things.' Ideas are nonrival goods that could be stored in a bit string. Things are rival goods with mass (or energy). With ideas and things, one can explain how economic growth works. Nonrival ideas can be used to rearrange things, for example, when one follows a recipe and transforms noxious olives into tasty and healthful olive oil. Economic growth arises from the discovery of new recipes and the transformation of things from low to high value configurations.[5]

Decoding the clunky economic terminology, "rival" goods are simply things that cannot be used by two or more persons at once, e.g., cars, drill presses, computers, even human bodies and brains. "Nonrival" goods can be used by any number of people simultaneously, e.g., recipes for bread, blueprints for houses, techniques for growing corn, formulas for pharmaceuticals, scientific principles like the law of gravity, and computer programs.

To understand the potency of ideas, consider that a few decades ago silicon was used primarily to make glass. Today it is a crucial component in microchips and optical fibers. Again, until fairly recently petroleum was known mainly as a nuisance for people engaged in drilling water wells; its use as a cheap lighting replacement for increasingly scarce whale oil only began in the 1890s, and soon after came the internal combustion engine.

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[5]Romer, "Why, Indeed, in America? Theory, History, and the Origins of Modern Economic Growth", *Journal of the American Economics Association* (May 1996), p. 204.

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We make ourselves better off, then, not by increasing the amount of resources on planet earth—that is, of course, fixed—but by rearranging resources we already have available so that they provide us with more of what we want. This process of improvement has been going on ever since the first members of our species walked the earth. We have moved from heavy earthenware pots to ultrathin plastics and lightweight aluminum cans. To cook our food we have shifted from wood-intensive campfires to clean, efficient natural gas. By using constantly improving recipes, humanity has avoided the Malthusian trap while at the same time making the world safer and more comfortable for an ever larger portion of the world's population.

In fact, *increasing*, rather than diminishing, returns characterize many economic activities. For example, it may cost $150 million to develop the first vial of a new vaccine to prevent Lyme disease. Yet every vial after that is essentially free. The same is true for computer programs: it may cost Microsoft $500 million for the first copy of Windows 98, but each subsequent copy is merely the cost of the disk on which it is stored. Or in the case of telecommunications, laying a fiber optic network may cost billions of dollars, but once operational it can transmit millions of messages at virtually no added cost. And the low costs of each of these inventions make it possible for the people who buy them to be even more productive in their own activities—by avoiding illness, expediting word processing, and drastically increasing the tempo of information exchanges.

What modern Malthusians who fret about the depletion of resources miss is that it is not oil that people want; they want to cool and heat their homes. It is not copper telephone lines that people want; they want to communicate quickly and easily with friends, family and businesses. They do not want paper; they want a convenient and cheap way to store written information.

In short, what is important is not the physical resource but the function to be performed; and for that, ideas are the crucial input. Robert Kates notes that technological discoveries have "transformed the meaning of resources and increased the carrying capacity of the Earth"; economist Gale Johnson concludes that history has clearly confirmed that "no exhaustible resource is essential or irreplaceable"; and economist Dwight Lee asserts that "the relevant resource base is defined by knowledge, rather than by physical deposits of existing resources."

Romer sums it up this way:

> Every generation has perceived the limits to growth that finite resources and undesirable side effects would pose if no new recipes or ideas were discovered. And every generation has underestimated the potential for finding new recipes and ideas. We consistently fail to grasp how many ideas remain to be discovered. The difficulty is the same one we have with compounding. Possibilities do not add up. They multiply.

This, it should be noted, is the mirror image of Malthus' argument about exponential growth. Here, however, ideas grow much faster than population.

By using a number of simple calculations, Romer illustrates the point that the number of possible discoveries and inventions is incomprehensibly vast. Take, for example, the chemical combinations one can derive from the periodic table of elements. There are about 100 different elements and if one serially combined any four, one would get about 94 million combinations. Romer further assumes that these elements could be combined in differing proportions ranging from 1 to 10. This yields 3,500 proportions times 94 million combinations and provides 330 billion different recipes in total. At the

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Prophet of Doom

rate of 1,000 recipes per day, it would take scientists nearly a million years to evaluate them all. What is more, this vastly underestimates the actual number of combinations available, since one could combine more than four elements, in different proportions, at different temperatures and pressures—and so on and on.

Again, consider the number of computer programs that could be installed on a single computer hard disk drive. Romer calculates that the number of distinct software programs that can be put on a one-gigabyte hard disk is roughly one followed by 2.7 billion zeros. By comparison, the total number of seconds that have elapsed since the beginning of the universe is only about 1 followed by 17 zeros, and the total number of atoms in the universe is equal to about 1 followed by 100 zeros.

In short, then, people possess a nearly infinite capacity to rearrange physical objects by creating new recipes for their use. Yet some committed Malthusians object that Romer and others who hold that economic growth is potentially limitless not only violate the law of diminishing returns but transgress an even more fundamental physical law: the second law of thermodynamics. According to the second law, in a closed system disorder tends to increase. Think of a droplet of ink as a highly ordered pigment that is diluted when it is dropped into a ten-gallon aquarium. When the pigment's molecules spread evenly throughout the water, disorder is at a maximum—that is, it becomes virtually impossible to reconstitute the droplet. The idea, then, is that the maintenance of order in one part of the system (heating a house) requires an increase of disorder elsewhere (burning oil).

In fact, the solution to the puzzle of life and of a growing economy is that the earth is *not* a closed system—the energy that drives it comes principally from the sun. It is true that the sun's energy is being dissipated. But it will not burn out for another four to five billion years. Hence, the recipes that humans could devise for obtaining and using energy are for all practical purposes limitless. Until medieval times, people inefficiently heated and cooked with open fires in their homes. Then someone in Europe invented the chimney, which dramatically increased the efficiency of heating and cooking. In the eighteenth century, Benjamin Franklin invented the cast iron stove, which again boosted efficiency—and so on, to today's modern electric heat pumps and gas furnaces. And new ideas and designs continue to be developed all the time, among them passive solar homes, solar cells, fuel cells and nuclear power plants. It seems safe to conclude that so long as the sun shines, the second law of thermodynamics is not terribly relevant.

Indeed, trying to forecast today the energy mix for the next hundred years, especially given the current rate of technological innovation, is as fruitless as someone in 1900 trying to predict our current energy requirements. A person in 1900 would surely not have anticipated scores of millions of automobiles and trucks, thousands of jet planes, and millions of refrigerators. Because of this, the

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wisest course is for humanity to support institutions and incentive systems that will encourage future scientists, inventors and entrepreneurs to discover, finance and build the technologies that will supply human needs and protect the natural world in the coming century.

Reframing the Problems

INSIGHTS FROM New Growth Theory reframe many environmental problems and suggest some surprising solutions. For example, one of the global environmental problems most commonly attributed to population and economic growth is the loss of tropical forests. But is growth really to blame? According to the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, the chief factor that drives deforestation in developing countries is not commercial logging but

> poor farmers who have no other option to feeding their families other than slashing and burning a patch of forest. . . . Slash-and-burn agriculture results in the loss or degradation of some 25 million acres of land per year.

By contrast, the United States today farms less than half of the land that it did in the 1920s but produces far more food now than it did then. The key, of course, is technology. In fact, available farming technology from developed countries could prevent, and in many cases reverse, the loss of tropical forests and other wildlife habitat around the globe. Unfortunately, institutional barriers, the absence of secure property rights, corrupt governments and a lack of education prevent its widespread diffusion and, hence, environmental restoration.

Another environmental problem frequently attributed to population growth is pollution. In 1972 *The Limits to Growth* computer model projected that pollution would skyrocket as population increased: "Virtually every pollutant that has been measured as a function of time appears to be increasing exponentially." But once again, the new Malthusians had things exactly backward. Since 1972, America's population has risen 26 percent and its economy has more than doubled. Western Europe and Japan have experienced similar rates of growth. Yet, instead of increasing as predicted, air pollutants have dramatically declined.

In fact, a growing body of literature suggests that in most cases there are thresholds of wealth at which the amount of a pollutant begins to decline. Department of Interior analyst Indur Goklany calls these thresholds the "environmental transition." What this means is that when people rise above mere subsistence, they begin demanding amenities such as clean air and water. The first environmental transition is clean drinking water. Goklany has found that the level of fecal coliform bacteria in rivers, which is a good measure of water pollution, peaks when average per capita incomes reach $1,400 per year. The next transition occurs when particulates like smoke and soot peak at $3,200. And again, levels of sulfur dioxide peak at about $3,700.

Not surprisingly, committed Malthusians reject such findings. Paul Ehrlich, for instance, stubbornly insists that, "*Most people do not recognize that, at least in rich nations, economic growth is the disease, not the cure.*" [emphasis in original] To counteract the "disease" of economic growth, Maurice King recommends that people in the "privileged North" should engage in "the deliberate quest of poverty" to curb their "luxurious resource consumption."

The favored target of such critiques is the United States, whose citizens are supposedly consuming more than their fair share of the world's goods and causing more than their fair share of its ills.

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The average American, however, is not only a consumer but a producer of both goods and ideas. Americans and Europeans get more done with relatively less because of their higher levels of education, greater access to productive tools, superior infrastructure, democratic governments and free markets. As a consequence, output per hour of labor in the United States today is ten times what it was a hundred years ago. Thus, the average Westerner creates far more resources, especially knowledge and technology, than she or he consumes. Thus, too, both Western economies and environments are improving simultaneously.

All that said, if the right social institutions are lacking—democratic governance, secure private property, free markets—it *is* possible for a nation to fall into the Malthusian trap of rising poverty and increasing environmental degradation. The economies of many countries in Africa are declining, not because of high population growth rates or lack of resources, but because they have failed to implement the basic policies for encouraging economic growth: namely, widespread education, secure property rights and democratic governance.

Democratic governance and open markets have in fact proved indispensable for the prevention of famine in modern times. Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen notes that "in the terrible history of famines in the world, there is hardly any case in which a famine has occurred in a country that is independent and democratic, with an uncensored press." Why is this? Because, says Sen, "So long as famines are relatively costless for the government, with no threat to its survival or credibility, effective actions to prevent famines do not have the urgency to make them inescapable imperatives for the government."[6] Along with Romer and other theorists, Sen also argues that general economic growth, not just growth in food output, is crucial to ending the threat of famine in Africa. He calls "for measures to encourage and enhance technical change, skill formation and productivity—both in agriculture and in other fields."

CONTEMPORARY Malthusians liken humanity to a car travelling one hundred miles per hour on a foggy road. And they warn of dire consequences if we do not slow down. But if we adopt institutions and regulations that slow the pace of innovation, we may find ourselves depleting our current energy supplies before they can be replaced by new ones. New Growth Theory suggests that a better analogy might be that human society is an airplane cloaked in clouds flying at a speed of six hundred miles per hour. If the plane slows down, it will lose air speed and may crash before arriving safely at its destination.

We cannot deplete the supply of ideas, designs and recipes. They are immaterial and limitless, and therefore not bound in any meaningful sense by the second law of thermodynamics. Surely no one believes that humanity has already devised all of the methods to conserve, locate and exploit new sources of energy, or that the flow of ideas to improve houses, transportation, communications, medicine and farming has suddenly dried up. Though far too many of our fellow human beings are caught in local versions of the Malthusian trap, we must not mistake the situation of that segment as representing the future of all of humanity and the earth itself; it is, instead, a dwindling remnant of an unhappy past. Misery is not the inevitable lot of humanity, nor is the ruin of the natural world a foregone conclusion. □

[6]Sen, "Public Action to Remedy Hunger", Arturo Tanco Memorial Lecture (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, August 2, 1990).

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Books

Turning Point

Michael Howard

John Lukacs, *Five Days in London: May 1940* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 236 pp., $19.95.

"HISTORY IS NOW, and England", wrote the American expatriate poet T.S. Eliot during the Second World War. This certainly was the case in the summer of 1940. Professor Lukacs' claim that the five days in London between May 24 and 28 saw a turning point in history sounds hyperbolic, but it stands up well to examination. It was then that the British government under the leadership of Winston Churchill decided not to ask a triumphant Adolf Hitler for terms, but to fight on whatever the odds. By that decision they gained the support of the United States, and persuaded Hitler to turn directly on his ultimate objective, the Soviet Union. Britain did not thereby win the war, but it created the conditions that made it virtually certain that Hitler would lose it. As a result, "civilization as we know it" survived for another fifty years. "Perhaps", Professor Lukacs concludes gloomily, surveying the scene at the end of the century, "that is enough."

Those five days, and that decision, have received repeated scrutiny. Scores of memoirs have been written by contemporaries, and the events have been minutely analyzed by such British historians as David Dilks, Philip Bell and Andrew Roberts. In this typically idiosyncratic work, John Lukacs generously acknowledges their work, as he does the unpublished theses of G.N. Esnouf and Sheila Lawlor, and it must be said that his own research has turned up little that we did not already know. But he brings to his topic, as to everything else he has treated, a sparkling and original mind, and interpretations that have to be taken very seriously, even if they are not entirely accepted.

In this study he makes two major contributions. The first is to examine the evolution of British public opinion during those fateful days, largely through the reports of that innovative institution, "Mass Observation", which are now preserved at the University of Sussex. The second is to analyze minutely the reports of the British cabinet meetings from May 25–28, when the possibility of using Mussolini as an intermediary to discuss peace terms was strongly pressed by the foreign secretary, Lord Halifax, and not entirely discounted, at least initially, by Winston Churchill himself.

"There was a white glow, overpowering, sublime", wrote Churchill of those

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days, "which ran through our island from end to end." But as the Mass Observation and other reports make clear, it was not quite like that. On May 16, when the full extent of the German breakthrough in France became apparent, there was initial bewilderment: "It just hadn't occurred to people", wrote one observer, "that we could be beaten." Still, no one doubted that Britain would triumph in the end, as it always had in the past. Ten days later, however, on May 25, when the French army had been totally defeated and the British surrounded at Dunkirk with little prospect of escape, the public mind was reported as being "in a chaotic condition and ready to be plunged into the depths of a shocked, almost unbelieving dismay."

Chaotic, indeed. I was myself in my last term at a British public school, one that educated a high proportion of the country's military leaders and where events were in consequence discussed with an above average degree of expertise. My own letters home indicated what was probably a fairly typical mixture of "defeatism" (a newly minted term then coming into general currency) and resolution. The defeatism arose from a reasoned belief that the *Wehrmacht* would capture the entire British Army on the Continent and follow up with an invasion that we could do little to resist. The resolution was simply a feeling that in the meantime there was no alternative to living our lives as normally as possible until we were called on to "do our bit", whatever that might be. We were enrolled in the Home Guard, patrolled the school grounds looking for parachutists, and looked forward to an invasion with curiosity rather than dread. (It does help, in wartime, to be rather young.) But it never occurred to us, for a single minute, that our government might sue for peace; certainly not until matters had been put to the test by invasion. I suspect that this was the general reaction outside a very narrow circle concentrated around Westminster and Whitehall; and that this was what a Labour Member of Parliament meant when he declared in the House of Commons on May 28, when the evacuation from Dunkirk had hardly begun, that "we have barely begun to touch the fringe of the resolution of this country." That resolution may have been rooted in what Lukacs refers to, a little unkindly, as "the habitual slowness of British minds", and it probably was. One can only say, thank God for it.

IT WAS AGAINST this background that decisions were taken in Whitehall during those fateful days, and one of the most interesting conclusions to arise from Professor Lukacs' study is how little connection there was between elite and public opinion. Whatever the state of public opinion may have been, there was simply no time for Britain's leaders to take it into account. Certainly no reference was made to it in the course of the cabinet discussions that Lukacs goes on to analyze.

Churchill's War Cabinet consisted of only five members: the prime minister himself; Neville Chamberlain, his predecessor; Lord Halifax, the foreign secretary; and two members of the recently co-opted Labour Party, who were quite inexperienced in foreign affairs and contributed little to the discussions. Churchill, it must be remembered, had as yet little formal political support in the country. The majority Conservative Party regarded him with some reason as an unreliable maverick, whose track record, from his sponsoring of the Dardanelles campaign in 1915 to his more recent support for the abdicated King Edward VIII, had been uniformly disastrous. He was a journalist by profession, half American by provenance, was known to drink heavily and to be surrounded by a disreputable crowd of *roués*. Chamberlain, on the contrary, was respectable, upright and effi-

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cient. He had made an excellent peacetime prime minister: he had restored the British economy, and his dogged search for peace before 1939 had commanded nearly universal approval. He had certainly forfeited general confidence by his handling of the catastrophic Norwegian campaign, but still enjoyed the support of the Conservative Party and much of the British "Establishment" (a term that had yet to be coined). As for Halifax, a highly intelligent aristocrat with a fine record of public service, he was "a safe pair of hands" whom the Establishment, from King George VI down, would probably have preferred as prime minister. If pressed, he would no doubt have accepted out of a sense of public duty, and the history of the world might then have been very different. But he knew he was not the man for the job, and stood back while Churchill undertook the role for which he himself had no doubt that history had destined him.

Halifax and Chamberlain were thus still formidable adversaries, and on May 26, when all hope of rescuing the British Army seemed lost, both supported the idea of a confidential approach to the Italians. Halifax was later to claim that he was interested only in securing Mussolini's neutrality, but the record makes it clear that more than this was involved. His objective was to see whether Hitler would consider peace on terms that "did not postulate the destruction of Britain's independence", and Halifax declared that they would be "foolish if they did not accept them." Chamberlain was initially supportive, and even Churchill, at this stage, did not object; he suggested only that "it would be best to do nothing until we see how much of the Army we could re-embark." The next day, with the capitulation of Belgium, the situation looked still blacker, and positions had hardened. Chamberlain was wavering, but Halifax strongly urged an approach to the Italians. Even Churchill admitted that he would not reject terms that consisted only of restoring Germany's colonies and yielding "the overlordship of Central Europe." But since they were most unlikely to get such terms, nothing would be lost by fighting on: "we should get no worse terms if we went on fighting", he repeated on May 28, "even if we were beaten." By the following day it became clear that the bulk of the army was likely to escape from Dunkirk, and the issue was not raised again. Halifax, in Lukacs' words, had been "defeated." Churchill shipped him off at the first opportunity to the United States, where he proved to be a surprisingly good ambassador.

"In the last days of May 1940", states Professor Lukacs, "the fate of Britain—indeed, the outcome of the Second World War—depended on two things. One was the division between Churchill and Halifax. The other was the destiny of the British Army crowding back into Dunkirk." The second, probably, yes. If the British Expeditionary Force had not gotten away, Britain would have had no army left to speak of: all of its senior officers—Montgomery, Alanbrooke, Alexander, to name but three—would have spent the rest of the war as prisoners. Further, the boost that Dunkirk gave to British morale was tremendous. Thereafter bewilderment did turn into resolution: we had no doubt that we would win somehow or other, and something like the "white glow" that Churchill was later to describe *did* run, for a few months, from end to end of the country. It was a good time to be alive: History *was* now and in England, and we knew it.

But was the division between Churchill and Halifax of comparable importance? I find this very hard to believe. What if Halifax had "won"; that is, convinced Chamberlain and his Labour colleagues that Britain should ask

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for terms? Apart from anything else, those Labour colleagues would have needed some convincing: for all its faults, the Labour Party (which Lukacs totally ignores in his analysis) was anti-fascist to a man and woman, and in any case would have been highly reluctant to serve under the leadership of the aristocratic Halifax. If Churchill had been outvoted in cabinet, would he have resigned? Unthinkable: he had gotten the job he had coveted all his life, and knew that no one else could do it. Would he have remained, and asked for terms? In spite of his apparent wavering at the earlier meetings of the cabinet, when he was no doubt playing for time, this is even less thinkable: it would be a betrayal of everything that he had stood for throughout his entire life. He recognized that if worse came to worst someone might have to do so, and like many others he had cast the veteran Lloyd George in the role that was to be played in France by Marshal Pétain. But he himself would have gone down fighting, and with relish. (His advice to the British people in the event of invasion, in defiance of all Hague conventions, was rumored to be, "Take one with you.")

As for Halifax, had he become prime minister on May 10, the situation might have been very different. But now he was a member of Churchill's cabinet, and whatever his disagreements with the leadership, the resignation at such a crisis in his nation's history of a man with his record of loyal public service would have been almost as unlikely as that of Churchill himself. Indeed, if Halifax *had* resigned at the end of May few people would have noticed, or cared very much if they did: they had more important things on their minds. During the previous three weeks the world had been turned upside down, and traditional loyalties with it.

The cabinet discussions are thus little more than a footnote to history, and cannot bear the weight that Professor Lukacs tries to place on them. But they are certainly interesting, if only because they were suppressed for many years and Churchill himself was to deny that they had ever taken place. It is no discredit to Halifax that he should have initiated them. He was a rational man concerned for the national interest, and one brought up in the diplomatic tradition of "the balance of power." It was not clear to him at that moment that Britain's interests might not best be served by accepting a limited defeat at the hands of a not unfriendly power with whom there was an adversary in common—the Soviet Union. He was not alone in this belief: Lloyd George might have assembled quite an able cabinet, and we can still have fun discussing who would have joined it. Even today a few right-wing British historians have expressed regret that this view did not prevail. If it had, they claim, Britain might have retained its Empire and the world might not have been first divided between the United States and the Soviet Union, and then subjected to American hegemony. On this view I can only comment, as did the Duke of Wellington on a famous occasion, "If you can believe that, you can believe anything." □

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The Pope's Divisions

James H. Billington

George Weigel, *Witness to Hope: The Biography of Pope John Paul II* (New York: Cliff Street Books, 1999), 992 pp., $35.

AMIDST ALL the ink spilled over the coming of a new Christian millennium, remarkably little has been written in the mainstream media about the leading Christian spokesman of our era. Pope John Paul II's life and thoughts have, however, now been fully chronicled in George Weigel's magisterial and well-written biography, a work that will both broaden and deepen our understanding of the man he calls a "witness to hope."

Weigel describes this "Pope from a far country" as "the man seen by more people than any man who ever lived", yet who remains "the least understood major figure of the twentieth century." Weigel rejects the political categories of liberal and conservative usually relied on in characterizing John Paul II. In a brilliant prologue he sets the stage for his own more nuanced and theology-centered exposition by laying out a series of paradoxes. The Pope is both a simple, pious Pole and a sophisticated, intellectual polyglot; both a mystic and a sportsman. He is "a celibate with a remarkable insight into human sexuality, especially as viewed from the perspective and experience of women." He is "arguably the most well informed man in the world, yet he rarely reads newspapers."

The great renaissance mystic, Nicholas of Cusa, defended medieval faith against rising skepticism in the early modern era by characterizing God as *coincidentia oppositorum*, "the union of opposites"—what an earlier mystic, Dionysius the Aereopagite, had called "the superessential Darkness that is hidden in the light of existing things." John Paul appears at the end of modernity as himself such a "union of opposites": fusing a passionate humanist defense of freedom and rights with an unremitting call for traditional Christian obedience and obligations.

This Pope has meditated deeply on the darkness of the last century, which produced more human suffering and martyrdom than any in history, but he sees flickers of light trying to get through the darkness from diverse corners of the world. He has served all the while as a "witness to hope" that the new millennium will bring the renewal we need rather than the retribution we deserve. In the last of his many memorable tableaux, Weigel recounts how some of the Pope's oldest Polish friends asked the aging "Wujek" (his old nickname and the Polish word for Uncle) in the late summer of 1997 why he always gets up before dawn. He replied simply, "I like to watch the sun rise."

THIS BIOGRAPHY has three distinctive characteristics that are rarely found—let alone woven together—in current historical writing. First, Weigel has essentially revived and blended together two of the oldest and most forgotten forms of biography: hagiography and the epic. This is an unabashedly admiring study by someone who has had substantial personal contact with a man that he clearly considers saintly. At the same time, it is an epic account of the global odyssey of a man whom he also considers a larger-than-life figure in pursuit of a sacred mission, fac-

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ing many trials—including some from other, more timid custodians of the cause he is serving.

The book was written as if in response to the Pope's comment to Weigel in 1996 about previous biographers: "They try to understand me from the outside. But I can only be understood from the inside." Like the Pope himself, Weigel sees important events in the external world—such as the fall of communism, which is central to this epic—as essentially caused by internal, moral forces. There is a providential cast to Weigel's narrative. Thus, he suggests that the religious-based, bottom-up movement of Solidarity in Poland posed (to use Arnold Toynbee's terms) the terminal challenge to which a Leninist empire could find no adequate response. Weigel's account of the Pope's consistently religious approach to the transforming events in his beloved native land will annoy those who believe that material causes are decisive in history and that the Pope had to be involved in some kind of political conspiracy for such dramatic changes ever to have occurred.

John Paul II has been a prophet of change, not a player with power. Weigel's account suggests that the Pope's moral force, unprecedented elevation and first papal appearance in Poland started an irreversible process of implosion. Looking at the other end of this process, I have argued in my *Breakthrough to Hope* (1992) that internal moral forces were also central to the final collapse of Soviet communism as I personally witnessed it in Moscow in August 1991. I would further suggest that our near total preoccupation since then with the externals of economic and political failures at the top in post-communist Russia may have rendered us incapable of recognizing the inner moral forces that have sustained hope and are now producing constructive changes there from the bottom up.

A second distinctive feature of Weigel's book is that he has poured thoroughly modern content into these ancient genres. He has interlaced into his apologia for a contemporary holy man nearly all the important criticisms leveled against the Pope—both explicitly by his many detractors and implicitly by contemporary secular society. Whenever he describes a papal encyclical or major pronouncement, Weigel generally presents the major arguments advanced against it. Only then does he proceed to describe (and in some cases seem to construct) a papal rebuttal.

Weigel sees John Paul II not as a medieval throwback, but as a modern, even postmodern, figure anxious not just to convert but to convince the world. The Pope is shown to have been addicted to open discussion groups (from the time of his youthful kayak and ski outings), deeply shaped by his experience as a writer and actor immersed in the poetry and dialogue of the Polish romantic stage (the Rhapsodic Theatre), and the first Pope to become deeply versed in modern secular philosophy (writing a thesis on the phenomenology of Max Scheler).

This, then, is not just hagiography, but also a modern biography of a modernizing Pope anxious to put an old faith into new bottles and to open dialogue with a pluralistic world. Weigel suggests that *Redemptor Missio* may be "the most consequential of John Paul's encyclicals"; and it seems doubtful that any earlier Pope could have written the key words (let alone added the italicized emphases) in that document: "*The Church proposes; she imposes nothing.* She respects individuals and cultures, and she honors the sanctuary of conscience."

A third virtue of this biography is its relentlessly factual focus on what its subject actually did and said, and on the concrete character of each of the diverse forums and nations into which this unprecedentedly peripatetic Pope thrust

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himself. There is no psychologizing, no attempt to fit the Pope's many innovations into preconceived ideological categories, and little gratuitous attribution of ulterior motives to any of the main actors. Instead, Weigel provides a wealth of detailed, new and often colorful information largely derived from the first-hand accounts provided to him by dozens of people who have known the Pope well or were with him at crucial points in his life.

WITNESS TO HOPE brings into focus for the modern reader the frontal, two-fold cultural challenge that the Pope seems to be extending to all his varied audiences: Will you really, after the horrors of this century, recognize fully the sanctity of all human life? And can you freely, and without disparaging others, center your own life on allegiance to God as revealed in Jesus Christ?

Modern man is generally reluctant to confront—let alone answer—such stark questions personally; and the mass media seem structurally disinclined even to discuss them. As a result, little attention has been paid in the so-called advanced nations to the central mission and message of this Pope. He has all too often been trivialized as just another *People* magazine celebrity, demonized as a traditionalist wolf in sheep's clothing, or condescendingly included in the category of benign but vestigial spiritual curiosities.

Among John Paul's many challenges to this contemporary culture, none has been as polemically confrontational as his teaching on sex, gender and the role of women. Weigel makes it clear that this has been a central concern of his papacy from his first gathering with his bishops and his early focus on "The Theology of the Body" in an astonishingly extended series of 130 general audiences.

The sacrament of marriage and "the community of the family" are, for the Pope, unique human institutions in which we "guard, reveal and communicate love", which is the "fundamental and ultimate vocation of every human being." God's original creation of humanity in the divine image involved "from the beginning" two distinct genders whose bodies are, however, battlefields between love and lust, self-giving and self-assertion. In some of his most arresting pages, Weigel paraphrases the Pope as suggesting to us all that "human sexuality is far greater than you imagine", and that "the self-giving love of sexual communion is an icon of the interior life of God" capable of becoming "an act of worship . . . a way to sanctify the world." Weigel sees this exalted view as "exorcising the . . . deprecation of human sexuality from Catholic moral theology" and launching a "theological time bomb" that will probably detonate in the twenty-first century.

Of course, there have already been explosions against the papal teachings that have flown out of this theology into current public debates over birth control (which the Pope prefers to call "fertility regulation"), abortion, chastity (even within marriage), homosexuality and many other related matters. Feminists have not taken kindly to the Pope's view that "the true advancement of women requires that clear recognition be given to the value of their maternal and family role by comparison with all other roles and all other professions." Nevertheless, Weigel's detailed analysis suggests that the Vatican has been more successful in advancing its core concerns on these matters in international forums than a mostly adversarial Western press has reported. Women play for this Pope a central role not only within the family ("the domestic church") but also within the Church itself, where many have felt that the Pope was moving toward pronouncing the Virgin Mary as "co-redemptor" with Christ.

The Pope's personal warmth, good humor and dramatic flair have enabled him

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to avoid seeming to be scolding or self-righteous as he speaks in tough, traditional terms to a generation that resists the message but cannot resist the messenger. He may—again, paradoxically—have been more successful in reaching the world as a whole with this general message than in advancing his deep desire for the reunification of Christendom. Weigel is persuasive in arguing that the Pope was decisively shaped by the modernization and outreach emphases of Vatican II, but seems to recognize that his papacy has not significantly advanced ecumenism despite the engagement of some of the Pope's most talented protégés in this enterprise. Weigel's recounting of the Vatican discussion of the possible ordination of women reveals a strong inclination to hold fast to an all-male clergy by wrapping that historic practice in the robes of papal infallibility, without either formally proclaiming it to be an obligatory article of faith or seriously arguing the case. This will seem more authoritarian than authoritative to many Christians interested in a deeper dialogue with Rome on what seem to be central matters.



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The least understood figure of the 20th century.

For example, the traditionalist turn of the Anglican communion at the 1998 Lambeth Congress reflects the same rising force of African Christianity that the Pope recognized and helped stimulate in Catholicism. Yet both of the Protestant communions that are probably closest to Catholicism, the Anglican and the Lutheran, seem to have made more progress coming together with each other than either has with Rome. Weigel blames the waning of ecumenical progress almost exclusively on the growth of permissiveness within these and other "mainline" Protestant denominations. Such criticism is also voiced by the more evangelical Christian groups, whose numbers are growing particularly among the poor. Yet there is little indication in the book that the Pope has taken much spiritual account of Pentacostalism and other less traditional denominations.

The most serious failure of Catholic ecumenism during this papacy has been with the Slavic Orthodox churches—the very linkage that the Pope allegedly most wanted to make and seemed uniquely equipped to pursue. Weigel places almost all of the blame on the leaders of the dominant Russian Orthodox Church. They made many compromises with their Soviet overlords, themselves crafted a prolonged persecution of Eastern-rite Catholics in Ukraine, and have never extended to the Pope the episcopal invitation that he normally requires to make a foreign visit.

But John Paul had a cordial relationship with Gorbachev, who invited him to come to Russia in a spontaneous public gesture to which this normally bold Pope unaccountably failed to respond. Even more inexplicable on the part of a Pope who believes that culture determines history was the cultural insensitivity of beginning his post-Soviet diplomacy by

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appointing Polish bishops for newly delineated dioceses in Russia. Weigel is at his least convincing in implying that an already bruised Russian sense of national identity might have been consoled by a little more advance notification, or by the technicality that these bishops were only called "administrators."

There is no telling what the impact might have been if the first Slavic Pope had visited Russia as it was discovering freedom, recovering the Christian base of its culture, and looking for new beginnings from the bottom up. Instead, the Vatican seemed to be creating rival authorities to Orthodox bishops, and equipping them to extend their influence from the top down and further fragment Russia.

I participated in a conference on the Russian situation convened by the Vatican in Rome early in 1992, just after the fall of the Soviet Union. A number of Russians were looking at that time, perhaps naively, for some grand gesture or bold proposal from the Pope. Some cardinals and informed Catholics seemed interested in exploring direct linkages between Western Catholic and Eastern Orthodox parishes. Yet it seemed at the conference and subsequently that the Pope looked at this momentous point in history mainly through the eyes of the long-beleaguered Catholic regions of the former Soviet Union that were culturally close to Poland: Lithuania and western Ukraine. Within Russia the Vatican pursued the understandable but parochial task of providing leaders for a small number of scattered Catholic Christians, without sending any substantial positive signals to the broader Orthodox population that was just entering into an open-minded search for new answers to old religious questions.

It seems particularly tragic for such a global moral leader not yet to have seriously connected with the spiritual searching that continues beneath the surface of corruption and cynicism of today's Russia. Cynicism, after all, is morality in search of a home, Diogenes with his lonely lamp in search of an honest man. Honesty should compel Western Christians not to rationalize present inaction by focusing so exclusively on the past complicity of many Orthodox leaders with communist oppression. While John Paul II personally lived with integrity through both forms of totalitarianism, more than a few Catholic and other Western Christian leaders behaved similarly when living under fascism. The Pope has a deep feeling for the new martyrs of our era and has canonized many of them. The Soviet Union, the world's first atheist state, produced the greatest number of Christian martyrs of the twentieth century. The great majority of them died professing the Russian Orthodox faith. Their often dramatic stories have been little recorded, even by the Russian Church itself, and their "eternal memory" has been celebrated more in emigration than inside Russia. Perhaps Western Christendom will someday find some innovative ways to honor the sacrificial purity of dead martyrs whose names we may never know—even if it cannot find a path toward reconciliation with living leaders whose imperfections we know all too well.

HOW CAN an ordinary historian properly assess the life work of an extraordinary religious leader? Unlike almost every other leader of our time, John Paul looks more to the distant future than to the immediate present. He relies on the concrete and final judgment of a God with whom few of us have much contact, rather than on the transient verdicts of "History", rendered daily by chattering media commentators.

Based on Weigel's account, the impact of the Pope's global odyssey would seem to have been somewhat greater in Latin America and the Third World than is

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often assumed, and somewhat less in Western Europe and the remaining communist states of Cuba and China. (The Chinese leaders have never answered the letter he addressed to Deng Xiaoping eighteen years ago, one of several communications between communist leaders and the Pope that are published here for the first time.)

John Paul seems to have pushed the Vatican bureaucracy about as far as anyone could. The *éminence grise* of Catholic diplomacy, the late Cardinal Casaroli, appears to have been a dragging anchor, and many of the interminable meetings flapping sails, on a ship that the Pope was trying to speed up. The often maligned Cardinal Ratzinger, on the other hand, is portrayed as the Pope's trusted navigator—a theological modernizer rather than an Inquisitor in modern dress. The brief glimpses we are given of the talented and diverse crew of new cardinals appointed by this Pope suggest that they may be his greatest legacy to the next pilot of St. Peter's craft.

Weigel gently suggests that the non-Catholic world might do well to heed and respond more imaginatively to the Pope's invitation to say what it would like to see in a future papacy. Many would be inclined to say simply: John Paul III. However, even if cloning were possible, there would still remain the unresolved, underlying dilemma posed by the conflicting legacy of his papacy—and perhaps of the office itself in this confused, often cruel and increasingly self-indulgent age: Is a pope, in the last analysis, a priest who must be defender-in-chief of a besieged institution, whose members venture out mainly to help others come in to join their company? Or is he—can he be—a prophet of broader human renewal, the forerunner of some new community of faith and human solidarity for the coming millennium? George Weigel's magnificent modern defense of an ancient faith suggests that this Pope has tried to be both on a global scale. No one who perseveres to the end of this exhaustive account of a seemingly inexhaustible Christian can doubt that he has been as successful as any mortal man could hope to be. □

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Relative Values

Asked once whether Hitler or Stalin was worse, Isaiah [Berlin] replied, 'My answer will surprise you. I am a Jew and I should answer that Hitler was worse. Yet not only did Stalin destroy tens of millions of human lives . . . he also instilled slavish fear into people's souls, brought the intelligentsia to their knees, extolled lackeys, mediocrities. Apart from that he had a wonderful gift for playing on the lowly instincts of mobs.'

—Noel Annan, *The Dons: Mentors, Eccentrics and Geniuses*

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But the Patient Died

David Pryce-Jones

Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, *Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East 1789-1923* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 397 pp., $29.95.

IN ITS HEYDAY, for two full centuries after the capture of Constantinople in 1453, the Ottoman Empire was a superpower, complete with ideology. An absolute ruler, the Ottoman sultan was also Caliph, and Muslims everywhere were supposed to acknowledge his spiritual as well as temporal supremacy. The Ottomans were then in the forefront of military technology. They conquered Muslims and Christians alike, enslaving some of the latter and, with a stroke of originality all their own, transforming them into an elite corps. Pioneers of bureaucracy, the Ottomans devised a centralized organization of their subjects according to religious community—a form of pluralism, however imperfect. Machiavelli thought that they were likely to overrun Europe. Writing in the 1530s when Ottoman expeditions were raiding Italian ports, the great historian Guicciardini feared the moment had finally come.

For reasons having to do with social structure and outlook, the Ottomans in fact failed to keep pace with Western innovation, particularly in the sciences. A number of envoys and courtiers fatally misreported to the sultan that the Age of Enlightenment had nothing to teach them. Amid general astonishment at his audacity, Napoleon Bonaparte in 1798 invaded and occupied Egypt, hitherto an Ottoman backwater. The Ottoman order would never be the same. Its protracted decline throughout the nineteenth century came to be known as the Eastern Question, a delicate euphemism for a great power struggle that was the nineteenth century's equivalent of the Cold War. Territory was to be gained, boundaries redrawn, and commercial advantages enjoyed. The potential winners were the British, Habsburg and Russian empires, with France in the running, Germany at the rear, and Iran at the sidelines. If the powers could not obtain what they sought, they would nevertheless thwart the ambitions of others. Here was a laboratory illustration of what used to be the central doctrine of international diplomacy, that a balance of forces best ensured the peace.

European encroachment on Muslim lands was in fact part of the normal historical process whereby the strong and the weak are continually adjusting their relationships. Muslim weakness was of course open to analysis and remedy, but it proved emotionally more satisfying to blame others rather than themselves. Thus, a myth was slowly to crystallize around the Eastern Question, and eventually to deform reality altogether. Today it appears to more and more Muslims—the Islamist militants first and foremost—that the Europeans were in agreement and even conspiracy to take their resources, destroy their culture, and suppress Islam. Out to achieve such ends, Europeans of all occupations and nationalities—and by imaginative extension, Americans as well—appear malign and wanton by definition, an undifferentiated mass lumped under the single reductive word "imperialist." This is a choice term of abuse borrowed from the

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communist lexicon (which in turn had borrowed it from the liberal). It served to vilify the supposed intention of Western powers to impose their values everywhere and exploit the whole world.

IN *EMPIRES of the Sand*, Efraim and Inari Karsh set out to show that this myth is a complete misreading of the record—indeed, more or less the opposite of what actually occurred. The statesmen of the century routinely sacrificed opportunities of conquest that threatened to overturn the balance of power. In spite of misunderstandings and breakdowns, they almost invariably sought to return if possible to the status quo, or else to limit damaging change, consistently shoring up the Ottoman Empire in one international treaty after another. Far from being greedy and ruthless, the strong displayed remarkable moderation. The real "imperialists" were the minorities within the Ottoman Empire, who detected in the weakness at the center the chance to realize ambitions of their own, and so consummated its ruin.

The British at once grasped that Napoleon's success in Egypt, if allowed to prevail, would introduce an unpredictable world order, and they made sure to evict the French. This was the precedent for the rather unusual policy that endured for the rest of the nineteenth century, whereby one of the leading Christian and European powers came to the rescue of an Asia-based Muslim power, and convinced the other powers that this was the proper course of action. Russian czars and Habsburg emperors continued to covet Ottoman provinces that looked ripe for the plucking, each time disturbing the balance of power, which then had to be redressed. Czar Nicholas I coined the memorable phrase that in the Ottoman Empire, "we have a sick man on our hands", but when he proposed to kill this sick man off, the British sided with the Ottomans in the Crimean War. To be sure, Gladstone called for the Turks to be driven out of Europe "bag and baggage", and Lloyd George was to share this streak of anti-Turkish prejudice that came to color the Liberal Party. Still, realpolitik dictated that the destruction of the Ottoman Empire was almost sure to precipitate a world war, and that was too high a price to pay.

To one Ottoman sultan after another, this was a boon, and they made good use of it, buying time in surprisingly successful efforts to modernize and catch up with the Europeans. Again and again they played the great powers off one another, persuading and inveigling them singly or in concert to safeguard the Ottoman interest. The Karshes emphasize that the sultans were diplomats skillful enough to convert political or military weakness into strength. Indeed, the holding operation had its brilliance.

It was ideological conflict that finally led to loss and collapse. Prior to the nineteenth century, Muslims, wherever they might live, were accustomed to defining themselves as a single community of the faithful. Whether Christians or Jews, members of other denominations had their own communal structures, subordinate to be sure, but with established rights including freedom of worship. In the wake of Napoleon came nationalism, a revolutionary by-product that encouraged people to define themselves in a novel manner, according to language and custom and place. Identity followed, and with it the nation-state, constitutional government, the franchise, democratic concepts of rights. This was a process of thought incompatible with the Ottoman order and an identity based on the supremacy of Islam.

The Karshes describe with clarity and in detail how the minority communities of the empire absorbed these new self-definitions, revolting in the name of independence and creating nation-states for themselves. Nationalism transformed

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peaceful and sometimes even privileged communities of Greeks, Armenians, Serbs, Bulgarians and Romanians into romantic revolutionaries with a cause. Every language, it turned out, required an uprising on its behalf, then an army in support, and then usually an appeal for help to one or another of the great powers. The Ottomans were bound to respond with war and massacre.

Nationalism was a European import, and in that sense Islamists can argue a case that alien values were somehow in the service of "imperialism." But as the Karshes establish beyond all doubt, nationalism was also a pretext—a cover—for empire-building, and Muslims themselves were as quick as Christians to perceive how they could thereby empower themselves.

First off the mark was Muhammad Ali, seizing power in Egypt after the rout of Napoleon. Conquering as far afield as Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Syria, he was at the point of overthrowing the sultan when the British decided that such an outcome would destabilize the entire region. As a compromise, he was allowed to found a dynasty. Though he formally acknowledged the sultan as overlord, he had effectively won an independent empire for himself. Overreaching themselves, his ambitious heirs bankrupted Egypt. Local power struggles threatened the peace, and the British landed an army where once they had evicted Napoleon. As so often was the case, apparent imperialism in this instance was actually the consequence of upholding the balance of power. It was an irony at more than one level that the anti-Turkish but also anti-imperialist Gladstone was the prime minister who took the decision to occupy Egypt. In the years to come, successive British governments were to pay lip service to Ottoman sovereignty through scores of declarations that they had no intention of remaining in the country.

Mounting their coup against the sultan in 1908, the Young Turks found themselves ruling an empire that was almost entirely Muslim. Freed from the troublesome Christian minorities who had won independence, they might well have preserved this Muslim core of Turks and Arabs indefinitely. Unfortunately, the Young Turks were not diplomatically as capable as the previous sultans. At the outbreak of the First World War, they took the initiative in concluding an alliance with Germany, on the assumption that Germany was certain to win. Such an alliance committed them to definite rewards or punishments, depending on the outcome of the war, with no possibility of playing on the whole range of European powers when it came to pulling their chestnuts out of the fire. More than a break with the past, this was a mistake. Had they stayed neutral, Turks and Arabs might very well have continued to form a united Islamic empire, and the whole Middle East would have had a very different development.

THE ARAB REVOLT and the final dissolution of the Ottoman Empire have been the subjects of a literature as immense as it is polemic. It is the sphere in which Arab nationalists and now Islamists habitually rage against the "imperialists." Rejecting the view that the Arabs were a tribal society without any cohesion at all, as alleged by Europeans and their "Orientalist" spokesmen, they claim that they were already a nation desperate to throw off Turkish rule. Their champion was supposedly Hussein ibn Ali, the sherif of Mecca, self-styled king of the Arabs. Treacherously, the British and the French egged him on, when they had already cut a secret deal to parcel out Arab lands among themselves. This they then proceeded to do, until a later generation of nationalists, inspired by the likes of Gamal Abdul Nasser, at last took things into their own hands. This version of events can be heard every day in any Arab cafe.

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Historians and scholars are in a position to match facts and emotions. In several books, and with an authority all his own, Elie Kedourie was first to unravel this complex myth of "imperialist" double-dealing. He showed how in the conditions of the First World War, the British hoped to have the sherif as an ally, and engaged Sir Henry McMahon, an official, to try to agree to terms for such an alliance. No previous plans had existed for disposing of Arab provinces in the event of Turkish defeat, and none was even outlined until the war was well under way. Suggestions for the postwar settlement were entertained by McMahon and the sherif in a correspondence that has been exhaustively picked over, but no treaty was proposed, much less signed, and there was not even an informal agreement. The Allied powers were guilty only of heedlessness in the final break-up of the Ottoman Empire, not giving proper consideration to its achievements and the unifying role it might still have played in a turbulent part of the world.

The Karshes go over this ground in the same spirit as Kedourie, and they reinforce his conclusions. A Muslim, indeed the honored keeper of the holy shrines of Mecca and Medina, the sherif had no qualms about joining a campaign with Christians against his sultan and Caliph. He gladly accepted large subsidies and asked for more. But while engaging McMahon in a tug of war, he also kept lines of communication open to the sultan. Taking all possible precautions to ensure that he would emerge on the winning side, he carefully deceived the British in a number of crucial respects, sending them unreliable emissaries, grossly inflating his strength, pretending to command a hundred thousand tribesmen and a huge proportion of Arab officers in the Turkish army, when the actual numbers were in the hundreds. Above all, he treated every British proposal, however qualified and tentative, as though it were a firm promise.

Always considered a "sideshow", sensationalized out of all proportion by Lawrence of Arabia and the publicity which that dubious character knew how to generate around himself, the Arab Revolt was essentially careerism on the part of the sherif. Nationalism and Islam in his case were expedients masking the ambition for absolute power. His two self-seeking sons, Faisal and Abdullah, similarly trapped the British, and Lawrence in particular, into sponsoring empire-building schemes of their own, as a result of which they finished as kings of Iraq and Jordan respectively. Here were further examples of weaker parties turning that weakness into a tool for extracting concessions from the stronger, a stratagem learned from those past masters at it, their former rulers, the Ottoman sultans. The abiding question is why even with their experience and well-informed intelligence services the British allowed themselves to be so manipulated by the sherif and his sons.

Turkey duly paid the price for alliance with Germany. The Allies, the Greeks especially, were unwise enough to make postwar territorial and other claims that endangered Turkey's future. In response, Mustapha Kemal, a genuine warlord, mobilized his fellow countrymen in the service of nationalism, not Islam. Once he had repelled the invaders, he exiled the sultan and closed the Caliphate. Following the example of their own previous minorities, the Turks thus redefined themselves as members of a nation-state. Constitutionalism and democracy have since been their declared aims, however imperfectly realized. Most Turks claim that this has been a process of Westernization that they freely chose, but the Islamist minority sees it as an imposition.

IT OUGHT TO BE impossible to continue arguing that European "imperialists" selfishly determined to destroy the Ottoman Empire simply

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because it was Muslim and powerful. The true "imperialists" came from within the empire itself, in the shape of assorted leaders, Christian and Muslim, who mobilized minorities into nations. Accused by Arab nationalists of dividing and betraying them, the British in fact were responsible first for accepting the fanciful notion that the Arab nation was a reality, and then for willingly participating in handing power to those whose claim to be its rulers was at best notional.

In spite of their minimal military effort, the Arabs did rather well politically out of the First World War, laying the foundations for what have become a score of independent states rather than a single nation. But the encounter with Europe and its values seems to have generated a widespread sense of defeat and humiliation that sets them apart from other former peoples of the Ottoman Empire. Victimhood of the sort is a deep and paralyzing emotion. The Karshes are the latest to provide a historical perspective that in the long run should liberate Islamists and other militants from self-destructive myth, and allow them to meet the rest of the world on equal terms. □

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God and Historians

"Although God cannot alter the past, historians can; it is perhaps because they can be useful to Him in this respect that He tolerates their existence."

—Samuel Butler, *Erehwon*

"Historians are always tempted to turn the past into a conversation piece. . . . They are at their most tiresome when playing Boswell to God."

—John Turner, *Times Literary Supplement*, November 12, 1999

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Unreal Realism

Terence Emmons

Jonathan Haslam, *The Vices of Integrity: E.H. Carr, 1892-1982* (New York: Verso, 1999), 240 pp., $35.

"BEFORE you study the history, study the historian. . . . Before you study the historian, study his historical and social environment." This advice has been taken up and applied with excellent results to its source, E.H. Carr (1892–1982), one of twentieth-century Britain's most prominent historians and public intellectuals, by Jonathan Haslam, who was a research associate of Carr's during the last decade of the indefatigable historian's long life. Excellent results, that is, for our understanding of this unusually complicated and highly individualistic historian, but also for our understanding of his times, for Carr truly was a product of his historical and social environment. His is a cautionary tale about ideology and power, and a significant chapter in the story of the Soviet impact on the Western world.

In his once widely cited 1962 lectures on *What is History?*, Carr gave a summary definition of history as a "dialogue between the events of the past and progressively emerging future ends." The historian who has a "long-term vision over the past and over the future", who "approaches towards the understanding of the future", can aspire to durability and approach "objectivity." A daunting task, no doubt, but an important one, for the function of history is not only to understand the past, but to "increase [man's] mastery over the society of the present." Add to this the eloquent subscription to "History as Progress" and we have a key to Carr's intellectual biography and to his achievement as a historian.

Edward Hallett Carr, author of *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, the immense *History of Soviet Russia*, *What is History?* and much else, was born into a modest, but well-educated, middle-class Victorian business family in the north of London. He was educated on a scholarship at Merchant Taylors' day school in central London, where he excelled, especially in Greek, and gained a reputation as a standoffish nerd. By this time, he had become a fervent supporter of the free-trade, social reform liberalism of Lloyd George.

Exempted from military call-up in World War I by a bout of rheumatic fever in his early college years, he was drafted into the Foreign Office upon graduating from Cambridge with distinction in June 1916. Carr was to remain in the foreign service for twenty years. Russia, the country to whose history his later work as historian would be principally devoted, first came to his attention in connection with his department's work in supplying Britain's wartime allies, and then, after the October Revolution, in the matter of keeping supplies out of the hands of the Bolsheviks. Carr, innocent of the Russian language, went with the British delegation to the Paris Peace Conference as a "Russian expert" and remained there until 1921. From late 1921 through 1924 he was back in London, and in 1925 he was posted as second secretary to the British legation in Riga, Latvia, where he remained until he was returned to the Foreign Office in March 1929. Inundated with Russian émigrés, Riga after the war was the main Western listening post for

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Soviet developments. It was here that Carr took up the study of the Russian language and began the preoccupation with Russia that dominated much of the rest of his life.[1]

The first fruits of Carr's independent Russian studies were books on several great nineteenth-century Russian figures—Dostoevsky, Herzen, and Bakunin—each famous in his own way for that questioning of conventional values and rejection of the *juste milieu* that was the hallmark of the Russian intelligentsia. Long since outdated, these books remain instructive about their author. Haslam argues persuasively that Carr's biographies of these radical individualists—ironical, detached and disinclined to take seriously the role of ideas in their lives—helped to liberate the historian from his own upbringing and received beliefs—helped, in other words, to turn him into the radical individualist that he would remain for the rest of his life. They also demonstrate Carr's dissatisfaction with his career in the Foreign Office, which he left in 1936.

By this time, his preoccupation with international affairs had taken over. Carr's observations of the great powers' behavior at the Paris Peace Conference and then at the League of Nations in Geneva undermined his early belief in a natural concert of nations and a liberal economic order guided by the unseen hand. He was disenchanted by the victorious Allies' inability to provide a just and prosperous peace, and at Geneva he came to the conclusion that free trade, the cornerstone of his liberalism, was simply "the doctrine of economically powerful states which flourished without protection." The Great Crash of 1929 and the ensuing economic morass in Europe clinched the case. But Carr did not yield to cultural pessimism as did so many of his generation. Rather, he held tenaciously to the belief in progress that he had inherited from his nineteenth-century upbringing by gradually abandoning liberalism: he traded the "utopianism" of his earlier view of international relations for a hardheaded realism, and he replaced a liberal view of the future with a socialist one.

After his resignation from the Foreign Office, Carr competed for, and won, an appointment to the prestigious but geographically remote Woodrow Wilson Chair of International Politics at Aberystwyth, Wales, and began a long association with the BBC as a "talking head" on international affairs. He also became active in the affairs of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House).

From these pulpits, Carr, arguing from his new "realist" perspective, proceeded to condemn the Versailles settlement of 1919 and, with the 1936 German reoccupation of the Rhineland, became an outspoken advocate of appeasement toward Hitler, up to and including approval of the Munich agreement in 1938. He dismissed the sanctity of imposed treaties that did not reflect the realities of power. The rise of nationalism that brought Hitler to power was a natural, indeed healthy, response to the humiliation of Versailles, a sign of national vitality, and German expansionism under Hitler was compatible with the realities of Germany's dominant position in Central Europe. The culmination of this line of reasoning was Carr's book, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, which he finished on the very eve of the war. It was, as Haslam notes, "a devastating polemic directed against the ideals that overlay the Versailles peace settlement and were epitomized in the League of Nations; a polemic all the more acute for the fact that these

[1]The parallel with the career of George Kennan, another diplomat who turned to writing about history and international affairs rather late, comes to mind. Kennan, some twelve years younger than Carr, cut his teeth in Russian studies when posted to Riga in the 1920s as a U.S. foreign service officer.

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ideals were once his own." He intended this book "to do for the understanding of international politics what Machiavelli had done for domestic politics; quite consciously so." The "crisis" of the title was that produced by the confrontation between the utopianism of the interwar collective security arrangements and the reality of German power. His case for appeasement was based on what he believed to be "the fact that some nations desire to maintain the status quo without having to fight for it, and others to change the status quo without having to fight in order to do so." It was Carr's most famous work, and it became a classic of international relations theory in the postwar years when realism came to dominate this new discipline, despite its by then embarrassing endorsement of the Munich agreement as a model for negotiating peaceful change (the passage was omitted from later editions). As a firm believer in progress, Carr did not deny a role to "utopianism" in international relations: it was always present in the defining of foreign policy goals. His bugbear was the neglect of power in their pursuit.

In working up his highly personal vision of the collectivist future, Carr never became a real Marxist, although he was led to read Marx and even to write a rather superficial biography of him. He never accepted the idea that the class struggle, or more broadly the antagonism between haves and have-nots, was the main force in history. Unlike many British intellectuals of the next generation, he was too much the nineteenth-century empiricist and individualist to have become a party line-hewing communist in the 1930s. Carr was inclined to see the Soviet and fascist states as mere variations on the same model, characterized by the "supersession of laissez faire by State capitalism." He saw this as "a world-wide phenomenon of which the totalitarian states are the most complete and uncompromising expression." The social planning going on in the Western democracies belonged to the same order of phenomena. His interest in and enthusiasm for the Soviet system, especially once it had graduated from plans for world revolution to building "socialism in one country" grew apace.

But as between the fascist and communist variants, the Carr of the late 1930s clearly preferred Germany. He had tasted a bit of Soviet reality in a short trip to Leningrad and Moscow in the terrible year of 1937, which along with the reports of the Terror in the press made Germany look good by comparison. In retrospect, Carr's indifference to the brutalities of the totalitarian states, and more generally to the implications for human rights in the runaway expansion of state control in these countries, seems amazing. He appears to have been blinded by his quasi-Hegelian confidence that he understood the nature and direction of the historical process, and, as his biographer suggests, perhaps to some extent by an assumption that a future collectivist order in a country like Britain would be rendered more humane by its indigenous liberal tradition.

Such was the climate of opinion in the British establishment that Carr's stand on appeasement right up to the outbreak of the war did no damage to his reputation as an international affairs pundit during the war. After a brief stint in charge of foreign propaganda at the Ministry of Information, he obtained an appointment as an assistant editor and leading writer on international developments at the ultra-establishmentarian *Times*. And he continued his association with the BBC. The war basically reinforced Carr's views on collectivism, and at the *Times* he proceeded to outline a postwar world in which war and unemployment would be avoided through European integration,

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which in practice would mean rejection of the principle of self-determination for small countries.

True to his ruthless "realism" *vis-à-vis* the small states of Europe, Carr had essentially written off the Baltics to Russia at the time of their occupation by the Soviet Union in 1940, and was busy assigning Eastern Europe to a postwar Soviet sphere of influence. The emerging Soviet victory in the war only made this the more "realistic." It seems more than likely, as Haslam remarks, that Carr had no conception of the true implications of the policies he recommended for the inhabitants of these countries. On the other hand, the stakes were, in his mind, probably high enough to justify almost any cost: a British condominium with Russia "assuming British predominance over western Europe as a quid pro quo for Soviet dominance over the east." Only in this way could Germany be restrained (and Britain's status as a great power maintained). There was no need to worry about Russian expansionism or the promotion of communism: Russia's interests (it was always "Russia" for Carr, not "the Soviet Union") were essentially defensive and security-minded, as the Soviet regime had abandoned its world revolutionary project in favor of concentration on domestic modernization.

The corollary of this view was that the United States was primarily responsible for the Cold War. Haslam writes that Carr's anti-Americanism (which did not prevent him from accepting several Rockefeller Foundation grants) seems to have been rooted, like that of many postwar French intellectuals, more in fear of succumbing to U.S. predominance than in ideology. Carr made several research trips to the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, but they apparently did nothing to cause him to re-examine his views. In his writing, he tended to equate McCarthyism with Stalinism.

By 1944 the Soviet Union had passed the ultimate realist test of war and was emerging as the greatest power on the continent. Its performance in the war revived Carr's confidence in the positive, progressive nature of the Russian Revolution and the Soviet experiment as a whole. "I came to feel", he recalled much later in Hegelian mode,

> that my preoccupation with the purges and brutalities of Stalinism had distorted my perspective. The black spots were real enough, but looking exclusively at them destroyed one's vision of what was really happening. . . . I became increasingly interested in what the Russians had done, and how far this had any lessons for western society.

He took up the question of lessons in the 1946 Oxford University Carpenter Lectures, which were published as a book, *The Soviet Impact on the Western World*, the same year.

The rest of Carr's career is in a sense anti-climactic. He became increasingly engrossed in the details of early Soviet history, which eventually yielded not one, but fourteen volumes, and even then covering developments only up to 1929. It was a unique, very mixed achievement. By far the most detailed history of the first dozen years of the Soviet Union in any language, it was mostly restricted to the history of policy debates within the Bolshevik elite and to the institutional aspects of their rule—to "documenting the regime's activities in its own terms", as Haslam succinctly puts it. Beginning with broader chronological scope in mind, Carr eventually decided that the documentation needed for his kind of work ceased to exist with the firm establishment of Stalin's dictatorship, that is, by 1930. By this time, moreover, the main features of the Soviet order as they would exist until the time of Gorbachev were already in place.

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The main story line is how the Bolshevik revolution came to be transformed from a launching pad for world revolution into an industrialization project for a single country. As he dug deeper into the documents, Carr's views of this process changed considerably. He began by assuming the primacy of politics—another Russian "revolution from above" in a tradition going back to Peter the Great—but eventually came to the conclusion that the Soviet story was really about improvisation, centering around the functioning of the economy. The role of ideology was largely discounted. Correspondingly, Carr gradually abandoned the notion that Soviet Russia held lessons for the West, but he replaced it with the view that its experience was a model and inspiration for the East; that is, for the modernization of traditional societies. So in the end, the progressive role of the Bolshevik revolution in history was preserved, as part and parcel of his fundamental belief in the overall progressive direction of history.

Carr's *History* received mixed reviews from the beginning. It was pegged, depending on the politics of the critic, as either whig history applied to the Bolsheviks or outright pro-Soviet apologetics. Where was the story of the civil war, and why was the great famine of 1921–22, with its millions of deaths resulting from Bolshevik policy, barely mentioned? Yet it was on the whole recognized by most scholars as a serious contribution to historical knowledge. Although it was in a broad historical sense "pro-Soviet", the work was anathema in the Soviet Union: it did not hew to the official party line and, most importantly, it mentioned various "unpersons" of the 1920s, most notably Trotsky.

The impact of Carr's Soviet work on American scholarship on Russia is not easy to assess. Its discontinuities, both chronological and thematic, and the slow cadence of the appearance of its volumes, prompted students cramming for exams and instructors cribbing lecture notes to look elsewhere for more comprehensive and coherent (even if in some respects no less tendentious) treatments of Soviet history. With the appearance of these works, Carr's work on early Soviet history faded from the mental horizon of American Russian scholarship. With the vogue of "social history" or "history from the bottom up" that came to the fore as the 1960s gave way to the 1970s, scholarly attention was largely diverted from high politics and foreign policy, the main focus of Carr's narrative. His work continued to be cited in bibliographies and to be mined by specialists, but his name is barely mentioned in the debates of the 1970s and 1980s over whether October 1917 was a revolution of the masses or a coup d'état; whether Stalin was Lenin's rightful heir or a "betrayer of the revolution"; whether his "great turn" at the end of the 1920s was "revolution from above" or "revolution from below." In Martin Malia's recent interpretation of Soviet history, *The Soviet Tragedy*, Carr's Soviet work is mentioned only a couple of times in passing.

Carr's historical views were complicated and paradoxical, the product, ultimately, as his biographer points out, of the tension between "utopia and reality" in his intellectual make-up. He was at once a hard-headed rationalist and a moralist. His friend Lewis Namier called him a romantic. Of course, broad historical interpretations as a rule draw on moralizing impulses. Carr's historical erudition and insight were in many respects remarkable, but from today's perspective many of his historical judgments—about Stalin and Hitler, about the Soviet experience as a whole—look quixotic if not downright wrongheaded.

Such is the lot, generally, of those who have the intellectual hubris to think they know where History is going, and

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there was plenty of that in E.H. Carr. Two other things, in particular, helped to skew his vision of contemporary history: his tendency to ignore the very significant role of ideology in twentieth-century history; and, specifically in regard to Soviet history, an apparently superficial knowledge of pre-revolutionary Russia, which caused him to overestimate the modernizing achievements of the Bolsheviks and to underestimate the toll those achievements took in human lives.

Carr's biographer describes his protagonist as an outsider, yet the positions he occupied in the British Establishment—ranking position in the Foreign Office, holder of a coveted chair, editor at the *Times*, perennial BBC commentator, senior fellow of Trinity College, and so on—belie such a notion. Moreover, he enjoyed at least respectful relations with many prominent members of the intellectual elite, including Lewis Namier, A.J.P. Taylor and Isaiah Berlin. Until several decades after World War II, Carr's views on such things as appeasement (toward the Soviet Union if not, in retrospect, toward Nazi Germany), the anticipated collapse of capitalism and the Soviet experiment were hardly those of a maverick. When Ved Mehta made the rounds of British intellectuals in 1961–62 for his delightful *New Yorker* articles, Carr was there, giving and receiving the acid, yet civilized, barbs with the rest of them, one set of highly individualistic opinions among many.[2] It was only fairly late—after the reforming impulses of the Khrushchev years had run out of gas and, one suspects, after the events of 1968 in Prague brought home as nothing before the nature of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the East European countries—that Carr's sometime contribution to these arrangements and his persistent refusal to revise significantly his views on Soviet domination of the region led to isolation and the expression of outright hostility toward his historical and political views. One has only to compare the rather light-minded discourse of the early 1960s, as reported by Mehta, to the posthumous all-out attacks on Carr's intellect and character, disguised as reviews of his last book, by Leopold Labedz and Norman Stone, to appreciate how times had changed.[3]

Haslam tells, in as much detail as his elusive subject permits, the story of Carr's personal life. He was a person of very strong emotions who was fated, perhaps by the peculiarities of his childhood upbringing, to be unable to share them with others. The result was three rather long and tortuous marriages into each of which Carr entered out of a strong need for feminine love and comfort, but which he was unable to sustain on his side. His response to the emotional conflicts that gradually but inevitably developed in each relationship was to isolate himself, thus sending the relationship into a downward spiral. It is a pathetic, but very human story, humanely told, and the more obvious connections between the intellectual and affective sides of Carr's life are spelled out without resort to psychohistorical speculation. □

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[2]Mehta, *Fly and the Fly-Bottle: Encounters With British Intellectuals* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1962).

[3]Labedz, "A History in the Making", *Times Literary Supplement*, June 10, 1983; Stone, "Grim Eminence", *London Review of Books*, 20 January – 3 February 1983. The book ostensibly under review was *Twilight of the Comintern, 1930-1935* (London: Macmillan & Co., 1982).

Terence Emmons is professor of history at Stanford University. His most recent book is *Alleged Sex and Threatened Violence: Dr. Russel, Bishop Vladimir, and the Russians in San Francisco, 1887-1892* (Stanford University Press, 1997).

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Letters

The Jacksonian Tradition:

I always look forward to reading Walter Russell Mead because he is a master of the *jeu d'esprit*. I recall especially a delightful article he wrote after the collapse of the Soviet Union suggesting that the United States purchase, develop and carve several new states out of . . . Siberia. His recent article ("The Jacksonian Tradition: And American Foreign Policy", Winter 1999/2000), though by no means tongue-in-cheek, displays Mead's habitual insight, wit and penchant for tweaking the conventional wisdom.

But does it work as history or contemporary sociology? Have his "Jacksonian" Americans, with their code of self-reliance, equality, individualism, easy credit and courage, really dominated American politics for the past 175 years, swallowing up immigrant communities with different values, and determining when, why and how the United States makes war? Must politicians and foreign policy pundits today really evince a "Jacksonian" spread-eagle, damn-your-eyes spirit if they wish to persuade a critical mass of voters to support foreign involvements?

I confess to a certain skepticism on both points. These paradigmatic dichotomies we all love to draw (e.g., Wilsonians vs. [Teddy] Rooseveltians, Hamiltonians vs. Jeffersonians) say more about contemporary politics than they do about history. Wilson and TR, after all, were both progressives and fierce interventionists and had far more in common with each other than either did with, say, Grover Cleveland. Likewise, however much Jefferson damned the Federalists' mercantile, nationalist vision in the 1790s, he proved as President to be a shrewd and tough promoter of the national interest. As for Andrew Jackson himself, his two terms were uniquely quiescent in foreign affairs, and (like late military men such as Grant, TR and Eisenhower) he never took the nation to war. Above all, it seems to me that Mead's Jacksonian category, so well chiseled at first, begins to lose its shape when it is made to contain everyone from Scots-Irish frontiersmen to inner-city blacks, hard-hats for Nixon and suburban yuppies.

The apparent pay-off of Mead's analysis, however, is in its implications for the selling of an interventionist foreign policy. He sees a profound disconnection between the various elite schools of thought on America's proper international posture and the "Don't Tread on Me!" Jacksonian masses whose inclination is to have no truck with "damned furriners" unless they trample on American interests or honor. And I think Mead is on firmer ground here. I will never forget the time I picked up a young white man hitchhiking outside El Paso in 1980 and asked him who he favored in that year's presidential race. Jesse Jackson, he replied to my surprise, "because he tells it like it is." But Jackson could never win, I said, so who was his second choice? "Oh, Ronald Reagan, of course." There was a true Jacksonian.

Still, I wonder if Mead's gap in opinions and values between the elites and the populace still matters. The people's Congress no longer declares wars; the President just sends armed forces overseas on his own authority. Neither do the people fight America's wars, thanks to the all-volunteer force. And to judge from the pronouncements of leaders in both major parties, globalization has put paid to the sort of visceral "robust nationalism" (to borrow Sam Huntington's phrase) so dear to Mead's

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Jacksonians. To be sure, a future president needing to rally the masses to wage a "big" war—say, against China—might well have to adopt a Jacksonian swagger (and maneuver the enemy into firing the first shot). But absent a national mobilization on that scale, I suspect that whatever Jacksonian hearts still beat beyond the Beltway can be comfortably ignored in our comfortable age.

WALTER A. MCDOUGALL
University of Pennsylvania

◆

Any resemblance between "the Jacksonian tradition", as rendered by Walter Russell Mead in your pages, and the historical Andrew Jackson is strictly coincidental.

Mr. Mead depicts Jacksonianism as warlike, trigger-happy, fundamentalist, nativist, paranoid, protectionist, suspicious of federal power, supportive of loose monetary policy, given to cowboy diplomacy, and committed to an anti-internationalist, unilateralist course in foreign affairs.

When I heard that Mr. Mead was planning an essay on Jackson's foreign policy, I sent him a note urging him to read J.M. Belohavek's standard work on the subject, *"Let the Eagle Soar!": The Foreign Policy of Andrew Jackson* (1985). Apparently he never got beyond the title; his text shows no evidence that he ever read the book.

Did Jacksonian foreign policy represent a sharp break in the conduct of American foreign affairs? I quote Professor Belohavek:

> The goals of the Jackson administration differed little from those of John Quincy Adams [his predecessor and, before that, a great secretary of state]; for both men, expanding commerce and settling claims remained the highest priorities. Yet Jackson succeeded where Adams failed.

Was Jackson warlike and trigger-happy? Jackson's past experience with Great Britain had hardly been harmonious. He bore the scar of a saber wound inflicted by a British officer during the War for Independence. A short fourteen years before his presidency he defeated the British at the Battle of New Orleans. The British government expected that

> the hot-tempered General would be eminently unsuccessful in his conduct of diplomacy toward Great Britain.... Instead, the opposite came to pass. . . . His attitude toward the English remained calm and dispassionate throughout. . . . Despite the gloomy predictions that had greeted the advent of a Jackson presidency, Palmerston [British foreign secretary] and Vaughan [British minister to Washington] could fairly say that they had received better treatment from Jackson than from any of his predecessors.

Was Jackson opposed to international agreements? His administration negotiated spoliations claims treaties with Denmark, France, Portugal and Spain and trade revisions or new agreements with Great Britain, France, Russia and Spain. "Jacksonian diplomacy was a timely blend of patience, understanding, and a show of power."

Was Jacksonianism driven, as Mr. Mead claims, by fundamentalist and evangelical emotions? Were Jacksonians consumed by "fear of the anti-Christ"? Jacksonians were in fact anti-clerical. They believed in keeping religion out of politics and were denounced by their opponents as irreligious. The leading free-thinkers of the day were all Jacksonians (see chapter 27, "Jacksonian Democracy and Religion", of my book *The Age of Jackson*).

Was Jacksonianism nativist and anti-Catholic? Jackson's party was the party of the immigrants and especially of the Irish Catholics. Was Jacksonianism paranoid, chronically fearful of secret conspiracies against the republic? It was John Quincy Adams, not Andrew Jackson, who flirted with the anti-Masons. Was Jacksonianism protectionist? His was the low-tariff party; the Federalists and the Whigs were the protectionists. Was Jacksonianism supportive of a loose monetary policy? Jackson was famously a hard-money man who distrusted all banks. Was Jacksonianism suspicious of federal power? Tell that to the nullifiers in South Carolina or to Nicholas Biddle of the Second Bank of the United States!

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I could go on; but, to cut it short, nearly everything Mr. Mead ascribes to Jacksonianism was untrue of Andrew Jackson and his administration. Mr. Mead is a political scientist, not a historian, and he seems to have been carried away by a metaphorical Jackson, based perhaps on the Battle of New Orleans and reconstructed in order to match his Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian and Wilsonian constructs. He is not at all interested in Jacksonian facts. He is enchanted by a literary conceit that turns into a gross case of historical hijacking.

I am sorry that he dragged Jackson in because his argument, minus the Jacksonian references, makes a lot of sense.

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.
New York, NY

◆

Walter Russell Mead has written a bracing commentary about how the culture of white male toughness and honor has helped to shape American foreign policy. Unfortunately, many of his historical claims are not to be trusted; Mead's assertions about the "Jacksonian tradition" swing between the imprecise and the incredible. To say that Jacksonians were "solid" Democrats through the 1940s but also unremittingly hostile toward immigrants and labor unions is a fundamental misreading of the political narrative. How does Mead think the Democrats became the majority party in the first place? Neither does he provide convincing evidence that many women and African-Americans have made the tradition their own. If immersion in the macho culture of urban gangs were enough to qualify one as "Jacksonian", young men in slums from Glasgow to Johannesburg would be sporting tattoos of Old Hickory.

Yet Mead is correct to stress that American gunfighter values have given a strongly democratic cast to the aggressive use of armed forces abroad. In no other developed Western nation do military heroes invariably become popular candidates for the highest office in the land (most, however, are not "populists"—think of Washington, Grant, Eisenhower and Powell). The tradition or, better, impulse that Mead identifies also helps to explain the truth of the cliché that Americans are slow to go to war but loathe to quit before they win. Whether or not that has made other nations freer or more prosperous is, of course, another question entirely.

MICHAEL KAZIN
Georgetown University

◆

The National Interest is to be commended for offering hospitality for writers seeking new and exploratory interpretations of the wider sweep of American foreign policy. Walter Russell Mead has intrepidly attempted in this and other articles to find new analytic lenses for portraying both past and future foreign policy. His article does not, however, greatly advance our understanding. For all its intriguing aperçus, the thesis of the essay has no real spine. It offers some observations that help to explain public attitudes which sometimes impinge on the making and sustaining of foreign policy. In seeking to destroy sacred cows and defy establishmentarian modes of analysis, he allows his own analysis to be scatter-shot and imprecise. Some of his evidence is force-fed, some of it drawn on leaps of the imagination.

His underlying notion of Jacksonianism is highly fluid and in the essay becomes more of a catch-basin of disparate aspects of American thought and behavior. Certainly he describes a number of mentalities. The counterpoise between Jacksonianism and the trinity of Jeffersonianism, Hamiltonianism and Wilsonianism is arbitrarily constructed. Especially in foreign affairs, the insertion of a dominant Jacksonianism adds little. The weave of the argument is loose and inclusive of so many components of American historical experience that it loses coherence. In John Hay's words, "it is like trying to hold a seal in your lap." At times Jacksonianism is almost mythos; sometimes it is most nearly analogous to populism; it is not quite an ideology or a movement; it is instinctual yet also an expression of cultural, religious and social *values*; it is also folkloric. It is the master key, he argues, to understanding everything from the War of 1812 to nativism, to Sherman's march and Appomattox, to

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Hiroshima, to the Vietnam Memorial, to oscillations of the public in attention and commitment to foreign affairs—even to the life trajectory of Irving Kristol! This inclusive embrace ultimately becomes limp with his further caution that there are among us many Jacksonians who do not know it. One wonders whether Jacksonianism in foreign affairs is for Mead more an allegory than an analytical portrayal. Wilson, Jefferson and Hamilton had significant foreign policies. If Jackson did, the secret remains with Walter Russell Mead. The tantalizing promise of the rehabilitation of Martin Van Buren is not enough.

FRED HOLBORN
Johns Hopkins' SAIS

Mead replies:

Walter McDougall fears that Jacksonians will be irrelevant in the brave new world of the twenty-first century. I'm not so sure. Between the Senate defeat of the CTBT, House passage of the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, and the long running battles over fast track and UN dues, Jacksonian values still seem to get a hearing.

Professor Schlesinger is right. Andrew Jackson was not a Jacksonian. While Andrew Jackson emerged from the Scots-Irish highland culture and drew on it all his life as a political leader, he was never the captive of a popular culture. I intended this article as a portrait of Jackson's followers and their heirs, and apologize for any confusion on this point.

Professor Kazin charges me with maintaining that the Jacksonians exhibited "unremitting" hostility toward labor and immigrants. True, American Jacksonians did sometimes organize and join unions, but generally speaking, agrarian populism suited them better than social democracy. Otherwise, Professor Kazin does Jacksonians an injustice to limit the tradition to "white male toughness" and "gunfighter values." Equality, democracy and the love of liberty are deeply planted in this tradition; were they not, we would be neither as free nor as prosperous as we currently are.

I don't disagree with Professor Holborn that writing about the influence of popular culture in politics is like trying to hold a seal in your lap. But even though they are slippery, cultures and seals are both real, and need to be grappled with somehow. On Jackson's foreign policy, I refer Professor Holborn to Professor Schlesinger.

I should add my gratitude that none of the correspondents was cruel enough to finger the true howling blunder in the piece. Andrew Jackson was, of course, our seventh president, not the sixth as the text idiotically and inexcusably states.

Kashmir:

Alexander Rose's analysis of the Kashmir imbroglio ("Paradise Lost: The Ordeal of Kashmir", Winter 1999/2000), though stimulating and perceptive, contains a number of factual errors that need to be put right.

Rose claims that Lord Radcliffe, who was responsible for drawing the boundaries of India and Pakistan, had originally allocated the three subdistricts of the Gurdaspur district to Pakistan. But later, under pressure from Lord Mountbatten, he allocated these districts to India, thereby making the accession of Kashmir to India possible. Rose cites the testimony of Christopher Beaumont, Lord Radcliffe's secretary at the time of India's partition, as a source of his information.

But Beaumont's testimony (which is deposited with the Warden of All Souls College, Oxford) says quite the opposite. In this testimony, Beaumont condemned Lord Mountbatten for allocating three sub-districts in the Ferozpur district to India, but on the Gurdaspur award he states that "no change, as has been subsequently rumored, was made in the northern (Gurdaspur) part of the line; nor in the Bengal line."

In the second part of his article, Rose claims that India has never been able to produce the original copy of the Instrument of Accession. In fact, the original document, which the ruler of Kashmir signed before he left for Jammu on the night of October 25/26 (Prem Shanker Jha, *Rival Versions of History*, Oxford University Press, 1996), was presented to Lord Mountbatten and the Defence Committee on

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October 26. Moreover, the authenticity of the Instrument of Accession was never raised or questioned in the subsequent UN Security Council meetings.

The Kashmir dispute, however, is not merely about territory; it is a conflict between Islamic triumphalism and India's religious pluralism. Witness that out of all the militants killed in action since 1994, only 2 percent were Kashmiris—the rest were from Pakistan, Afghanistan and other Muslim countries.

RANDHIR SINGH BAINS
Essex, UK

Rose replies:

Though I appreciate his kind comments, I'm afraid I must contest Mr. Singh Bains' charges. Firstly, Christopher Beaumont records that Radcliffe changed his mind about the Punjab border at a lunch with Mountbatten from which he (Beaumont) was "deftly excluded." In 1992 it was noted: "Not having been present at the lunch, he could not say who had said what." I do, however, make clear that the Gurdaspur "change" is an angry Pakistani allegation, not necessarily Gospel truth.

Secondly (passing over the contention that the maharajah signed the Instrument of Accession on October 25/26, rather than October 27), the Indian White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir (1948) reproduces only the sample text of a general-use Instrument with the spaces left blank, not the Instrument the maharajah signed. Such an act of conveyance bearing his signature and dated accordingly would have instantly proven India's case at the UN for legal possession of all Kashmir, but, curiously, it was not used. Indeed, it seems that in 1995 the Jammu and Kashmir state authorities declared the maharajah's original to be "missing."

However, in the words of J.N. Dixit, the Indian former foreign secretary, "everybody who has a sense of history knows that legality only has a relevance up to the threshold of transcending political realities." As my article concludes, India, Pakistan and China together own Kashmir—that is the political reality, legalistic quibbling aside.

The Asian Crisis:

Hilton Root's article ("Self-Inflicted Wounds", Winter 1999/2000) has a number of troubling premises. To support his contention that fraudulent accounting is an exercise in self-preservation in China, Root writes, "If a firm in China . . . were to maintain the same standards of accounting as its counterparts in the United States, it would soon find itself subjected to a wide range of capricious interventions by state officials." The truth is somewhat different.

Shares of numerous Chinese companies trade on the New York Stock Exchange, which requires the application of generally accepted accounting principles. And major American investment pools affiliated with top-tier Wall Street firms such as Goldman Sachs and hedge funds such as Paloma Partners, which would be barred by their very charters from investing in enterprises with lax accounting, have invested in China. . . .

Mr. Root states that "private sector initiatives have not emerged" in present-day China, India and Russia. But all three countries have stock markets in which foreign investors are welcome with varying degrees of enthusiasm. Russian companies regularly acquire or invest in other Russian companies, while Indian companies have matured to the point where they are acquiring foreign companies, such as Chicago's multibillion-dollar institution, Inland Steel.

Then, Mr. Root also makes the point that private—not government—financing based on accurate information financed the growth of American companies in the nineteenth century. He is wrong on both counts. He writes,

> Without government financing, managers turned to the public and issued stock, the sale of which required the release of vital information. Because governmental opportunism did not jeopardize firms that accurately disclosed information, American businesses were able to create a thriving equity market.

But the very need to enact a statutory scheme that created the Securities and Exchange Commission and regulated the dissemination of information,

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financing of utilities, and corporate bankruptcies was a reaction to prolonged market abuses in the decades prior to the 1930s, not an interruption of a halcyon *laissez faire* business environment, where the issuance of materially useful information was the order of the day.

As to the claim that the provenance of the capital was private and not governmental, Mr. Root has it wrong; the original financing was an admixture of government and private funds. In fact, much of the private funding came from London, which to this day has informational requirements relatively more lax than does New York. . . .

MARK M. FELDMAN
New York, NY

Root replies:

Mr. Feldman's assertions are factually incorrect. Unable to assess accounting transparencies in any of the individual companies listed, U.S. hedge funds in China invest on the basis of probabilities.

Of China's 853 listed companies, only 37 have met standards to register in the United States. Only 9 Chinese companies are listed on the NYSE, and a mere 23 Chinese firms are listed on all North American exchanges. Market capitalization is 24 percent of GDP for China, 27 percent for India, and less than 5 percent for Russia, whereas in the United States it stands at 164 percent. Their share of the world's total market capitalization is 0.84 percent, 0.38 percent and 0.08 percent, respectively, compared to the U.S. share of 49 percent. In Russia the ten largest stocks comprise 80 percent of the domestic equity market. Lacking minority shareholder protection, Russia's market has virtually collapsed. India's local equity market, similarly, is manipulated by a handful of groups.

Finally, U.S. economic growth benefited from a bull market that began in 1815 and lasted into the 1850s. The percentage of total securities held by foreigners was only 19 percent in 1853, including Londoners. Why are SEC capabilities not found in Feldman's countries? The misleading and poorly researched information found in Feldman's text is why U.S. investors make misinformed decisions, taking risks in foreign markets they would never take at home.

NATO and Kosovo:

Ivo H. Daalder rates the first full-blown experiment in humanitarian intervention a success of sorts but acknowledges that "NATO did not adopt the best policy" ("NATO and Kosovo", Winter 1999/2000). It is, in fact, proving to be a failure, because NATO deliberately rejected an earlier, preemptive intervention that could have been consistent with the UN Charter and less violent than hi-tech bombing.

Common sense, international law, regional stability and, not least, humanitarian considerations dictated from early 1998 onwards that Albania's lawless border region with Kosovo be sealed to stem the flow of weapons to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and to close down its training camps. Such humdrum foot soldiering could have had a Security Council mandate since a Russian and Chinese veto would not have been forthcoming. Furthermore, Albania was in no position to object given that it was bankrupt and a client state of NATO .

Imagine the impact on Ulster if the Irish Republic had descended into anarchy with all of its armories looted, and the Irish Republican Army took control of the border areas. Yet the equivalent occurred in Albania.

If only NATO had moved against the KLA in Albania, Kosovo would have been spared much of the ensuing violence and retained its multi-ethnicity. The "terrorist" KLA would not have supplanted the "pacifist" Rugova. Kosovo's Albanians would have also realized that enhanced autonomy—already conceded in principle by Belgrade, providing it did not open the door to secession—was the most that could be achieved. Limited military action in Albania would have reinforced diplomacy's refrain that Yugoslavia's territorial integrity was inviolable. At the very least, valuable time would have been bought.

YUGO KOVACH
The Lord Byron Foundation for Balkan Studies, UK

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The Black Book:

Peter Rutland's notes on *The Black Book of Communism* ("The Arithmetic of Atrocity", Winter 1999/2000) are interesting and contain some apposite (if sometimes carping) detail. But in his obsession with stunted trees he has quite missed the forest.

The real purpose of the book (mentioned by Rutland only in passing) was to lower communism to the same level as Nazism and show how much worse it was in many respects—especially systemically. In this respect the book was an outstanding success, as the uproar over its first publication showed. The pathetic attempts to defend communism by such figures as the French writer Jean Daniel and others only underlined this success.

Rutland is quite wrong to pretend that the "political content" of anti-communism is radically different in France and America. Both rest essentially on the same aversion to totalitarianism of the Left as it developed in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. He is also wrong to suppose (apparently) that few in America are willing to claim redeeming features for communism and mark it several notches above Nazism on the moral scale, or that communism never penetrated American society very deeply. No one who knows anything of 1930s' blue-collar (and artistic and literary) America, or of well-documented communist infiltration of the American government and Civil Service in the 1930s and 1940s, would make such an assumption. Even today, the disgrace of so-called revisionist historians (i.e., those who find excuses for the worst Stalinist horrors) in America's "liberal" academic community gives lie to this assertion. Perhaps that is why Rutland, as a member of that community, dismisses this aspect so quickly.

He will find more interesting detail about the question of communism and Nazism as blood brothers (pun intended) in the recently published *Rouge Brun—le mal du siècle* by the French historian Thierry Wolton. The parallels between Nazism and communism are specific and documented, as is the collaboration and mutual admiration between Stalin and Hitler. Wolton also analyzes in depth the relationship between communism and nationalism.

As for the rest, the record speaks for itself, and is more than relevant to the United States, where communism penetrated far enough to spark off the so-called "witch hunts" of the 1940s and 1950s (for which American academics prefer to blame anyone and everyone but the communists) and derived major sustenance from the "peace" movement of the 1960s and 1970s. The betrayal of major atomic secrets is another example of that penetration. The corruption of "liberal" academia and the world of the arts (an effect which has not vanished, but, so to speak, only changed its spots) is another. A sad business, which Rutland might have done well to mention. *The Black Book* sketches all too vividly so much of what that wretched crew preferred to ignore and/or excuse.

HERB GREER
Manchester, UK

Rutland replies:

On one point I can agree with Mr. Greer—communism had a wide-ranging and negative impact on life in the twentieth century. One such consequence was that liberals started to behave in an illiberal fashion—as reflected in Mr. Greer's letter. Knowing nothing about my opinions, he casts me as a member of the "'liberal' academic community", using a syllogism that Beria (and McCarthy) would recognize: "Rutland is an academic, all academics are liberals, therefore Rutland is a liberal."

Second, Greer praises the book for drawing the comparison between Nazism and Stalinism (something I used to discuss with my late father-in-law, who had been arrested by both regimes). In fact, *The Black Book* offers no such systematic comparison, despite the "uproar" around its publication. Its absence is another of the book's weaknesses. The fact that Greer can praise the book for something it does not do is reminiscent of another Soviet practice: judging a book by its political impact and not by its content.

In short, the victims of communism and Nazism deserve better than to be treated as a political football.

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Global Warming:

Henry Rowen and James Weyant, in their discussion of the means for dealing with global warming, miss one of the key elements ("Staying Cool About Global Warming", Fall 1999). Oil is held to be one of the offending fossil fuels. Production in the United States peaked in 1971; production in many other countries, including the important former Soviet Union, is also past peak; the North Sea is now at peak; and the world as a whole will peak around 2005. This assessment is based on all realistic studies of the resource (see my article in the Spring 1998 issue of *The National Interest*), now being confirmed by the chief executives of two major oil companies and the International Energy Agency, which is the world's premier authority.

By 2050, the production of conventional oil will be down to about what it was in 1960, and according to Shell 50 percent of all energy will by then have to come from renewable sources. This cannot fail to have a major impact on the emissions of carbon dioxide and the economy in general as prices rise from growing Middle East control. It may lead to increased emissions from other, more offensive fuels such as heavy oils, tarsands and coal, or greater risks from radioactivity, but it is surely a critical element in the climate debate that should not be ignored. □

C.J. CAMPBELL
Ballydehob, Ireland

Letters to the Editor

We welcome brief comments (under 300 words) from our readers. Due to space constraints, all letters are subject to editorial revision. Remarks should be addressed to:

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Meanwhile on the Left . . .

Lawrence F. Kaplan

AT THE END of the Cold War, there was a widely held belief that an era of rancorous foreign policy debates had been put behind us. But within a year or two foreign policy intellectuals were again going at each other full bore—over Bosnia, China, NATO expansion, human rights, trade and sundry other topics. It is fair to say that these debates have been dominated by conservatives. Typically, they have taken the form of intramural disputes between "neoconservatives" and "realists" in the pages of journals like *Commentary*, *The Weekly Standard*, *National Review*, *First Things* and *The National Interest*.

Given this dominance, it has been easy to overlook the fact that some interesting things have been happening on the foreign policy Left. True, with the Cold War's denouement many of its members have shifted their gaze to perceived injustices at home, while others have retreated to the academy and, as Paul Hollander has put it, "to new preoccupations like multiculturalism, identity politics, postmodernism, deconstructionism, or radical feminism." But even if somewhat marginalized, there remains a distinctive leftist critique of America's global role.

Or rather several competing leftist critiques. For just as the demise of Soviet communism dissolved the substantial foreign policy consensus on the Right, so did it sunder the Left into competing factions. From these there have emerged four distinct camps, which are of interest both in themselves and because, in a way, they help to explain the divide on the Right.

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The Not-So-New Left

THE FIRST and least interesting of these—what might be labeled the Not-So-New Left—descends from the radicalism of the Vietnam era. In fact, to listen to the rhetoric of its spokesmen is to be transported back to that fractious period, for neither the end of the Cold War nor the advent of humanitarian intervention seems to have made the slightest impression on this group. What motivates its ranks and is central to its position is the conviction that American foreign policy is irredeemably tainted, marred by past involvement in too many suspect conflicts and past support for too many dictators. "This fitful attention to human rights should arouse suspicion", *Nation* columnist Katha Pollitt cautioned her readers during the war in Kosovo. "How likely is it that the United States has suddenly awakened to moral realities of which it was ignorant when it was supporting the Mobutu regime in Zaire, financing the contras in Nicaragua?"

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And even Pollitt was outdone by Tom Hayden, who seized upon the military effort in the Balkans as clear proof that the United States intended to "consolidat[e] an economic and military alliance" of "the former colonial and imperial powers."

For all their coarseness, however, the Haydens and Pollitts of this world are the residue of a vanishing past. Less hidebound commentators on the Left, indeed, have felt constrained to rebuke them for their reflexive opposition to American power. One of these, David Rieff, recently denounced in the pages of *World Policy Journal* "the utopian nihilism of a left that would prefer to see genocide in Bosnia and the mass deportation of the Kosovars rather than strengthen, however marginally, the hegemony of the United States." Likewise, *Nation* columnist Christopher Hitchens has admonished Noam Chomsky for his rote denunciation of American intervention in Kosovo, drawing his attention to the fact that we live "in a new era, where old reflexes serve us less well." These "old reflexes", moreover, have been subjected to some honest, and what for some must be a painful, scrutiny. Casting a glance backward in *Dissent*, for example, Paul Berman has conceded that, on matters of foreign affairs, "we, too, as much as any slippery *Nation* editor or forthright Fidelista or honest Sandinista, had gotten frozen in the past."

The Anti-Globalization Left

THIS IS NOT to say that the post-Cold War Left is losing its gift for demonization. But at least in the case of our next group, new villains have been designated—specifically, the global economy and the multilateral institutions thought to sustain it. As its title indicates, what inspires the Anti-Globalization Left is antipathy toward the process of rapidly expanding trade and financial ties, much of which has been directed at international economic institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). An activist enunciated the camp's logic recently in the pages of *In These Times*: "The WTO is the latest escalation in the whole system of global corporate rule. We need to stop that escalation and then tackle all the other institutions of corporate rule, such as the IMF and the World Bank." *Dissent* contributor Susan George has echoed and escalated this argument, insisting that the imperative of defeating "antidemocratic institutions like the WTO" amounts to nothing less than "an epic battle for civilization and freedom against barbarism and tyranny."

There is an irony here. Phrases like "corporate rule", thought to have been banished forever from the lexicon of American politics along with "class war", have once again returned to favor. Only this time such terms are applied not to American power as wielded in Southeast Asia or Central America, but against the very achievement of economic and political integration that has for generations held the progressive imagination in thrall. So long as a borderless world created by capitalism was a distant and unrealizable goal, it fascinated the Left; now, as it increasingly appears achievable, the Left has turned against it, insisting it is little more than a rapacious corporate scheme. Richard Falk, for one, derides as futile the attempt "to project a visionary cosmopolitanism . . . without addressing the subversive challenge of the market-driven globalism currently being promoted by transnational corporations and banks." Immanuel Wallerstein, too, has grown suspicious of those who tout a global polity as an enlightened aim. "The stance of 'citizen of the world' is deeply ambiguous", he cautions. "It can be used

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just as easily to sustain privilege as to undermine it."

Here we pass through the looking glass. For globalization has driven many on the Left to the extreme of calling for a return to the virtues of "traditional patriotism." While no less a figure than Ralph Nader has lately been hounding executives to begin their meetings with a pledge of allegiance to "the country that bred them, built them, subsidized them and defended them", others, their economic nationalism having mutated into something like political nationalism, have rendered themselves all but indistinguishable from Pat Buchanan.

The Cosmopolitan Left

WHILE ALL this has been going on in one quarter of the Left, among the ranks of a more urbane liberalism—those we might label the Cosmopolitan Left—we find that the universalist idea is actually enjoying a vogue. The stance of this group is exactly the reverse of the Anti-Globalization Left, for here allegiance to the nation-state becomes the very obstacle to universal peace and justice. Thus, cosmopolitan theorist Martha Nussbaum frets—in an essay that traces the notion of universal citizen back to the Stoics—that "patriotism is very close to jingoism", and rues the fact that the persistence of "a morally arbitrary boundary such as the boundary of the nation" still affects political deliberations. Reasoning, too, that economic integration will yield some sort of political confederation, adherents of the cosmopolitan idea generally applaud the expansion of financial and commercial ties. The view has been neatly encapsulated by *New Republic* contributing editor Robert Wright, who enthuses that "political globalization is catching up to economic globalization", which is sure to yield a diffuse version of world government, which, he proclaims, is a very good idea.

But the cosmopolitan world-view has relevance beyond matters of political economy. In fact, its influence has been most evident in the recent transformation of mainstream liberal attitudes toward American military power. The precise explanation for this shift is to be found in the emergence of a doctrine for employing that power in concert with, and on behalf of, the "world community." This, in turn, has offered assurance that the awesome military power of the United States serves not only American interests but the interests of all humanity. Hence, Anthony Lewis, Michael Walzer and other writers who consistently opposed the use of force during the Cold War could support U.S. efforts in Kosovo because, as Walzer approvingly observed, "obviously, U.S. national security is not at stake."[1] And where many on the Right declined to support the air campaign in the Balkans because they failed to discern a national interest there, the endorsement of a liberal Democratic congressman like Paul Wellstone derived precisely from what he claimed to be the absence of such an interest.

Alas, beyond humanitarian intervention, cosmopolitanism has proved next to useless as a blueprint for American military policy. As President Clinton discovered after enshrining a version of it in an ambitious policy known as "assertive multilateralism", national leaders who place their military establishments at the service of the world community do so at their own political peril. For the Clinton administration, indeed, the steep political price paid for the loss of twenty-six American soldiers in Somalia demolished the theory's appeal in one fell swoop.

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[1]For a taxonomy of this camp's views on intervention, see Adam Wolfson, "Humanitarian Hawks", *Policy Review* (December 1999).

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Neoliberalism

THIS brings us to neoliberalism, a creed perfectly embodied by the Clinton team. Its essence is the achievement of cosmopolitan aims—the relief of parochial resentments, the obsolescence of major war, and political interdependence—through decidedly traditional foreign policy means: cutting trade deals, pursuing open markets, and vigorously promoting U.S. business interests abroad. According to the President, focusing on markets makes more than just good economic sense; the United States, he insists, may henceforth build "peace through trade, investment and commerce", the increase of which will "compel the world towards integration."

The prefix "neo", as shortly became apparent, signified something other than revised liberalism. While neoliberalism paid lip service to liberal ideals, it seemed more exactly to be liberalism *shorn* of its ideals, a naked appeal to the satisfaction of human appetites.

Thus, where the Clinton team initially characterized its approach to the international political economy as "neo-Wilsonian", its true inclinations were soon revealed to bear a much closer resemblance to the policies of Harding, Coolidge and Hoover. "The days when we could afford to subordinate our economic interests to foreign policy concerns are long past", declared former U.S. trade representative Mickey Kantor. What the United States must do, in the words of former Clinton Undersecretary of Commerce Jeffrey Garten, is "use all its foreign policy levers to achieve commercial goals." Business first; high-minded aims later.

Comforted by the notion that it could achieve democratization by means of sheer acquisitiveness, the administration promptly turned a blind eye to human rights violations in countries where American corporations happened to do business. And in the name of its ostensible commitment to political liberty, the White House has maintained sanctions against states of marginal commercial significance while actively promoting trade with states like China, which boast no less abysmal human rights records but large markets. As for U.S. efforts to influence the behavior of its adversaries, the neoliberal obsession with trade has, if anything, proved less of a help than a burden, creating an interest in maintaining the status quo and inhibiting America's ability to use its power for political ends. Thus has neoliberalism ensnared the United States in moral complications to which, finally, it provides no adequate response.

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THE DEFECTS of these various stances—the anti-Americanism of the Not-So-New Left; the self-defeating protectionism of the Anti-Globalization Left; the utopianism of the Cosmopolitan Left; the tawdriness of neoliberalism—are numerous and irreparable. Ironically, if it is a principled and sensible liberalism that we seek, we must proceed rightward. And here is where the conservative debate enters the picture.

A centerpiece of that debate has been the charge that neoconservatives are, as Gideon Rose has alleged in these pages, "old-fashioned liberals" whose "ideological passion remains constant and dangerous", and who, therefore, are not "properly conservative." Setting aside the fact that neither America nor for that matter American conservatism qualifies as "properly conservative", the allegation of covert liberalism, with its imputation of ideological heresy, is meant to intrigue. And so it does. But are neoconservative foreign policy prescriptions really comparable to the

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ones just described? Are they, as has been variously charged, "Wilsonian", "ameliorist", "utopian" and "radical"?[2]

The kernel of veracity in the charge is that, properly understood, neoconservatives are the heirs and custodians of American exceptionalism, a doctrine that does indeed possess certain liberal attributes. Neoconservatives may even be, as their critics contend, Wilsonian. But if so, theirs is a Wilsonianism of a decidedly less grandiose sort than that practiced by Wilson himself. For while neoconservatives do echo his democratic idealism, they vehemently reject his artless universalism—this distinction being precisely what sets them apart from their intellectual relations on the Left.

In the neoconservative telling, the United States does not advance its ideals solely, or even principally, for the benefit of others. To begin with, a straightforward argument from self-interest is offered: As democracies rarely if ever wage war against one another and generally sustain political freedoms, it follows that the more democratic the world becomes the more likely it is to be congenial to America. An even more crucial distinction between neoconservatives and contemporary liberals derives from the former's insistence that theirs is the natural expression of an unabashed and explicitly ideological sense of national pride. While most Americans are disinclined to think of themselves as possessing an ideology, neoconservatives remain keenly attentive to the fact that the United States is a "creedal" nation. That creed—democracy—may be universal in its applicability, but it is equally America's particular inheritance, what Hans Morgenthau has described as a "nationalistic universalism."

What does this distinction mean in practical terms? For one, unlike contemporary liberalism, neoconservatism does not deny the primacy of, or put ideology before, national security. Where the former prefers that peace and political liberty be fostered within international organizations and through the expansion of trade and finance, neoconservatives look to American power. And while a deep-seated reluctance to judge others and lingering skepticism about America's founding ideals lead the Left to emphasize humanitarian aid over the promotion of democracy, no such misgivings inhibit neoconservatives. Accordingly, where members of the Cosmopolitan Left reluctantly concede that America may indeed need to play the role of global policeman, for neoconservatives it must be much more than that. "A policeman gets his orders from higher authorities", writes Joshua Muravchik, "but in the community of nations there is no authority higher than America."

If this religious attachment to the American idea distinguishes neoconservatives from liberals, it equally sets them apart from contemporary realists. True, neoconservatives concur with certain staples of the realist catalogue—above all, the view of the international environment as a fundamentally anarchical and dangerous place. Where the two camps part company is over the neoconservative claim that this condition may be, and indeed has been, tamed through the vigorous application of American power, American ideals, and the ameliorative possibilities of both.

Now, whether—or to what extent—those ideals should be injected into America's foreign policies is a question about which there remains ample room for disagreement. This country's leaders

[2]How the term neoconservatism became shorthand for democratic idealism is a mystery, as some of the foremost neoconservatives—Irving Kristol and Charles Krauthammer, for example—are also prominent realists. Indeed, the arguments on the Right have largely been *between* neoconservatives.

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have for two centuries been engaged in a serious and legitimate debate on this very question, with one side arguing that America's international conduct should exemplify its values and the other arguing that, while its ideals indeed possess universal significance, America could best inspire others through their practice at home. To their credit, realists have for years invoked the latter understanding of American exceptionalism to disprove the contention that theirs is an alien creed. Alas, the denial of America's exceptional inheritance has lately become a leitmotif of the realist complaint against neoconservatism, much as it was coming from the Left thirty years ago.

So it is true: while hardly liberal in the current sense of the word, neoconservatism is also not properly conservative. Which makes it well suited to a country that is neither. □

Tough Choices

The scene is New York on a typical day during the spring, after NATO began bombing Serbia. I receive two phone calls, both from activist friends, colleagues on the left. One asks that we rush to a certain street corner to protest the bombing; the other indicates a different street corner to support the humanitarian intervention to save the Albanian Kosovars from genocide. Each side speaks in a language that retreats to a pre-1989 predictability, describing a binary world—language that could have been used at any time in the last thirty years. Each proclaims underlying values I share.

—Ann Snitow, *Dissent* (Fall 1999)

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"CHINA is too big to be ignored, too old to be slighted, too weak to be appeased, and too ambitious to be taken for granted."

—Zbigniew Brzezinski

"KEY Harvard-Chubais transactors were quintessential chameleons. To suit the transactors' purposes, the same individual could represent the United States in one meeting and Russia in the next—and perhaps himself at a third—regardless of national origin."

—Janine R. Wedel

"TODAY's consensus is facile and complacent, reflecting a lack of concern about the possibility of another major war, let alone agreement about how to prevent one."

—Paul Wolfowitz

"BENIGN HEGEMONY is something of a contradiction in terms."

—Kenneth N. Waltz

"CHURCHILL was a journalist by profession, half American by provenance, was known to drink heavily and to be surrounded by a disreputable crowd of *roués*. Chamberlain, on the contrary, was respectable, upright and efficient."

—Sir Michael Howard

"GORBACHEV invited him to come to Russia in a spontaneous public gesture to which this normally bold Pope unaccountably failed to respond. . . . There is no telling what the impact might have been if the first Slavic Pope had visited Russia as it was recovering the Christian base of its culture."

—James H. Billington

"THE PRESENT danger is that the United States will, either in a fit of absentmindedness, or parsimony, or indifference, allow the international order that it created and sustains to collapse."

—Robert Kagan and William Kristol

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